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INTRODUCTION 
On February 10, 2017, the United States marked the fiftieth anniversary of 
the ratification of the Constitution’s Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Born out of 
the tragedy of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, the 
Amendment’s provisions on presidential succession and inability have 
supplied stability in other times of crisis during the Amendment’s first fifty 
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years.1  Nevertheless, scholars and experts have identified remaining flaws 
and gaps in the presidential succession system.2 
Fordham University School of Law has a history of promoting solutions to 
flaws in the nation’s presidential succession system,3 beginning with John D. 
Feerick’s October 1963 Fordham Law Review article, “The Problem of 
Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?”4 and his two articles 
during the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s drafting and refortification.5  The law 
school then hosted a symposium on the vice presidency in 1976.6  In the past 
decade, Fordham has continued its engagement on presidential succession 
issues through a symposium in 20107 and a Presidential Succession Clinic 
that published a report with reform recommendations in 2012.8 
In August 2016, Fordham University School of Law formed a second 
Presidential Succession Clinic that met during the 2016 to 2017 academic 
year.  Like the first Clinic, the second studied the succession system and 
interviewed experts to develop reform proposals.9  Accordingly, the Clinic 
advances recommendations with respect to six areas:  (1) contingency 
planning in the executive branch for presidential succession, (2) the 
presidential line of succession, (3) simultaneous inabilities of the President 
and Vice President and sole inabilities of the Vice President, (4) Congress’s 
responsibility to resolve disputes over the President’s capacity under Section 
4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, (5) health disclosures of presidential 
candidates, and (6) political party rules for replacing and removing 
presidential candidates. 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A. 
 2. See, e.g., Past Reform Recommendations on Presidential Succession, FORDHAM L. 
ARCHIVE SCHOLARSHIP & HIST. (2017), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi 
?article=1005&context=twentyfifth_amendment_reports [https://perma.cc/44MK-DWZ8]. 
 3. See generally Twenty-Fifth Amendment Archive, FORDHAM L. ARCHIVE SCHOLARSHIP 
& HIST. (2017), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_archive/ 
[https://perma.cc/8F7A-FEEW]. 
 4. See generally John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress 
Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1963) (discussing the issues of presidential 
succession). 
 5. See generally John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 173 (1965); John D. Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the 
Problems of Presidential Succession and Inability, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 457 (1964). 
 6. Symposium on the Vice Presidency:  American Bar Association Special Committee on 
Election Reform, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 707 (1977). 
 7. See generally Symposium, The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in the 
21st Century:  Filling the Gaps and Clarifying the Ambiguities in Constitutional and 
Extraconstitutional Arrangements, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 775 (2010) (discussing the history of 
presidential succession and the ambiguities that surround it). 
 8. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Ensuring the 
Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2012) 
[hereinafter First Clinic Report] (explaining the history of presidential succession in the United 
States and providing recommendations for improvement). 
 9. This Clinic focused on some of the same topics as the first Clinic but it also explored 
new issues.  This Clinic reached the same conclusions as the first on some issues, while it 
differed on others. 
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This Report begins with an overview of the presidential succession system, 
particularly the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provisions.  The remaining Parts 
describe the Clinic’s recommendations. 
The first Part of the Clinic recommendations discusses executive branch 
contingency planning and outlines two steps the White House can take to 
prepare for presidential inabilities.  First, the Clinic recommends that the 
President determine in advance situations where the Vice President should 
act as President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s voluntary transfer 
provision at Section 3.  Such a “prospective declaration of inability” would 
allow for transfers of power during emergencies when the Cabinet is not 
easily reachable to invoke Section 4, the Amendment’s other inability 
provision.  Second, given that some Presidents have suffered psychological 
ailments, the Clinic recommends that the White House add a mental health 
professional to the unit of doctors and nurses who care for the President. 
The next Part describes the Clinic’s recommendations for improving the 
line of succession.  These recommendations address concerns about the 
successors’ qualifications and other vulnerabilities.  The Clinic’s 
recommendations include removing legislators and lower-ranking Cabinet 
members as well as adding some officials chosen by the President and 
confirmed by Congress. 
Next, the Report addresses the absence of procedures for vice presidential 
inabilities and “dual inabilities” of the President and Vice President.  These 
gaps could prevent orderly transfers of power.  The Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment’s inability provisions are unusable when the Vice President is 
incapacitated.  In a “dual inability” situation, there is no formal way for the 
next person in the line of succession to take power.  The Clinic recommends 
statutes that mirror the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s inability provisions to 
address these gaps. 
The following Part considers how Congress would carry out its 
responsibility to resolve a dispute over whether the President is unable.  
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gives Congress twenty-one days 
to “decide” whether the President is unable if the President contests an 
inability determination by the Vice President acting with the Cabinet or 
another body.  The Clinic recommends the creation of a joint committee of 
both Houses of Congress.  This Part also anticipates legal disputes that may 
arise in such a scenario. 
The final two Parts focus on succession and inability issues during 
presidential campaigns.  Some candidates have been less than forthcoming 
with the public about their health histories.  To encourage more transparency, 
the Clinic recommends that a commission develop guidelines for what 
candidates should disclose about their health.  Last, the Report considers the 
political parties’ procedures for replacing presidential candidates.  The 
parties’ current replacement rules lack detail and have unclear provisions for 
situations where candidates become unable.  The Clinic recommends making 
the vice presidential nominee the designated successor to the nomination in 
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the final weeks of the campaign and creating a provision for candidate 
inabilities. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION SYSTEM 
The presidential succession system comprises constitutional and statutory 
provisions as well as procedures created by the executive branch.  Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution makes the Vice President the first 
successor to the presidency and authorizes Congress to establish procedures 
for presidential succession.10  Congress has in turn passed three laws to 
establish lines of succession.11 
The Twelfth Amendment provides the procedure for electing the President 
and Vice President, modifying the original Electoral College system in 
Article II.12  The Twentieth Amendment provides for succession when the 
President-Elect has died or failed to qualify before the inauguration.13  The 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment addresses presidential succession and disability as 
well as a vice presidential vacancy.14 
A.  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment has four sections.  Section 1 provides that 
the Vice President becomes President if the President dies, resigns, or is 
removed from office.15  There had been ambiguity about the Vice President’s 
status upon succession that may have deterred at least one Vice President 
from acting as President when the President was disabled.  When President 
James Garfield “wavered between life and death” for nearly three months in 
1881 after he was shot, Vice President Chester Arthur did not assume the 
powers and duties of the presidency in part out of fear that doing so would 
permanently displace the President, regardless of whether he recovered.16  
Section 1 clarifies this ambiguity by stating the only contingencies where the 
Vice President becomes President.  The Amendment’s inability provisions in 
Sections 3 and 4 make clear that the Vice President merely acts as President 
when the President is disabled.  Section 1 was used in 1974 when Vice 
 
 10. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; see also infra Appendix A. 
 11. See infra Part III.A; see also infra Appendix C. 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 13. Id. amend. XX. 
 14. Id. amend. XXV; see also infra Appendix B. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1. 
 16. See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 10–11 (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT]; see 
also Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-Presidential Behavior in Disability Crisis:  The Case of Thomas 
R. Marshall, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, at 37, 46–47 (stating that this ambiguity may have 
reduced the likelihood of Vice President Thomas Marshall acting as President following 
President Woodrow Wilson’s stroke in 1919).  The ambiguity over the Vice President’s status 
was highlighted by the controversy surrounding Vice President John Tyler’s claim that he 
became President—not Acting President—upon President William Henry Harrison’s death in 
1841. See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS:  THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 
89–98 (1965) [hereinafter FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS]. 
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President Gerald R. Ford succeeded to the presidency upon President Richard 
Nixon’s resignation.17 
Section 2 allows the President to fill a vacancy in the vice presidency 
subject to approval from majorities of both houses of Congress.18  Prior to 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the country was without a Vice 
President on many different occasions, the length of these vacancies totaling 
over thirty-seven years.19  These examples illustrate the need for this 
provision.  Additionally, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s presidential 
inability procedures, which do not work without a Vice President, created 
another reason to curtail vacancies.  Section 2 provided stability during the 
Watergate era, allowing the nominations of Gerald Ford after Vice President 
Spiro Agnew’s resignation in 1973 and Nelson Rockefeller after Ford’s 
succession to the presidency in 1974.20 
Section 3 allows the President to temporarily transfer presidential powers 
and duties to the Vice President by submitting a written declaration to the 
Speaker of the House and Senate President pro tempore that he is “unable” 
to discharge those powers and duties.21  The President can resume his powers 
and duties by submitting a written declaration to the same officials.  
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush have invoked Section 3 
before undergoing medical procedures under general anesthesia.22  White 
House officials have also considered invocations of Section 3 before 
 
 17. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 165. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. 
 19. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 314. 
 20. See Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  Lessons in Ensuring 
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 972 (2010).  President Nixon may have 
been more hesitant to resign had Gerald Ford not been Vice President.  Without a Vice 
President, Nixon’s resignation could have led to a change in party control of the White House 
because Democratic Speaker of the House Carl Albert would have been the successor. See id. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3. 
 22. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 196–98, 202–03. 
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Presidents Jimmy Carter,23 Ronald Reagan,24 George H.W. Bush,25 Bill 
Clinton,26 and Barack Obama27 underwent medical procedures. 
Section 4 allows for the President’s temporary removal if he is unable or 
unwilling to invoke Section 3.28  The Vice President becomes Acting 
President when he and either a majority of the Cabinet29 or “such other body 
as Congress may by law provide”30 submit a declaration to the Speaker of 
the House and Senate President pro tempore stating that the President is 
“unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”31  If the President 
declares to the Speaker and President pro tempore that he is able, he returns 
to the powers and duties of the presidency, unless the officials who initiated 
his removal submit another declaration within four days reasserting that the 
President is unable.  In that case, Congress has twenty-one days to “decide 
the issue.”32  Unless two-thirds of both houses of Congress vote that the 
 
 23. The White House drafted documents for invoking Section 3 when it appeared that 
President Carter might have hemorrhoid surgery under general anesthesia. See Robert J. 
Lipshutz & Office of the White House Counsel, Documents from Carter’s Contemplated Use 
of Section 3, FORDHAM L. ARCHIVE SCHOLARSHIP & HIST. (1978), 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_executive_materials/4/ 
[https://perma.cc/HG5Y-AFBA]. 
 24. Before President Reagan underwent surgery for skin cancer, the White House 
Counsel’s Office drafted a declaration for President Reagan to invoke Section 3, but the 
surgery did not ultimately require general anesthesia. See ABA Division for Public Services, 
The 25th Amendment, Vice Presidential Selection and Remaining Issues in Presidential 
Succession, YOUTUBE (May 18, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-5k17y7RpE 
[https://perma.cc/6EB6-GHCJ] (sharing comments of former White House Counsel Arthur B. 
Culvahouse Jr. at timestamp 20:15). 
 25. When President Bush developed an irregular heartbeat, the White House considered 
invoking Section 3 if he needed to undergo a procedure to return his heartbeat to normal. See 
FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 200–01. 
 26. The Senior White House Physician was prepared to recommend invocation of Section 
3 if the knee surgery that President Clinton underwent in 1997 required general anesthesia. 
See E. Connie Mariano, In Sickness and in Health:  Medical Care for the President of the 
United States, in MANAGING CRISIS:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT 
83, 93 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000). 
 27. The White House contemplated invoking Section 3 before President Obama 
underwent a colonoscopy in 2010. See Fresh Air, NPR (Apr. 18, 2017), 
http://www.npr.org/programs/fresh-air/2017/04/18/524534726/fresh-air-for-april-18-2017 
[https://perma.cc/3T4R-AA97] (interviewing former White House Deputy Chief of Staff 
Alyssa Mastromonaco at timestamp 14:00); see also Press Release, The White House, Release 
of the President’s Medical Exam (Feb. 28, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/the-press-office/release-presidents-medical-exam [https://perma.cc/7Q5A-
9ZB8]. 
 28. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 29. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment refers to the Cabinet as the “principal officers of the 
executive departments.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.  The legislative history indicates that 
acting department heads can participate in declaring the President unable. See FEERICK, 
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 117–18. 
 30. Congress has never created another body to participate in the Section 4 process, but, 
in 2017, several lawmakers proposed legislation to do so. See H.R. 1987, 115th Cong. (2017); 
see also H.R. 2093, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 32. Id. amend. XXV, § 4. 
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President is unable, the President returns to power.33  Section 4 is the only 
provision of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that has never been invoked. 
B.  Defining Inability in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers purposely avoided a specific 
definition of inability.34  They intended the Amendment’s text to be flexible 
“to cover all cases in which some condition or circumstance prevents the 
President from discharging his powers and duties.”35  While instances of 
physical or mental illness are clearly covered,36 it extends to “any imaginable 
circumstance[]” in which the President “is unable to perform the powers and 
duties of that office.”37  For example, the President’s inability to reliably 
communicate with the White House could qualify.38  The next two Parts 
discuss the various situations in which Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment could be invoked. 
1.  Inability in Section 3 
Invocation of Section 3 might be appropriate in certain circumstances 
when invocation of Section 4 would not be appropriate.39  That the President 
determines when to invoke Section 3 might allow for a broad interpretation 
of “unable,” while Section 4, which does not involve the President in the 
determination, might cover a narrower set of circumstances.40  The 
President’s broad discretion finds further support in Section 3’s structure, 
such as its lack of a review provision like the one in Section 4.41 
The framers of the Amendment envisioned that the President would use 
Section 3 when ill or undergoing surgery42 but did not intend to confine its 
invocations to those contingencies.43  The limits of Section 3 were explored 
during the Watergate era when members of Congress were among those to 
 
 33. Id. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 34. See Richard H. Poff, Presidential Inability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
STUDENT L.J., Dec. 1965, at 15, 17.  Representative Poff, a key drafter of the Amendment, 
noted that attempting to define inability could have resulted in a “rigidity which, in application, 
might sometimes be unrealistic.” Id. 
 35. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 112. 
 36. See id. at 60. 
 37. See KENNETH R. CRISPELL & CARLOS F. GOMEZ, HIDDEN ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 
209–10 (1988). 
 38. See Presidential Inability:  Hearings on H.R. 836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 240 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Herbert 
Brownell, former Att’y Gen.). 
 39. Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  The Power 
of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 26, at 165, 195–96. 
 40. See Adam R.F. Gustafson, Presidential Inability and Subjective Meaning, 27 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 459, 461–62 (2009). 
 41. See id. at 472–73.  But see FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 
113 (“Section 3 does not provide a mechanism for a President to step aside temporarily without 
justification, thereby neglecting his duties.”). 
 42. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 113. 
 43. See Gustafson, supra note 40, at 480–81. 
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suggest that President Nixon might use the provision to step aside 
temporarily.44  In practice, however, Section 3 has been used for brief 
surgical procedures, as the Amendment’s framers predicted. 
2.  Inability in Section 4 
Senator Birch Bayh, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s principal sponsor in 
the Senate, said Section 4 was for situations where the President is “unable 
to make or communicate his decisions as to his own competency.”45  
Representative Richard Poff, a manager of the Amendment in the House, said 
Section 4 inability included physical impairments that prevented the 
President from declaring himself unable and psychological impairments that 
prevented the President from “mak[ing] any rational decision, including 
particularly the decision to stand aside.”46  Notably, the circumstances under 
which an inability arises could be relevant to using Section 4; a fleeting 
inability, such as a brief surgical procedure, would not merit the use of 
Section 4 absent an immediate need for exercise of presidential powers.47  
Perhaps in response to the ambiguity of inability under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, some doctors, including a former White House physician, have 
developed criteria to assist inability determinations.48 
II.  EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s provisions must be supplemented by 
contingency planning in the White House.  The military and presidential 
administrations over the past half-century have planned extensively for 
ensuring continuity of government and providing the President exceptional 
healthcare.49  The Clinic’s recommendations focus on two of the many 
aspects of this planning.  First, the Clinic recommends that the contingency 
 
 44. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 161; see also John D. 
Feerick, The Way of the 25th, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 1973), http://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/ 
13/archives/the-way-of-the-25th.html [https://perma.cc/YNY9-U6NQ]. 
 45. 111 CONG. REC. 3282 (1965). 
 46. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 117. 
 47. See id. at 116–17 (quoting Senator Bayh as saying, “[a] President who was 
unconscious for 30 minutes when missiles were flying toward this country might only be 
disabled temporarily, but it would be of severe consequence when viewed in the light of the 
problems facing the country”). 
 48. See HERBERT L. ABRAMS, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT:  CONFUSION, DISABILITY, 
AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF 
RONALD REAGAN 221–27 (1992); PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY 276–82 (James F. Toole & Robert 
J. Joynt eds., 2001); Lawrence C. Mohr, Medical Consideration in the Determination of 
Presidential Disability, in MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 26, at 97, 99. 
 49. See generally GARRETT M. GRAFF, RAVEN ROCK:  THE STORY OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT’S SECRET PLAN TO SAVE ITSELF—WHILE THE REST OF US DIE (2017) (exploring 
the government’s planning since World War II for surviving catastrophic attacks); Mariano, 
supra note 26, at 83–95; Presidential Succession, C-SPAN (July 2, 2009), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?287421-1/presidential-succession [https://perma.cc/Q25W-DFE3] (recording 
the remarks of former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism 
Frances F. Townsend on the steps taken by President George W. Bush’s administration for the 
continuity of government); Interview with John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intelligence Agency, 
in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2016). 
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planning for uses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should provide for 
emergencies where there is no time to coordinate with the Vice President and 
Cabinet to invoke Section 4.  The President should create a prospective 
declaration of inability to allow for quick transfers of power in these 
situations.  Second, the White House should ensure that the President has 
adequate access to mental healthcare.  Ideally, the White House Medical Unit 
should add a mental health professional to achieve this goal. 
A.  Prospective Declarations 
Before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provided legal mechanisms for 
transferring power during presidential inabilities, Presidents created 
arrangements that allowed their Vice Presidents—or the Speaker of the 
House, in one of President Johnson’s arrangements—to discharge the powers 
and duties of the presidency if they ever became disabled.50  These “letter 
agreements,” which President Dwight D. Eisenhower first implemented,51 
authorized the Vice President to unilaterally declare the President unable.  
For example, the letter agreement between President Eisenhower and Vice 
President Richard Nixon only required Nixon to engage in “such consultation 
as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances” before declaring the 
President unable and proceeding to act as President.52 
The agreements, while exercises in responsible and creative contingency 
planning, lacked a firm legal basis.53  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
provided a major improvement by explicitly authorizing certain officials to 
declare the President unable.54  However, by requiring that the Vice President 
work with the Cabinet, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gave the Vice President 
significantly less discretion than the letter agreements. 
Section 4’s expanded procedural requirements could be an issue in a 
narrow set of emergency circumstances where power must be transferred 
immediately.  To account for such contingencies, Presidents and their Vice 
Presidents should develop arrangements similar to those in the letter 
agreements but that are consistent with the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  The 
Clinic believes that Section 3’s broad grant of authority to the President for 
determining inabilities allows the President to create a prospective 
declaration of inability giving the Vice President authority to initiate a 
transfer of power in certain predetermined circumstances.55 
 
 50. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 53–54; see also Arthur 
Krock, The Johnson-Humphrey Agreement Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1965, at 28. 
 51. See Jeffrey Frank, What If a President Loses Control?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/what-if-a-president-loses-control 
[https://perma.cc/7N8U-8GHG]. 
 52. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 53. 
 53. See id. at 54.  Perhaps the only legal argument in support of the letters was based on 
the contingent grant-of-power theory. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 55. The first Presidential Succession Clinic proposed that the President, Vice President, 
and any official who acted as President create prospective declarations.  This recommendation 
was intended as a remedy for the absence of procedures for declaring (1) the President unable 
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1.  The Need for Prospective Declarations 
Prospective declarations of inability are needed for situations where 
presidential action must be taken immediately but the President is unable and 
the Section 4 decision-makers are not easily reachable to participate in 
declaring the President unable.  The assassination attempt on President 
Ronald Reagan in 1981 and the events of September 11, 2001, illustrate some 
of the challenges that may arise during a crisis when the President is unable 
for medical or other reasons, such as communication failures. 
On March 30, 1981, President Reagan was shot after giving a speech56 and 
was placed under general anesthesia for surgery shortly thereafter.57  
Officials resisted invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment due to political 
considerations and concern that it would alarm the public.58  But its use might 
not have even been possible because Vice President George H.W. Bush, an 
indispensable participant, was flying aboard Air Force Two without reliable 
communications.59 
In the White House Situation Room, Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
declared to several officials that “constitutionally” he was in charge until 
Bush arrived back at the White House.60  Haig was the highest-ranking 
member of the Cabinet, but the Speaker of the House was the next person in 
the line of succession after the Vice President.61  He eventually repeated his 
claim to the press after the Deputy Press Secretary was unable to say who 
was in charge at the White House.62 
The uncertainty over who was discharging presidential powers and duties 
became even more significant when those in the Situation Room learned that 
two Soviet submarines were patrolling “unusually close to the United States,” 
reducing their nuclear missile range by two minutes.63  The nuclear football 
had already been brought into the Situation Room,64 but there was confusion 
over who, if anyone, had authority to launch nuclear missiles.  Secretary of 
 
when there is not an able Vice President, (2) the Vice President unable, and (3) an Acting 
President unable. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 31–34.  We focus on presidential 
prospective declarations as a part of planning for emergencies and further explore the legal 
issues that their use presents. 
 56. See ABRAMS, supra note 48, at 48–54. 
 57. See id. at 62–63. 
 58. See id. at 94; DEL QUENTIN WILBER, RAWHIDE DOWN:  THE NEAR ASSASSINATION OF 
RONALD REAGAN 164 (2011).  Additionally, many officials were either not aware of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment or did not have a detailed understanding of it.  White House 
Counsel Fred Fielding remembers seeing Cabinet members’ “eyes glaze[] over” when he 
mentioned the Amendment. See Fred F. Fielding, An Eyewitness Account of Executive 
“Inability,” 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 827 (2010). 
 59. ABRAMS, supra note 48, at 83–90.  The line of communication with Air Force Two 
was neither secure nor strong enough for verbal communication. See WILBER, supra note 58, 
at 132. 
 60. WILBER, supra note 58, at 167 (quoting Secretary of State Haig as stating, “[s]o the 
helm is right here . . . [a]nd that means right here in this chair for now, constitutionally, until 
the Vice President gets here”). 
 61. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012). 
 62. WILBER, supra note 58, at 174–75. 
 63. Id. at 175. 
 64. Id. at 161.  The football contains plans for launching nuclear missiles. Id. at 12. 
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Defense Casper Weinberger asserted that he had command authority in 
Bush’s absence, but Haig disagreed, arguing that they had sufficient ability 
to communicate with Bush.65  However, since the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
had not been invoked and there was ambiguity about the devolution of the 
command authorities, it was unclear if Bush had the authority.66 
Twenty years later, on September 11, 2001, technological limitations 
aboard Air Force One impaired President George W. Bush’s ability to 
communicate with key officials as the government scrambled to respond to 
the terrorist attacks.67  Bush recalled that he was able to instruct Vice 
President Cheney, who was at the White House, to authorize the military to 
shoot down hijacked airliners.68  But other communications were limited; he 
was not able to reach some senior officials, including the Defense Secretary, 
and his line to the White House “kept cutting off.”69  Additionally, he relied 
on spotty local television signals as primary sources of information about the 
attacks.70  Bush later said the “woeful communications technology on Air 
Force One” was one of his “greatest frustrations on September 11.”71 
Several Cabinet members were also traveling on 9/11.  Secretary of State 
Colin Powell was traveling back to the United States from Peru and did not 
have reliable communications for nearly the entire flight.72  Treasury 
Secretary Paul O’Neill was in Japan and Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
who was travelling domestically, was blocked from landing in Washington, 
D.C., by air traffic control.73 
Unlike with the Reagan assassination attempt, the need to transfer 
presidential power was less clear on September 11.  But both crises illustrate 
the challenges that exist when the President is incapacitated or hard to reach 
during emergencies.  Profoundly consequential decisions might be impeded 
or made by individuals who are not clearly authorized to do so. 
 
 65. Id. at 177. 
 66. Id. at 177 (“We can get the [V]ice [P]resident any time we want.”). 
 66. See Kiron K. Skinner, Governing During a Time of Crisis:  The Reagan Presidency, 
in WHEN LIFE STRIKES THE PRESIDENT:  SCANDAL, DEATH, AND ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 
257, 272–75 (Jeffrey A. Engel & Thomas J. Knock eds., 2017). 
 67. See Garrett M. Graff, ‘We’re the Only Plane in the Sky,’ POLITICO (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230 
[https://perma.cc/VA8C-YJC4]. 
 68. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 40–41 (2004). 
 69. Id. at 40. 
 70. See GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 130 (2011); GRAFF, supra note 49, at 352. 
 71. BUSH, supra note 70, at 130. 
 72. GRAFF, supra note 49, at 352. 
 73. William M. Arkin & Robert Windrem, Secrets of 9/11:  New Details of Chaos, Nukes 
Emerge, NBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/9-11-anniversary/ 
secrets-9-11-new-details-chaos-nukes-emerge-n645711 [https://perma.cc/T9UX-YD87]. 
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2.  Prospective Declarations as 
Part of White House Contingency Planning 
Prospective declarations would fit within the larger plans for uses of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which historically have involved predrafted 
letters and agreements between the President and Vice President.  This 
planning has become increasingly extensive over the fifty years since the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification.  The Reagan assassination attempt 
may have been an impetus for expanding the planning.  About six years 
earlier, the White House Counsel’s Office produced a memorandum for 
President Ford outlining gaps and ambiguities that executive action could 
address,74 but the memorandum’s recommendations were not 
implemented.75  The memorandum indicated that the only previous planning 
for uses of the Amendment consisted of a “verbal agreement” between Vice 
President Ford and President Nixon.76 
In the early days of the Reagan administration, White House Counsel Fred 
Fielding drafted letters for invoking Sections 3 and 4.77  Although not used 
after the assassination attempt, the letters have become a key aspect of 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment contingency planning.  The letters are kept in 
various places, including the White House Counsel’s office, presidential 
emergency facilities, Air Force One and Two, and inside the nuclear football, 
which travels with the President and Vice President.78 
In the first months of President George H.W. Bush’s term, he called a 
meeting with his wife, Vice President Dan Quayle, the White House 
Physician, the Chief of Staff, the White House Counsel, and several others to 
discuss how and when the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should be invoked.79  
The Bush administration ultimately implemented a mostly secret plan that 
was later adopted by the Clinton administration.80 
 
 74. Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg, White House Assoc. Counsel, to the 
President Regarding the 25th Amendment (Aug. 21, 1975), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=twentyfifth_amendment_executive_materials 
[https://perma.cc/M6EU-GJXB]. 
 75. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 340. 
 76. See Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg to President Ford, supra note 74, at 4. 
 77. Fielding, supra note 58, at 828. 
 78. Id. at 828–29; Interview with Dr. Connie Mariano, former Dir., White House Med. 
Unit, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Apr. 25, 2017) (stating that the letters were carried in the nuclear 
football during her tenure in the White House Medical Unit between 1992 and 2001); Robert 
Windrem & William M. Arkin, Donald Trump Is Getting the Nuclear Football, NBC NEWS 
(Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/donald-trump-getting-nuclear-
football-n709006 [https://perma.cc/26W8-YDWF] (noting that the Vice President and 
Secretary of Defense “get their own ‘footballs’”). 
 79. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 200.  A year earlier, the 
Miller Center’s Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had 
recommended a similar meeting. See MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 5 (1988).  In 
1995, the Working Group on Presidential Disability echoed the Miller Commission, 
recommending that “[a] formal contingency plan for the implementation of the Amendment 
should be in place before the inauguration of every president.” See PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, 
supra note 48, at 529. 
 80. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 200–02. 
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An aspect of the plan involved “secret letters of understanding” between 
the President and Vice President “indicating their intentions for transfer of 
power in case of illness.”81  Whether the same plan was adopted by the 
administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama is unclear, 
but it is known that both had comprehensive contingency plans.82  One 
significant aspect of the Bush administration’s contingency planning 
involved a resignation letter presigned by Vice President Dick Cheney, who 
instructed his counsel to give the letter to President Bush to decide whether 
to submit it if Cheney became disabled.83 
3.  How Prospective Declarations Would Work 
If a prospective declaration of inability is not part of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment contingency plans, the White House should consider including 
it.  A prospective declaration would encompass situations where the 
President is unable to communicate his inability, including as a result of 
unconsciousness, kidnapping, technological failure, or cyberattack. 
The President should execute the prospective declaration pursuant to 
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment because the Amendment provides 
the only legal means for transferring presidential powers and duties.  To make 
the declaration effective under Section 3, the President must sign it.  He 
should do so at the start of his term.  The declaration would be similar to the 
declarations that President George W. Bush used to invoke Section 384 but 
would list in advance the situations requiring its use.  The Vice President’s 
Office should hold copies of the declaration for transmission to the Speaker 
of the House and Senate President pro tempore on behalf of the President if 
a situation detailed in the letter occurs.  The President might also consider 
giving copies of the letter to other parties, such as the Chief of Staff and 
White House Counsel. 
The White House should inform the public if the President creates a 
prospective declaration.  The best way to announce the arrangement would 
be for the President and Vice President to publicly describe how the 
 
 81. Gustafson, supra note 40, at 477. 
 82. See ABA Division for Public Services, supra note 24 (providing comments of former 
White House Counsel Robert Bauer and discussing Twenty-Fifth Amendment planning during 
the Obama administration at timestamp 24:45); Presidential Succession, supra note 49; The 
Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in the 21st Century, Part 2, FORDHAM L. 
ARCHIVE SCHOLARSHIP & HIST. (Apr. 16, 2010), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth 
_amendment_photos/4/ [https://perma.cc/4LBQ-RB2V] (providing the comments of former 
Senator Birch Bayh and describing a conversation with a top advisor to President Obama 
regarding the plan for uses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment at timestamp 1:19:00). 
 83. DICK CHENEY WITH LIZ CHENEY, IN MY TIME:  A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL MEMOIR 
319–22 (2011). 
 84. See Discharge Letter from President George W. Bush to Congressional Leaders (July 
21, 2007), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75568 [https://perma.cc/K4Q7 
-VG9N]; Discharge Letter from President George W. Bush to Congressional Leaders (June 
29, 2002), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/acting_presidents.php [https://perma.cc/3435-
9Q33]. 
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prospective declaration works.  Awareness of the declaration would 
encourage the public to view uses of it as legitimate.85 
4.  Legal Basis for Prospective Declarations 
Prospective declarations of inability pursuant to Section 3 are consistent 
with the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s provisions and purposes.  The 
Amendment is predicated on the need to “always [have] someone authorized 
to exercise presidential powers and duties.”86  John Feerick, who assisted in 
the Amendment’s drafting, said its “goal [is] providing a framework for 
succession and inability without unduly binding the hands of those officials 
who may have to confront those incidents.”87  Prospective declarations 
leverage the Amendment’s flexibility to serve its purpose of promoting 
continuity. 
During the congressional hearings on the amendment in 1965, Attorney 
General Nicholas Katzenbach opined that prospective declarations under the 
proposed section 3 were consistent with the text of the amendment and that 
they would essentially continue the “letter agreement[s]” between the 
President and Vice President.88  He also indicated that interpreting the 
amendment to bar arrangements like the letter agreements might discourage 
the President and Vice President from “work[ing] out a system of 
continuity.”89  John Feerick has also supported prospective declarations, 
asserting that they “can survive constitutional scrutiny and are consistent with 
the legislative history of the Amendment.”90 
Although the Clinic agrees with this assessment, there are noteworthy 
arguments that prospective declarations are not compatible with the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment.  The declarations strain the language of Section 3 in two 
ways, as Adam R.F. Gustafson has observed.91  First, the Amendment uses 
the present tense, stating that the President’s declaration of inability should 
state that “he is unable to discharge the powers” of the office.92  Present tense 
language could imply that the President must declare his disability when it 
happens, not prospectively.93  However, the temporal component of the text 
can be resolved by evaluating the declaration as it is transmitted to Congress, 
not as it was signed—meaning the President is not declared incapacitated 
 
 85. The Miller Commission and the Working Group on Presidential Disability 
emphasized the importance of public awareness of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and plans 
for its use. See MILLER COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 79, at 2; PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra 
note 48, at 535. 
 86. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 982. 
 87. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 293. 
 88. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 98 (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, 
Att’y Gen.). 
 89. See id. at 96. 
 90. John D. Feerick, Presidential Inability:  Filling in the Gaps, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 
2014, at 11, 24. 
 91. See Gustafson, supra note 40, at 479. 
 92. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 93. See Gustafson, supra note 40, at 479. 
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until the declaration is transmitted to the Speaker and President pro 
tempore.94 
Second, the text states that the President is to transmit the letter, creating 
some difficulty with a third party, even the Vice President, submitting a letter 
on his behalf.95  However, the President can arguably use a designated proxy 
to submit the letter on his behalf as he is unlikely to personally submit the 
declaration under any circumstance.96 
The Miller Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment recommended against using prospective declarations because, 
the Commission concluded, “Section 4 provides the exclusive means for 
determining a presidential inability once the President loses the capacity to 
make that determination for himself.”97  An invocation of Section 3 through 
a prospective declaration would require the Vice President “at least to 
confirm that the President’s current condition fits within the description of 
inability provided in the President’s prospective declaration.”98  The Vice 
President’s exercise of this discretion comes close to unilaterally declaring a 
presidential disability, something the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not 
explicitly authorize the Vice President to do. 
But, as the Miller Commission acknowledged, prospective declarations are 
not necessarily unconstitutional.99  The Clinic submits that they are 
consistent with the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring 
executive branch continuity.  To ensure that there is always someone capable 
of legitimately exercising presidential powers, the executive branch must be 
empowered to engage in comprehensive contingency planning for a wide 
range of exigencies.100  Prospective declarations provide the only means for 
transferring power under certain emergency circumstances. 
Furthermore, prospective declarations find support in the President’s broad 
latitude to determine how Section 3 is used.  As discussed, the President can 
declare himself unable in a wide range of circumstances that extends beyond 
 
 94. See id. at 479 n.85 (stating “the tense of the verb ‘be’ is not, considered alone, 
dispositive” (quoting Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 125 (1964))). 
 95. See id. at 477–78. 
 96. See, e.g., Scott Conroy, Polyps Found in Bush Colonoscopy, CBS NEWS (July 21, 
2007, 9:18 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/polyps-found-in-bush-colonoscopy/ 
[https://perma.cc/EA34-83ES] (noting that the letters invoking Section 3 were sent via 
facsimile). 
 97. MILLER COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 79, at 7. 
 98. Gustafson, supra note 40, at 478. 
 99. MILLER COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 79, at 7 (“The Commission regards the 
constitutionality of such agreements as an open question since there is no definitive authority 
on the point.”). 
 100. President George H.W. Bush’s contingency plans exemplified this approach by 
planning “for implementing the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment under every 
conceivable circumstance . . . so that [his] approval as to how to deal with a situation could be 
gotten before the situation actually presented itself.” FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, 
supra note 16, at 230; see also Mohr, supra note 48, at 104 (“I am confident in stating that the 
authors of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment wanted to ensure that there is appropriate opportunity 
for both judgment and flexibility in implementing the provisions of the Amendment in any 
given situation.”). 
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the narrower set of circumstances in which Section 4 is appropriate.101  
Additionally, the President has flexibility to determine the manner in which 
Section 3 is invoked.  Although Section 3’s text suggests that invocation 
occurs when the President’s inability declaration is signed or transmitted, at 
least some of the Amendment’s framers intended Section 3 to allow the 
President “to name the hour when the Vice President is to begin as Acting 
President.”102  This is the approach President Reagan took when he invoked 
Section 3 in 1985; his inability declaration stated that power would be 
transferred when he went under anesthesia for surgery.103  The President also 
is likely able to specify the period of time during which the Vice President 
will act as President.104 
Finally, there is an inherent protection against abuse built into the 
prospective declaration system.  Because the transfer of power occurs under 
Section 3, the President can simply reclaim power at any time without 
challenge.105  Abuse of prospective declarations is unlikely due to the close 
working relationships between recent Presidents and Vice Presidents106 and 
the prospect of negative political consequences for a usurping Vice President.  
Accordingly, prospective declarations provide efficient transfer of power and 
continuity of government in the event of an emergency with minor risk of 
abuse. 
B.  Providing for Mental Healthcare in the White House 
Mental illness might be cause for invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  
More than half of Americans will develop some form of mental illness during 
their lives, even if that illness is short term.107  Sometimes even physical 
illnesses will trigger psychological distress.108  Presidents have not been 
immune from this reality.  One study estimated that nearly a third of the 
nation’s first thirty-seven Presidents suffered some form of mental illness 
while in office.109 
 
 101. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 102. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 113. 
 103. See Discharge Letter from President Ronald Reagan to Congressional Leaders (July 
13, 1985), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38883 [https://perma.cc/ 
3QP9-U9JA]. 
 104. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 113. 
 105. See Gustafson, supra note 40, at 478. 
 106. See JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY:  THE PATH TO 
SIGNIFICANCE, MONDALE TO BIDEN 4 (2016). 
 107. Benedict Carey, Most Will Be Mentally Ill at Some Point, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 7, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/07/health/most-will-be-mentally-ill-at-
some-point-study-says.html [https://perma.cc/6NT4-TAN4]. 
 108. See ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY:  ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE 
WHITE HOUSE 255 (1998) (discussing the possible impact of President Reagan’s cancer 
surgery on his decision-making abilities).  President Dwight D. Eisenhower became depressed 
after having a heart attack in 1955. See Robert E. Gilbert, Eisenhower’s 1955 Heart Attack:  
Medical Treatment, Political Effects, and the “Behind the Scenes” Leadership Style, POL. & 
LIFE SCI., June 2008, at 2, 3–4.  President Chester A. Arthur suffered depression as an effect 
of Bright’s disease. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 10. 
 109. See GILBERT, supra note 108, at 255. 
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A President suffering an acute episode of mental illness, such as clinical 
depression, may use Section 3.  Invocation of Section 4 might be appropriate 
where a President experienced mental illness or cognitive decline without 
realizing it or where a President recognized his mental illness but refused to 
step aside.110  Even if the President suffers a mental health episode that is not 
serious enough to merit use of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, his ability to 
carry out his duties could be impaired.111 
Given the possible impact of mental illness on the presidency, the White 
House Medical Unit should add a mental health professional to assess 
whether the President is experiencing mental illness or impairment, and, 
where possible, to provide treatment. 
1.  Mental Illnesses and Impairments in Presidents 
The history of mental illness in the White House provides a compelling 
case for the addition of a mental health professional.  President Calvin 
Coolidge is among the Presidents who seem to have suffered mental illness.  
His time in office provides a particularly dramatic lesson on the dangers of 
untreated mental illness. 
President Coolidge’s son passed away suddenly in 1924, which created 
ripples throughout Coolidge’s presidency.112  The once decisive and active 
President withdrew from his responsibilities after his son’s death.  He stopped 
engaging with Congress, delegated near total authority to his Cabinet, 
displayed frighteningly little knowledge of serious issues, and slept for as 
long as fifteen hours a day.113  Although Coolidge was never formally 
diagnosed, scholars like Robert Gilbert have observed that he exhibited all of 
the hallmarks of major depression set out by the American Psychiatric 
Association.114 
Coolidge’s depression left the country without an involved President in a 
time when domestic and international turmoil demanded a strong leader.115  
 
 110. See ROSE MCDERMOTT, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, ILLNESS AND DECISION MAKING 
33–44 (2008). 
 111. Alex Thompson, The President Needs a Psychiatrist, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/presidential-psychiatrist-mental-health-
congress-214597 [https://perma.cc/EZ5Y-MWXX]. 
 112. Jack Beatty, President Coolidge’s Burden, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2003), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/president-coolidges-burden/303175/ 
[https://perma.cc/C23F-QS2B]. 
 113. Robert E. Gilbert, Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  The 
Difficulties Posed By Psychological Illness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 863 (2010) [hereinafter 
Gilbert, Difficulties Posed By Psychological Illness]; see also Robert H. Ferrell, Calvin 
Coolidge, the Man and the President, in CALVIN COOLIDGE AND THE COOLIDGE ERA 132, 140–
41 (John Earl Haynes ed., 1998).  See generally Robert E. Gilbert, The Dysfunctional 
Presidency of Calvin Coolidge, 4 WHITE HOUSE STUD. 371 (2004) [hereinafter Gilbert, The 
Dysfunctional Presidency] (discussing the troubled presidency of Calvin Coolidge). 
 114. Robert E. Gilbert, Calvin Coolidge’s Tragic Presidency:  The Political Effects of 
Bereavement and Depression, 39 J. AM. STUD. 87, 93–94 (2005); see also supra note 113 and 
accompanying text. 
 115. Gilbert, supra note 114, at 100–07. 
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His “abandonment” of the presidency included a failure to confront the 
economic instability that preceded the Great Depression.116 
Other Presidents have struggled psychologically at trying times for the 
nation.  President Franklin Pierce lost his son in a train accident shortly before 
he took office, resulting in a depression that may have hindered attempts to 
defuse the tensions precipitating the Civil War.117  During the Civil War, 
President Abraham Lincoln fell “into deep depression” after losing his 
eleven-year-old son, but, having wrestled with depression for most of his life, 
Lincoln avoided the crippling effects experienced by Coolidge and Pierce.118  
A century later, President Lyndon B. Johnson was so paranoid during the 
Vietnam War that he carried fake statistics on the war in his pocket, 
prompting two aides to secretly consult psychiatrists.119 
Given the prevalence of substance abuse in the United States,120 it is not 
surprising that several Presidents may have suffered from such disorders.  
President John F. Kennedy received regular injections from a doctor known 
to give patients his own cocktail of steroids and amphetamines.121  At the 
height of Watergate, President Richard Nixon, who was known for his low 
alcohol tolerance,122 reportedly drank so heavily that he was unable to 
respond to at least one international crisis.123  Even without drinking, Nixon 
was sometimes paranoid and exhibited other signs of psychological 
distress.124  Days before Nixon’s resignation, his Defense Secretary became 
“so worried that Nixon was unstable that he instructed the military” to 
disregard certain orders from the President, especially those involving 
nuclear weapons.125 
 
 116. Gilbert, Difficulties Posed By Psychological Illness, supra note 113, at 864–65. 
 117. Id. at 855–60. 
 118. Id. at 869–70.  See generally JOSHUA WOLF SHENK, LINCOLN’S MELANCHOLY:  HOW 
DEPRESSION CHALLENGED A PRESIDENT AND FUELED HIS GREATNESS (2005) (discussing 
President Lincoln’s depression and his coping mechanisms). 
 119. Evan Osnos, How Trump Could Get Fired, NEW YORKER (May 8, 2017), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/08/how-trump-could-get-fired 
[https://perma.cc/PH8R-23WR]. 
 120. See Nationwide Trends, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (June 2015), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/nationwide-trends 
[https://perma.cc/M72A-43BL]. 
 121. See Rose McDermott, The Politics of Presidential Medical Care:  The Case of John 
F. Kennedy, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, at 77, 84. 
 122. See WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER:  A BIOGRAPHY 263 (1992). 
 123. See Daniel J.T. Schuker, Burden of Decision:  Judging Presidential Disability Under 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30 J.L. & POL. 97, 107–17 (2014); see also MCDERMOTT, supra 
note 110, at 186.  One of Nixon’s advisors said he was “ranting and raving—drunk in the 
middle of [a] crisis.” SEYMOUR M. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER:  KISSINGER IN THE NIXON 
WHITE HOUSE 88 (1983). 
 124. See Jeremi Suri, A Depressed and Self-Destructive President:  Richard Nixon in the 
White House, in WHEN LIFE STRIKES THE PRESIDENT:  SCANDAL, DEATH, AND ILLNESS IN THE 
WHITE HOUSE, supra note 66, at 233, 233–55; John A. Farrell, The Year Nixon Fell Apart, 
POLITICO (Mar. 26, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/john-farrell-
nixon-book-excerpt-214954 [https://perma.cc/EQ3Z-CXKN]. 
 125. Robert D. McFadden, James R. Schlesinger, Willful Aide to Three Presidents, Is Dead 
at 85, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/us/politics/james-r-
schlesinger-cold-war-hard-liner-dies-at-85.html [https://perma.cc/N9UX-UFPJ]. 
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Whether President Reagan, who was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease 
after leaving office, experienced cognitive impairment during his time in 
office has been the subject of significant speculation.  In 1987, several White 
House aides believed Reagan was “so depressed, inept and inattentive” that 
invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might be appropriate.126  Others 
at the White House then have flatly rejected that Reagan was impaired,127 
and mental status examinations that Reagan took beginning in 1990 showed 
no signs of Alzheimer’s until 1993.128  However, a 2015 study of Reagan’s 
public comments found evidence of cognitive decline.129  And Reagan’s son, 
Ron, wrote in a 2011 book that the question of whether his “father suffered 
from the beginning stages of Alzheimer’s while in office more or less 
answers itself,”130 though he later said he was referring to the disease’s 
organic aspects.131 
Following cancer surgery in 1985, Reagan may have experienced 
cognitive impairment that impacted decisions leading to the Iran-Contra 
scandal.  Robert Gilbert has opined that Reagan may have prematurely 
resumed power after the surgery and that the aftereffects of anesthesia and 
the traumatic nature of cancer surgery could have diminished his faculties as 
key decisions leading to the scandal were made.132 
2.  Monitoring and Treating Mental Illness in the White House 
Mental health issues fall within the ambit of the White House Medical Unit 
(WHMU), which manages the President’s healthcare.133  Military medical 
personnel staff the WHMU, except for rare occasions when Presidents 
 
 126. Jack Nelson, Removal of Reagan from Office Suggested to Baker:  Report Said Aides 
Described President As Depressed, Inept in Wake of Iran-Contra Crisis, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 
1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-09-15/news/mn-2825_1_president-reagan 
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 127. See Lawrence K. Altman, While Known for Being Forgetful, Reagan Was Mentally 
Sound in Office, Doctors Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/ 
05/us/while-known-for-being-forgetful-reagan-was-mentally-sound-in-office-doctors-
say.html [https://perma.cc/WLY5-4NYW]; A.B. Culvahouse, Bill O’Reilly’s ‘Killing Reagan’ 
Revives Debunked Myth, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2015, 10:01 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/opinion/2015/10/09/b-culvahouse-shameful-reagan-myth-making-resurges-
column/73612714/ [https://perma.cc/CJL5-SSS9]. 
 128. Lawrence K. Altman, When Alzheimer’s Waited Outside the Oval Office, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/health/views/22reagan.html 
[https://perma.cc/LBJ6-YGPU]. 
 129. See Lawrence K. Altman, Parsing Ronald Reagan’s Words for Early Signs of 
Alzheimer’s, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/health/ 
parsing-ronald-reagans-words-for-early-signs-of-alzheimers.html [https://perma.cc/WS2Q-
2Q6N]. 
 130. Robert E. Gilbert, The Politics of Presidential Illness:  Ronald Reagan and the Iran-
Contra Scandal, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, 58, 69 (quoting RON REAGAN, MY FATHER AT 
100:  A MEMOIR 218 (2011)). 
 131. See Altman, supra note 128. 
 132. See Gilbert, supra note 130. 
 133. See Mariano, supra note 26, at 90–91. 
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choose private physicians to lead the unit.134  The WHMU is also responsible 
for the health of White House staff, the Vice President, and the President’s 
and Vice President’s families.  Whenever necessary, the WHMU consults 
with specialists,135 including psychologists.136 
These consultations are not necessarily for the President’s treatment.  The 
WHMU frequently encounters mental health issues in treating staff members.  
For example, Dr. Connie Mariano, a retired Navy Rear Admiral who led the 
WHMU during the Clinton administration, recalled that staffers commonly 
suffered ailments like anxiety and insomnia,137 but some even became 
suicidal.138 
Although it is publicly unknown whether Presidents have joined the ranks 
of those seeking mental health treatment through the WHMU, the unit’s 
personnel are well positioned to recognize any behavioral issues affecting the 
President.  White House physicians, particularly the doctor who leads the 
WHMU, have frequent contact with the President.  The WHMU has an office 
in the White House, and its physicians and medics travel with the 
President.139  Dr. Mariano observed that she was “one of only a small number 
of doctors in America who actually got to observe a patient doing his job.”140 
The WHMU plans extensively for uses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
including providing input on when invocation is required.141  Additionally, 
commissions on presidential inability have emphasized the importance of the 
President’s physician having a prominent role in the White House, reasoning 
that it would help to ensure that information about the President’s health will 
reach the Twenty-Fifth Amendment decision-makers.142  There are 
indications that administrations have been receptive to these suggestions.143  
Finally, White House physicians have indicated that they are well aware of 
the political nature and sensitivities of their role,144 an especially important 
consideration when dealing with mental health issues. 
 
 134. Dr. Lawrence K. Altman, For the White House Physician, a Sensitive Role with a 
Public Patient, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/08/science/ 
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 135. Interview with Dr. Lawrence Altman, Glob. Fellow, Wilson Ctr., in N.Y.C., N.Y. 
(Oct. 19, 2016). 
 136. Interview with Dr. Connie Mariano, supra note 78. 
 137. CONNIE MARIANO, THE WHITE HOUSE DOCTOR 212–13 (2010). 
 138. See id. at 233; Jerrold M. Post, Broken Minds, Broken Hearts, and the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment:  Psychiatric Disorders and Presidential Disability, in MANAGING CRISIS, supra 
note 26, at 111, 114–15. 
 139. See White House Doctors:  The President’s Shadow, CNN (Sept. 24, 2004), 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/09/23/wh.doctors/ [https://perma.cc/6G2F-XG4J]. 
 140. MARIANO, supra note 137, at 192. 
 141. See id. at 123–25; Mariano, supra note 26, at 92–93. 
 142. See MILLER COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 79, at 2; see also PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, 
supra note 48, at 254–56. 
 143. See Mariano, supra note 26, at 92 (noting that the Clinton administration’s plans for 
using the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gave the President’s physician “a significant role . . . in 
determining medical disability and in advising the administration about the president’s 
health”). 
 144. See, e.g., Mohr, supra note 48, at 107. 
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However, White House physicians have not always been appropriately 
consulted.  For example, Dr. John Hutton did not evaluate President Reagan 
before he reassumed his powers following his 1985 surgery.145  Hutton later 
stated it was “absurd” to allow Reagan to retake power so quickly without 
consultation.146  When President George W. Bush used Section 3 before 
undergoing colonoscopies, the WHMU took an improved approach.  Bush 
completed neurological baseline testing before and after the procedures to 
ensure that he was not impaired before retaking power.147 
Despite the lack of permanent mental health professionals at the White 
House, Presidents are not without emotional support.  Their families and staff 
surely provide valuable advice and companionship.  Additionally, Presidents 
have historically relied on religious figures for guidance and counseling, 
especially during times of turmoil.148 
President Kennedy and his wife had a long-lasting relationship with 
Cardinal Richard Cushing, who presided over their wedding and the funeral 
for their infant son, Patrick, while President Kennedy was in office.149  In 
1998, after President Clinton admitted to an “inappropriate relationship” with 
White House intern Monica Lewinsky, he assembled “a circle of two or three 
ministers to serve as a team of personal spiritual advisers.”150  One of the 
ministers said they would focus on helping Clinton understand “what went 
wrong with him personally.”151  President Obama had a group of five 
religious leaders that he called upon at various times.152 President Donald 
Trump had televangelist Paula White, who he had known for fifteen years, 
deliver the invocation at his inauguration.153 
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3.  Discussion of Recommendations 
The existing approaches to recognizing, diagnosing, and treating mental 
illness in the White House would be improved by the addition of a full-time 
mental health professional to the WHMU.  If the ability to make a rational 
decision is central to the determination of presidential inability,154 then it is 
critical to consider the insights of mental health professionals.155  Whereas 
physicians are best equipped to diagnose physical illness, a psychiatrist or 
psychologist is best equipped to diagnose psychological impairment.  A 
mental health professional in the WHMU is preferable to the outside mental 
health professionals consulted by the White House.  The sensitivities 
surrounding the President’s psychological health could discourage external 
consultations and a staff mental health professional might have more frequent 
interactions with the President. 
While a mental health professional in the WHMU could provide critical 
insight into whether invocations of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment are 
appropriate, perhaps just as importantly he or she could treat the President.  
A transfer of power would be needlessly disruptive if treatment could address 
the President’s malady.156  And, often, untreated psychological struggles do 
not require invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,157 but treatment 
could improve the President’s well-being and performance.158  Furthermore, 
a mental health professional could assist in treating White House staff 
members who experience psychological challenges.  The White House’s 
willingness to appoint a mental health professional could also help 
destigmatize mental illness in society. 
Realistically, however, Presidents and their advisors would probably resist 
the addition of a mental health professional to the WHMU out of concern that 
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 155. Assessment always takes social and contextual factors into consideration.  Every 
individual is embedded in a complex set of social networks, beginning with the family of 
origin and continuing into adolescence and adulthood.  These networks play a significant role 
in the development of intelligence, social judgment, and prosocial orientation.  
Neuropsychological evaluation can accurately assess core domains of cognitive functioning, 
insight, and judgment at a single time point of evaluation and over time but findings are always 
interpreted in light of social contexts, including race, class, ethnicity, gender, and other forms 
of social membership. See Interview with Dr. David Marcotte, Assistant Professor of 
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it would raise questions about the President’s mental health.  There are 
several possible approaches to addressing such concerns.  First, the White 
House could consider adding a mental health professional without 
announcing it to the public.159  But, if word of the addition leaked, it may 
raise more suspicions than a public announcement would have.  Second, the 
White House could describe a mental health professional as a “performance 
coach” or “consultant,” a common practice in the business world.160  Third, 
the sitting President could sign an executive order or Congress could pass 
legislation providing for the addition of a mental health professional to the 
WHMU at the start of the next presidential term to avoid the public 
interpreting the move as a reflection of the current President’s mental health. 
Finally, if the White House finds it infeasible to place a mental health 
professional in the WHMU, officials should take alternative measures to 
ensure that mental health issues are addressed.  Those steps could include 
bolstering the current policy of consulting outside psychologists and 
psychiatrists and facilitating communication between the WHMU and the 
President’s staff and family regarding the President’s health needs. 
III.  THE LINE OF SUCCESSION 
Planning for presidential succession and inability in the executive branch 
is essential, but there are significant limitations on the unilateral actions of 
those in the White House.  As discussed in this and the following two Parts, 
Congress must act to bolster key aspects of the presidential succession 
system. 
This Part addresses steps Congress should take to reform the line of 
presidential succession.  It first discusses the history that led to the current 
line of succession.  Next, this Part describes potential weaknesses in the line 
of succession’s composition.  The following Part outlines the Clinic’s 
proposal to remove legislators and some lower-ranked Cabinet officials from 
the line of succession and add four “Standing Successors” nominated by the 
President and confirmed by Congress.  Given the political challenges of 
implementing this proposal, some alternative recommendations are also 
discussed.  This Part concludes by advancing other reform proposals relating 
to the line of succession, including steps to address the vulnerability to the 
line of succession on Inauguration Day. 
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A.  History and Current Line of Succession Statute 
Congress has used its constitutional authority in Article II, Section 1, 
Clause 6 to appoint presidential successors after the Vice President on three 
occasions.  The first line of succession Congress created, the Presidential 
Succession Act of 1792, included only two officials:  the Senate President 
pro tempore followed by the Speaker of the House.161  A proposal to place 
Cabinet members in the line of succession had been thwarted by partisan 
politics.162  Federalists in the Senate blocked the proposal because it would 
have placed Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, a Democratic-Republican, 
first in the line.163 
Nearly one hundred years later, President James A. Garfield’s 
assassination in 1881 exposed a major flaw in the Act of 1792.  When Vice 
President Chester A. Arthur succeeded to the presidency, there was no 
President pro tempore or Speaker of the House, leaving the country without 
any presidential successors.164  The line of succession was also vacant after 
Vice President Thomas A. Hendricks’s death in 1885.165  Those incidents 
and concerns that legislators are not constitutionally eligible successors led 
Congress to pass the Presidential Succession Act of 1886.166  This Act 
removed legislators and listed only Cabinet members in the order of the 
creation of their respective departments.167 
After President Harry S. Truman succeeded to the presidency in 1945 
following President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s death, he called on Congress to 
return legislators to the line of succession.168  His succession left the vice 
presidency vacant, making the Secretary of State the first successor to the 
presidency.169  The prospect of the Secretary of State’s succession troubled 
Truman because he believed that unelected officials should not become 
President.170  He also opposed the President handpicking his successors, as 
happens with Cabinet succession.171 
Congress acted on Truman’s concerns, passing the Presidential Succession 
Act of 1947.  The statute creates a line of succession that begins with the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, followed by the President pro 
tempore of the Senate, and then the Cabinet secretaries.172  The Speaker was 
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legislative line of succession are not surprising considering its origins . . . .  [T]he idea of 
placing congressional leaders after the Vice President [in the line of succession] was born not 
out of logic, but partisanship.”); see also Feerick, supra note 90, at 12–13. 
 163. See RONAN, supra note 162, at 123–24. 
 164. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 38. 
 165. Id. at 40. 
 166. See id. at 40–42. 
 167. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1, 1 (repealed 1947). 
 168. RONAN, supra note 162, at 129–30. 
 169. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 42–43. 
 170. See Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Succession to the 
Presidency (June 19, 1945), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12201 
[https://perma.cc/87X5-8MTJ]. 
 171. See id. 
 172. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2012). 
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placed first in the line of succession largely because President Truman 
suggested that members of the House, who choose the Speaker, are closer to 
the people than Senators.173  The Act of 1947, which Congress has updated 
to include Cabinet secretaries whose departments were created after 1947, is 
the current line of succession law.174 
B.  Problems with the Composition 
of the Line of Succession 
This Part discusses the problems raised by the inclusion of legislators and 
some lower-ranked Cabinet secretaries in the line of succession. 
1.  Problems Posed by Legislators in the Line of Succession 
a.  Preparedness of Legislators 
Legislators may not be well equipped to immediately assume the powers 
and duties of the presidency.175  The Speaker of the House is among the 
“Gang of Eight” congressional leaders who receive classified intelligence 
briefings from the executive branch.176  Additionally, Speakers are typically 
members who have had long tenures in the House and have developed 
significant knowledge of domestic and international policy matters.  But the 
Speaker’s responsibilities of crafting and promoting legislation and engaging 
in various political activities, particularly fundraising, may often be all 
consuming.  These responsibilities could prevent the Speaker from focusing 
on the wide range of international affairs and executive branch functions that 
would likely be relevant if the Speaker succeeded to the presidency, as his 
succession would probably result from a crisis, such as a major terrorist 
attack. 
The Senate President pro tempore, who is the longest serving Senator of 
the majority party,177 might be less qualified than the Speaker to serve as 
President.  Like the Speaker, the President pro tempore almost necessarily 
 
 173. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 41. 
 174. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1).  The Cabinet secretaries are listed in the line of succession in 
the following order:  (1) Secretary of State, (2) Secretary of Treasury, (3) Secretary of Defense, 
(4) Attorney General, (5) Secretary of the Interior, (5) Secretary of Agriculture, (6) Secretary 
of Commerce, (7) Secretary of Labor, (8) Secretary of Health and Human Services, (9) 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, (10) Secretary of Transportation, (11) 
Secretary of Energy, (12) Secretary of Education, (13) Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and (14) 
Secretary of Homeland Security. Id.  Successors still need to meet constitutional qualifications 
for the Presidency.  If a cabinet member were a naturalized citizen or under thirty-five, for 
example, he or she would not be eligible for succession. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 175. See John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability:  Before and After the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 945 (2011). 
 176. See Mark Hosenball, FBI’s Comey Meets with Top U.S. Congressional Leaders, 
REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-documents-idUSKB 
N16G2PY [https://perma.cc/F6EJ-3BDL]. 
 177. Glossary, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/president_ 
pro_tempore.htm [https://perma.cc/6PYE-RMUC] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (defining 
President pro tempore). 
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has developed a wealth of policy knowledge, but the President pro tempore 
is not part of the “Gang of Eight,” which leaves him less informed on 
significant national security matters.  Additionally, the President pro 
tempore, while a distinguished legislator, is typically in the twilight of his 
career.  For example, the current President pro tempore, Orrin Hatch, is 
eighty-three years old and has been considering retirement.178  From the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification in 1967 until 2015, the President pro 
tempore has, on average, been seventy-seven and a half years old at the start 
of his term and more than eighty-three years old at the end of his term.179  
Twelve Senators have held the position during this period.180 
b.  Perverse Incentives 
There are a number of perverse incentives that may influence legislators in 
scenarios in which their succession to the presidency is possible.  In some 
cases, their status as successors could motivate them to improperly support 
the President’s impeachment181 or temporary removal under Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.182  The risk of legislators abusing their 
impeachment powers may have increased in the modern era because the close 
partnerships between recent Presidents and Vice Presidents make it more 
likely that both would be implicated in the same scandals, allowing 
legislators to attempt to remove them at the same time.183  While such a coup 
is unlikely,184 the incentive will remain so long as legislators remain part of 
the line of succession. 
Conversely, and more likely, a legislator may be reluctant to temporarily 
act as President because he or she would have to resign from legislative 
office.  The Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause and the line of succession 
statute require legislators to resign from Congress before assuming the 
presidency.185  In cases of temporary disability or incapacitation, the Speaker 
or President pro tempore may be unwilling to resign to be the Acting 
 
 178. See Rebecca Savransky, Hatch:  I May Retire If Romney Runs to Replace Me, HILL 
(Mar. 29, 2017, 8:43 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/326263-hatch-i-may-retire-if-
romney-runs-to-replace-me [https://perma.cc/Z9R3-8CA3]. 
 179. RONAN, supra note 162, at 127. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law 
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 122 (1995) (“The structure of the Constitution simply 
does not permit participants in the impeachment process to have such a direct, immediate, 
personal stake in the outcome.”). 
 182. See id. at 127–28. 
 183. See Whet Smith & Mark J. Rozell, American Presidential Succession Is a Ticking 
Time Bomb, HILL (Aug. 1, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-
administration/344824-american-presidential-succession-is-a-ticking-time-bomb 
[https://perma.cc/HNA3-T5JS]. 
 184. This would not be unprecedented.  During President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment 
in 1868, President pro tempore Benjamin Wade, who would have become President upon 
Johnson’s removal, had already selected his new Cabinet when he voted to remove Johnson. 
Id. at 123. 
 185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, 
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”); 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b) 
(2012). 
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President for a short time.  This leads to the troubling potential of successors 
refusing the presidency in times of crisis, creating further unpredictability 
during a time when stability is important. 
c.  Party Continuity 
With legislators in the line of succession, there is a possibility for a 
destabilizing change in party control of the White House if there is neither an 
able President nor Vice President.186  Beginning with the Nixon 
administration in 1969 “and continuing through the end of the Obama 
administration, every President except Jimmy Carter” has spent at least some 
of his term with Congress controlled by the opposing political party.187  
Between 1969 and 2016, the President and Speaker have been of different 
parties for thirty-four of the forty-seven years, more than 70 percent of the 
time.188  Accordingly, under this succession statute, voters might elect a 
President of one party but end up with a President from the other party. 
d.  Democratic Legitimacy 
Some argue that having legislators as successors promotes democratic 
values because legislators are elected.189  As discussed, President Truman 
feared that a line of succession of only Cabinet secretaries allowed the 
President to undemocratically nominate his “immediate successor in the 
event of [his] own death or inability to act.”190  But Cabinet members are not 
without democratic legitimacy; the President, who is nationally elected, 
unlike legislators, appoints them.  The President’s national election makes 
him the most politically representative figure of the national constituency.191  
Additionally, Cabinet members must be confirmed by the Senate,192 which 
allows input from the people through their Senators.  In contrast, local 
constituencies choose the Speaker and President pro tempore.  The House 
selects the Speaker,193 but the President pro tempore automatically receives 
the position based on seniority within the party.194  Furthermore, President 
Truman only advocated for including legislators with the assumption that a 
special election would occur shortly after a legislator’s succession in the 
 
 186. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS:  THE 
CONTINUITY OF THE PRESIDENCY 39 (2009). 
 187. See RONAN, supra note 162, at 128. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 45. 
 190. See Truman, supra note 170. 
 191. Amar & Amar, supra note 181, at 130 (citing Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative 
Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 58–70 (1995)) 
 192. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 193. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
 194. Glossary, supra note 177. 
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event of death, resignation, or removal of the President,195 but the current 
statute does not provide for a special election.196 
e.  Questionable Constitutionality 
The Clinic did not focus its analysis of the line of succession on the 
constitutional eligibility of legislators because others have considered the 
issue in detail.197  However, there are compelling arguments that legislators 
are not among the “Officer[s]” whom Congress is authorized to appoint as 
successors.198  On the one hand, as the first Clinic summarized, 
“Congressional leaders and scholars have interpreted the term ‘Officer’ to 
mean ‘Officer of the United States,’ which refers only to executive branch 
officers nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.”199  On the 
other hand, Professor Joel K. Goldstein has argued that evidence that the 
Constitution bars legislators from being successors is inconclusive.200  Given 
these opposing arguments, it is clear that legislators’ constitutional status in 
the line of succession is at least questionable, which is another mark against 
their inclusion.  Officials whose succession would not be unambiguously 
legitimate should not be part of the line of succession. 
f.  The Bumping Provision 
The line of succession’s “bumping” provision prevents a Cabinet member 
from acting as President if there is an able Speaker or President pro tempore.  
If one of those officials is selected or becomes able after suffering an 
inability, a Cabinet member acting as President must step aside to allow the 
Speaker or President pro tempore to act as President.201 
The bumping provision is flawed on constitutional and practical grounds.  
It may be unconstitutional because it calls for multiple successors in certain 
situations despite language in the Constitution’s Succession Clause that 
seems to contemplate only one successor.202  The practical problems are 
threefold.  First, multiple successors over a short period could sow further 
instability during a crisis.203  Second, the provision could allow legislators 
effectively to elect the President by choosing a new Speaker or President pro 
tempore.204  Third, if the President’s party did not control the House and 
 
 195. Truman, supra note 170 (“No matter who succeeds to the Presidency after the death 
of the elected President and Vice President, it is my opinion he should not serve any longer 
than until the next Congressional election or until a special election called for the purpose of 
electing a new President and Vice President.”). 
 196. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012). 
 197. See, e.g., First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 36–40. 
 198. Id. at 37. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 1019–22. 
 201. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2). 
 202. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 42. 
 203. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 16, at 268–69 (noting that the bumping 
procedure could result in several Presidents within a short period of time). 
 204. Amar & Amar, supra note 181, at 135 (citing William F. Brown & Americo R. 
Cinquegrana, The Realties of Presidential Succession:  “The Emperor Has No Clones,” 75 
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Senate, either chamber could initiate a shift in party control by selecting a 
Speaker or President pro tempore. 
2.  Qualifications of Cabinet Members in the Line of Succession 
There are a number of qualities that the Clinic believes make an official 
well suited to assume the presidency:  awareness of executive branch 
activities, familiarity with administrative activities, knowledge of foreign 
affairs, a working relationship with the President and the rest of the Cabinet, 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and an ability to command worldwide 
respect.  While this is not an exhaustive list, it is fair to expect successors to 
satisfy these qualifications to some degree.  While Cabinet secretaries are 
undoubtedly qualified for their specific posts, the Clinic’s study suggests that 
some may lack necessary qualifications to assume the presidency. 
After studying the secretaries of the last several administrations, it is clear 
that looking at resumes of officials who have held Cabinet positions provides 
limited insights into which Cabinet secretaries are suited for the line of 
succession.  The backgrounds of the individuals who have held certain 
Cabinet posts vary widely, with some, but not others, holding clearly 
sufficient qualifications to succeed to the presidency.  For example, President 
Obama’s first Secretary of Commerce, Gary Locke, had held several 
positions that likely equipped him to serve as a President if the need arose.  
He had served in the Washington House of Representatives, as King County 
Executive, and as Governor of Washington.205  In contrast, the next official 
President Obama nominated to the post, John Bryson, did not have similar 
experience in elected office.  He helped found the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, held leadership positions in California’s water and utility agencies, 
and served as director of several major corporations.206  While he was 
inarguably qualified to be Secretary of Commerce, Secretary Bryson had no 
governing experience. 
Because of the difficulty predicting Cabinet officials’ qualifications based 
on their predecessors’ backgrounds, the Clinic focused on evaluating the 
expertise of each department.207  The current line of succession statute’s 
approach of ordering Cabinet secretaries by when their departments were 
created enhances predictability, but it is not necessarily the best order for 
effective governance.  For example, the system places the Secretary of 
 
GEO. L.J. 1389, 1437–40, 1448–50 (1987) (arguing that the political gamesmanship that could 
have occurred after President Reagan’s assassination attempt supports the idea that the 
bumping provision should be reformed)). 
 205. See Secretary Gary Locke, U.S. DEP’T COM., http://2010-2014.commerce.gov/about-
commerce/commerce-leadership/secretary-gary-locke.html [https://perma.cc/T9J8-G3BW] 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 206. See Secretary John Bryson, U.S. DEP’T COM., http://2010-2014.commerce.gov/about-
commerce/commerce-leadership/secretary-john-bryson.html [https://perma.cc/TBC5-F2WS] 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 207. Telephone Interview with John Fortier, former Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n 
(Nov. 9, 2016) (suggesting a focus on the Cabinet departments’ expertise). 
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Homeland Security last, far behind the Secretary of Agriculture.208  This 
current order means that in the event of a catastrophic attack on Washington, 
D.C., the Secretary of Agriculture is more likely to succeed to the presidency 
than the Secretary of Homeland Security, despite the latter’s expertise in 
combating security threats. 
To evaluate the expertise of each department, the Clinic emphasized four 
areas of expertise:  foreign relations, economics, military, and security.  
These areas were selected considering that succession beyond the Vice 
President is unlikely absent a catastrophic event.  In addition to specializing 
in issues that would be relevant in a crisis, the leaders of the departments that 
focus on these areas receive regular security briefings, which lower ranking 
Cabinet members are not provided.209  Frances Townsend, a former White 
House Homeland Security Advisor, stressed to the Clinic that security 
briefings are far more important than events like Cabinet meetings for 
preparing department heads for succession.210  Additionally, the Clinic 
considered how frequently various department heads interact with the 
President, finding that Cabinet secretaries whose departments specialize in 
foreign relations, economics, military, and security met more frequently with 
the President. 
Based on these considerations, the Clinic concludes that the heads of the 
Departments of State,211 Defense,212 Justice,213 Treasury,214 and Homeland 
Security215 are best equipped to succeed to the presidency in a crisis. 
3.  Geographic Vulnerability 
Further, the current line of succession does not adequately provide for the 
possibility of a catastrophic attack in the Washington, D.C., area, where 
 
 208. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2012) (stating that the Secretary of Agriculture is sixth in the line 
of succession while the Secretary of Homeland Security is last at fifteenth). 
 209.  CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 45. 
 210. Interview with Frances F. Townsend, former Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Sec. & Counterterrorism, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct. 26, 2016). 
 211. See What We Do, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/whatwedo/ 
[https://perma.cc/7KZ2-G936] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (stating that “Arms Control & 
International Security” and “Economics, Energy & Environment” are among the State 
Department’s areas of expertise). 
 212. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/ [https://perma.cc/F8QV-7P6F] 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (“The mission of the Department of Defense is to provide the 
military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country.”). 
 213. See About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about 
[https://perma.cc/KB2X-7Y4F] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (stating the department’s mission 
“[t]o enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to 
ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic”). 
 214. See Role of Treasury, U.S DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-
treasury/ [https://perma.cc/N5AF-6S5A] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (stating the department’s 
mission to “maintain a strong economy . . . , strengthen national security by combating threats 
and protecting the integrity of the financial system, and manage the U.S. Government’s 
finances and resources effectively”). 
 215. See About DHS, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs 
[https://perma.cc/6LGT-G8CA] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (“The Department of Homeland 
Security has a vital mission:  to secure the nation from the many threats we face.”). 
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legislators and Cabinet members in the line of succession are frequently 
located.216  For example, a nuclear or biological attack when Congress is in 
session would threaten to leave the country without any clear successors to 
the presidency. 
The danger posed by concentrating successors in the Washington, D.C., 
area is addressed by the lines of succession for several executive branch 
agencies including at least two of the top four Cabinet departments.217  The 
Secretary of State’s successors include numerous ambassadors218 and the 
Attorney General’s successors include U.S. Attorneys in Virginia, Illinois, 
and Missouri.219 
C.  Recommended Composition of the Line of Succession 
The Clinic recommends removing legislators and several Cabinet 
members from the line of succession and adding four officials, or “Standing 
Successors,” outside of Washington, D.C.  The line of succession should be 
populated as follows:  (1) Secretary of State, (2) Secretary of Defense, (3) 
Attorney General, (4) Secretary of Homeland Security, (5) Secretary of the 
Treasury, (6) Standing Successor 1, (7) Standing Successor 2, (8) Standing 
Successor 3, and (9) Standing Successor 4.220 
1.  Standing Successors 
To address the geographic vulnerability problem and to lengthen the 
proposed line of succession, the Clinic recommends the creation of an Office 
of Standing Successors.  Four individuals located outside of Washington, 
D.C., would be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to 
properly qualify as eligible “Officers” under the Succession Clause.221  These 
officials should be placed at the end of the line of succession. 
The recommendation for Standing Successors was initially proposed by 
the Continuity of Government Commission, which suggested creating four 
or five new federal offices to which the President would appoint figures to be 
confirmed by the Senate.222  The Clinic largely agrees with the Commission’s 
recommendation but recommends the creation of only one new office, 
instead of one for each Standing Successor, for simplicity and efficiency. 
The Clinic also envisions a wider range of officials who could be appointed 
as Standing Successors than the Commission recommended.  The 
Commission suggested that the President appoint “former high government 
 
 216. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 39. 
 217. As discussed in Part III.E.1, successors in the executive departments might also be 
part of the presidential line of succession, but the statute does not explicitly include them. 
 218. See Exec. Order No. 13,251, 3 C.F.R. §§ 1841–1842 (2001). 
 219. See Exec. Order No. 13,775, 82 Fed. Reg. 10,697 (Feb. 14, 2017). 
 220. The first Presidential Succession Clinic also recommended removing legislators from 
the line of succession but did not propose removing any Cabinet secretaries. See First Clinic 
Report, supra note 8, at 46. 
 221. See supra Part III.B.1.e. 
 222. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 45. 
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officials” such as “former presidents, former secretaries of state, former 
members of Congress, [or even] sitting governors.”223  Past Presidents, 
former Secretaries of State, and former members of Congress would make 
excellent Standing Successors.  However, the Clinic believes that this list 
should be expanded to include other individuals with public service 
experience and expertise in the areas of foreign affairs, economics, military, 
or security.  Examples include past Vice Presidents and former Cabinet 
members, particularly former heads of the Defense, Justice, Treasury, and 
Homeland Security departments. 
The Twenty-Second Amendment’s two term limit for Presidents does not 
prevent past Presidents from being part of the line of succession.  The 
Amendment states “no person shall be elected to the office of the President 
more than twice.”224  Because succession does not involve a past President 
being elected to another term, it would not violate the Constitution.  Although 
some might argue that including former two-term Presidents violates the 
spirit of the Amendment, the Clinic contends that in a time of crisis where 
many other successors are not available, expertise and stability in the White 
House is critical.225 
The Clinic does not recommend sitting governors as Standing Successors 
to avoid possible conflicts of interest or violations of dual-office-holding 
laws in certain states.226 
The President’s discretion to appoint Standing Successors would be 
limited by the constitutional presidential eligibility requirements227 and 
possibly limited by Congressional requirements imposed pursuant to 
Congress’s authority under the Succession Clause to designate presidential 
successors.228 
The Clinic recommends that Standing Successors follow the Cabinet 
members’ line of succession to the presidency, as secretaries’ work in the 
executive branch—particularly frequent security briefings—would likely 
better prepare them for succession.  However, to ensure that the Standing 
Successors are aware of critical information, they should attend periodic 
security briefings.229 
 
 223. See id. 
 224. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (emphasis added). 
 225. Interview with Akhil Reed Amar, Professor of Law, Yale Univ., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct. 
5, 2016). 
 226. See Dual Office Holding:  Restrictions on Legislators, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/restrictions-on-holding-concurrent-
office.aspx [https://perma.cc/NAS4-445B]. 
 227. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 228. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 229. The Continuity of Government Commission recommended that the White House 
include appointed successors “in regular (at least monthly) national security briefings.” 
CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 45; see also Interview with Frances F. 
Townsend, supra note 186 (suggesting that appointed successors periodically attend meetings 
of the National Security Council or Homeland Security Council); cf. Interview with John O. 
Brennan, supra note 49 (stating that successors should receive training to prepare for their 
roles). 
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2.  Alternatives to Removing Legislators 
The Clinic is convinced that the drawbacks of including legislators in the 
line of succession weigh heavily against any benefits of their inclusion.  
However, the political reality is that members of Congress might resist 
removing their own leaders from the line of succession.  If Congress declines 
to remove legislators, the Clinic recommends three alternative reforms. 
a.  Remove Legislators from the Line of Succession 
in Cases of Temporary Disability 
or Removal from Office 
If legislators are not removed from the line of succession, Congress should 
only designate them as successors in cases where the President dies or resigns 
not where he is disabled or removed from office.230  Preventing legislators 
from succeeding during disabilities protects legislators from being forced to 
resign to act as President temporarily.  Similarly, preventing succession after 
the President has been removed through the impeachment process would 
avoid the conflict of interest inherent in the Speaker or President pro tempore 
taking action that could result in his own succession to the presidency. 
b.  Reorder Legislators to the End of the Line of Succession 
Congress might also consider moving legislators to the end of the line of 
succession.  This change would make their succession less likely, reducing 
the probability that a succession event would change party control of the 
White House. 
c.  Remove the Bumping Provision 
Congress should eliminate the bumping provision to prevent multiple 
Presidents in a short period of time and increase the public legitimacy of 
successors during a crisis. 
D.  Other Line of Succession Reforms 
In addition to changing some of the officials in the line of succession, there 
are several other steps that Congress should take to address vulnerabilities 
related to the line of succession. 
1.  Statutory Ambiguity About Acting Secretaries 
The current statute is unclear as to whether acting Cabinet secretaries are 
in the line of succession.231  Acting secretaries are the officials who lead 
 
 230. The first Presidential Succession Clinic also advanced this alternative proposal. See 
First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 46–47. 
 231. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 40–41. 
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executive branch departments in the absence of officials confirmed by the 
Senate to head the agencies.  Comparison of the language of the 1947 Act 
and the 1886 Act suggests that acting secretaries are included in the current 
line of succession. 
The 1886 Act explicitly excluded acting secretaries by enumerating the list 
of Cabinet secretaries who were included in the line of succession and stating 
that the list only applied to officials confirmed to “the offices therein 
named.”232  The current statute—the 1947 Act—is not as clear.  It provides, 
in relevant part, that “the officer of the United States who is highest on the 
following list [of Cabinet secretaries], and who is not under disability to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as 
President.”233  The statute states that the list of Cabinet successors includes 
only “officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.”234  Many officials who serve as acting secretaries receive Senate 
confirmations for deputy-level posts.  There is no language in the 1947 Act 
limiting succession to Cabinet secretaries confirmed for those positions.  
However, it is also possible that the exclusion of this language was not 
purposeful as there is no discussion of acting secretaries in the 1947 Act’s 
legislative history.235 
This lack of clarity might result in chaos in extraordinary circumstances.  
It permits the possibility of an acting secretary in a higher-listed department 
becoming Acting President ahead of a lower-listed, confirmed Cabinet 
secretary.  For example, it could be unclear whether an Acting Secretary of 
State would succeed before the Secretary of Defense.  Ambiguity about 
successors’ legitimacy is problematic in itself, but a further issue is that 
acting secretaries are not ideal successors.  They are often more obscure than 
their displaced superiors and may be from the opposing party.236  While the 
inclusion of acting secretaries expands the line of succession, it amplifies the 
Clinic’s concerns about the qualifications and legitimacy of the individuals 
who could assume the presidency. Addressing issues involving acting 
secretaries in the line of succession has become more urgent in recent years 
because the time that it takes for the Senate to confirm Cabinet secretaries 
has steadily increased,237 increasing acting secretaries’ tenures. 
Accordingly, Congress should at least clarify the ambiguity about whether 
acting secretaries are in the line of succession.  The Clinic recommends that 
Congress enact a new statute mirroring the language of the Presidential 
 
 232. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1, 1 (repealed 1947). 
 233. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2012). 
 234. Id. § 19(e). 
 235. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 43 (discussing the Act’s legislative history). 
 236. Olga Pierce, Who Runs Departments Before Heads Are Confirmed?, PROPUBLICA 
(Jan. 22, 2009, 4:13 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/who-runs-departments-before-
heads-are-confirmed-090122 [https://perma.cc/6JCN-7TPQ]. 
 237. See John W. Schoen, No President Has Ever Waited This Long to Get a Cabinet 
Approved, CNBC (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/24/trumps-cabinet-
waiting-for-confirmation.html [https://perma.cc/8CPE-W34V]. 
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Succession Act of 1886 to remove acting secretaries from the line of 
succession.238 
2.  Inauguration Day Vulnerability 
A particular point of vulnerability for the line of succession comes on 
Inauguration Day, when most of the outgoing Cabinet secretaries have 
resigned and the incoming secretaries have not yet been confirmed.239  The 
line of succession is nearly empty as most of the remaining successors—the 
Speaker of the House, President pro tempore, and incoming and outgoing 
Presidents and Vice Presidents—gather within feet of one another for the 
inauguration ceremony.  An attack or some other catastrophic event at the 
inauguration ceremony could leave the country without a clear successor to 
the presidency. 
Before President Obama’s first inauguration, a credible threat of attack on 
the ceremony led officials to prepare for the worst.240  President Bush’s and 
President Obama’s respective national security advisors met in the White 
House Situation Room on the morning of the inauguration to discuss the 
threat.241  President Obama was even given a statement to read in place of 
his inaugural address if an attack occurred.242 
On Inauguration Day, both the Speaker of the House and President pro 
tempore are in place, having assumed their positions when Congress 
convenes seventeen days prior on January 3.243  While the outgoing Cabinet 
members’ terms do not technically end with the outgoing President’s term at 
noon on Inauguration Day, typically most, if not all, have resigned at that 
point.  Their resignations leave acting secretaries in charge of the 
departments, and, as discussed, the current statute leaves acting secretaries’ 
eligibility as successors unclear.244 
Until a President-Elect’s Cabinet members are confirmed, they are not in 
the line of succession.  By the time of the inauguration, the Senate will have 
held hearings for some of the nominees but will not have confirmed any of 
 
 238. The first Presidential Succession Clinic recommended that Congress clarify the status 
of Acting secretaries and, if it decided to explicitly include acting Secretaries, place them at 
the end of the line of succession. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 47. 
 239. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 41; John Fortier, President 
Michael Armacost?:  The Continuity of Government After September 11, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Sept. 1, 2003), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/president-michael-armacost-
the-continuity-of-government-after-september-11/ [https://perma.cc/X2G8-UFNZ]. 
 240. See Peter Baker, Obama’s War over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.html [https://perma.cc/4MXB-
Y34S]. 
 241. Interview with John O. Brennan, supra note 49 (stating that he attended the meeting 
and briefed President-Elect Obama the night before the inauguration about the threat). 
 242. See Michael D. Shear, Obama Had Statement to Read If Terror Halted Inauguration, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015, 10:38 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/02/ 
10/obama-had-statement-to-read-if-terror-halted-inauguration/ [https://perma.cc/9JHM-
ERB8]. 
 243. See U.S. CONST. amend XX, § 1. 
 244. See supra Part III.C.1. 
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them.245  Many of the picks will typically be ready for immediate votes on 
the Senate floor as soon as the new President takes office and formally 
nominates them.  The process can be done quickly but will nonetheless take 
at least several hours and potentially a few days.246 
One approach to addressing this succession gap is delaying the outgoing 
Cabinet members’ resignations until after the inauguration or having the 
Speaker of the House or President pro tempore stay away from the ceremony.  
This approach was followed for the 2017 inauguration when outgoing 
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson stayed at his post and President 
pro tempore Orrin Hatch did not attend the ceremony.247  But this solution is 
problematic when the incoming President and the successors are from 
different political parties because succession could cause a disruptive shift in 
party control. 
A better solution is coordination between the incoming and outgoing 
administrations to allow for the confirmation of some incoming Cabinet 
secretaries before the inauguration.  In advancing this recommendation, the 
Clinic concurs with the Continuity of Government Commission, which 
recommended that the outgoing President nominate and the Senate confirm 
some of the incoming Cabinet secretaries.248 
At least four of the President-Elect’s chosen Cabinet members should be 
submitted for nomination to the Senate prior to Inauguration Day.  Ideally, 
these nominees would then be confirmed on the day before or the morning of 
the inauguration.  It would be preferable for the Senate to confirm as many 
of these nominees as possible in the time before the inauguration.  
Preconfirmed Cabinet secretaries would lengthen the line of succession and 
reduce the likelihood of an outgoing Cabinet secretary or acting secretary 
succeeding to the presidency.249 
The possibility of partisan conflict impeding a swift preinauguration 
confirmation process cannot be ignored.  For practical reasons, the President-
Elect should therefore put forth his least controversial nominees.  The 
President-Elect should prioritize the expeditious confirmation of nominees 
for the positions of Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary 
of Defense, Attorney General, and Secretary of Homeland Security.  
Additionally, at least one of the newly confirmed Cabinet members should 
 
 245.  CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 42. 
 246. See id. (“In 1989, the Senate did not meet to consider [the new cabinet] nominations 
until six days after the inauguration.”). 
 247. See Jordan Fabian, Jeh Johnson Is Designated Survivor for Inauguration, HILL (Jan. 
20, 2017, 12:07 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/315274-jeh-johnson-is-
designated-survivor-for-inauguration [https://perma.cc/DXV3-DSFF]; Press Release, Office 
of Senator Orrin Hatch, At the Request of President Trump, Hatch Serves as Designated 
Survivor During Inauguration (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm/2017/1/at-the-request-of-president-trump-hatch-serves-as-designated-
survivor-during-inauguration [https://perma.cc/BCE6-USTA]. 
 248. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 49.  The first Presidential 
Succession Clinic also endorsed this recommendation. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, 
at 60–61. 
 249. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 60–61. 
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not attend the inauguration and be outside of Washington, D.C., at the time 
of the ceremony. 
3.  Preparing for Succession 
The White House should plan for scenarios where the statutory line of 
succession is reached, particularly by ensuring that the successors are 
prepared.  Planning for succession beyond the vice presidency is already in 
place.  The Central Locator System, an executive branch office created 
during the Cold War, tracks successors to the presidency twenty-four hours 
a day.250  The system is only one part of extensive plans for continuity of 
government.251 
However, moments such as Secretary of State Haig’s inaccurate statement 
about his position in the line of succession following the Reagan 
assassination attempt underscore the importance of preparing successors for 
their roles.252  A similar lack of preparedness seemed evident on 9/11.  After 
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert was evacuated from Washington, D.C., 
he was unable to communicate with the White House.253  Eighty-three-year-
old Senate President pro tempore Robert Byrd stood outside the Capitol 
talking with reporters before simply going home254 and Vice President 
Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld refused to move to secure 
locations.255  Comprehensive planning with awareness and cooperation of 
successors is critical to avoiding chaos during crises. 
IV.  DUAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY 
The Clinic’s proposed reforms to the line of succession would help to 
ensure that there are always successors who are prepared to lead the country.  
Still, a separate set of reforms is needed to allow those successors to act as 
President in certain situations.  If the President and Vice President are 
disabled simultaneously, there is no legal method to trigger their succession 
because an unable Vice President cannot participate with the Cabinet to 
invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Similarly, if the Vice President is 
disabled, the President cannot use Section 3 to transfer his powers and duties 
 
 250. See GRAFF, supra note 49, at xvii–xviii; see also OFFICE OF EMERGENCY 
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to the next person in the line of succession.256  This problem is worsened by 
the absence of procedures for declaring the Vice President unable. 
The prospect of “dual inabilities” of the President and Vice President 
lurked behind two of the four presidential assassinations.  Vice President 
Andrew Johnson was targeted as part of the Lincoln assassination plot in 
1865.257  When President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, Vice President 
Lyndon Johnson was “in an open convertible” two cars behind the 
Kennedys.258  Beyond these historical illustrations, the danger of a dual 
inability is evident from the fact that all Presidents and Vice Presidents are 
frequently in close proximity to one another, including when they are 
working in the West Wing.259 
Additionally, many Vice Presidents have suffered debilitating health 
problems.  One analysis found that “20 of the 47 individuals who have served 
as vice president have suffered from apparent incapacity or experienced a 
‘near miss’ that could have resulted in their incapacity.”260  And seven Vice 
Presidents have died in office.261 
The Clinic recommends that Congress pass legislation with procedures for 
declaring (1) a dual inability of the President and the Vice President, 
including where there is no Vice President and (2) a sole inability of the Vice 
President.  These procedures should be modeled on the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment’s inability procedures. 
This Part first describes the Clinic’s proposed dual inability statute.  It then 
discusses the Clinic’s proposed vice presidential inability statute.262 
A.  Proposed Statute for Dual Inability 
The Clinic recommends the following statute, modeled after Section 4 of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, to provide for scenarios in which both the 
President and the Vice President are unable.263 
 
 256. Congress considered including provisions for dual and vice presidential inability in 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  However, those provisions were excluded in light of concerns 
that adding complexity to the Amendment would decrease its chances of ratification. See 
Feerick, supra note 175, at 909; see also Letter from John D. Feerick to Rep. Richard Poff, 
FORDHAM L. ARCHIVE SCHOLARSHIP & HIST. (Feb. 7, 1965), 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=twentyfifth_amend
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simultaneous inabilities). 
 257. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 16, at 109–10. 
 258. Id. at 4–5. 
 259. See The Vice President’s Residence & Office, WHITE HOUSE, 
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 262. The Clinic believes that the statute designed to fill the gaps posed by a dual disability 
scenario and the statute designed to fill the gaps of a vice presidential inability could be 
implemented individually or as one consolidated statute. 
 263. The first Presidential Succession Clinic also proposed a statute modeled after the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to address dual inabilities. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 
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Definition of Statutory Successor— 
For purposes of this statute, a “Statutory Successor” shall be defined as 
the highest-ranking official in the line of succession after the Vice 
President, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 19. 
Dual Inability of a President and a Vice President— 
Whenever the Statutory Successor and a majority of either the principal 
officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress 
may by law provide, transmit to the majority and minority leaders of 
both Houses of Congress their written declaration that the President and 
the Vice President are both unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of their offices, the Statutory Successor shall immediately assume the 
powers and duties of the presidency as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the majority and minority 
leaders of both Houses of Congress a written declaration that his 
inability does not exist, the President shall resume the powers and 
duties of his office.  Alternatively, when the Vice President transmits 
to the majority and minority leaders of both Houses of Congress a 
written declaration that his inability does not exist, the Vice President 
shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting 
President.  However, following either a declaration by President or 
Vice President, if the Statutory Successor and a majority of the 
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the majority 
and minority leaders of both houses their written declaration that both 
the President and the Vice President are unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of their offices, Congress shall decide the issue, assembling 
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session.  If the 
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written 
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days 
after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote 
of both Houses that the President and the Vice President are unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of their offices, the Statutory Successor 
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the 
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office. 
Presidential Inability with a Vacancy in the Office of the Vice President— 
Whenever there is no Vice President, and the Statutory Successor and 
a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments 
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the 
majority and minority leaders of both Houses of Congress their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office, the Statutory Successor shall immediately assume 
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. 
 
27–31.  We add to that recommendation by proposing statutory language for these 
contingencies.  In Roy Brownell’s article in this issue, he outlines an approach for policy-
makers to follow if a dual inability occurs in the absence of statutory procedures for handling 
it. See generally Roy E. Brownell II, What to Do If Simultaneous Presidential and Vice 
Presidential Inability Struck Today, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1027 (2017). 
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Thereafter, when the President transmits to the majority and minority 
leaders of both Houses of Congress a written declaration that his 
inability does not exist, the President shall resume the powers and 
duties of his office unless the Statutory Successor and a majority of the 
Cabinet or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, 
transmit within four days to the majority and minority leadership of 
both houses their written declaration that the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office.  Thereupon Congress 
shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that 
purpose if not in session.  If the Congress, within twenty-one days after 
receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, 
within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, 
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Statutory 
Successor shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; 
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his 
office. 
The proposed statute follows the framework of Section 4 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment to cover three dual inability scenarios:  (1) dual inability 
of both the President and the Vice President; (2) a presidential inability when 
there is no Vice President; and (3) a situation in which the Vice President 
becomes disabled while serving as Acting President.  The third contingency 
is a dual inability scenario because, under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the 
President would remain President as the Vice President is serving as Acting 
President. 
The proposed statute has two key provisions.  First, it provides that the 
Statutory Successor, the highest official in the statutory line of succession, 
shall declare when a dual inability exists before serving as Acting President 
in consultation with the Cabinet or another body appointed by Congress.  
Although the Speaker of the House is the first official in the line of 
succession, the proposed statute does not explicitly designate the Speaker to 
participate in a dual inability declaration.  It is likely that the Speaker would 
carry out that function, but the phrase “Statutory Successor” provides for a 
scenario where the Speaker is unable to participate.  In such a scenario, the 
next eligible successor to the presidency would be the Statutory Successor. 
Second, the proposed statute provides that the President or Vice President 
can declare an end to their inabilities.  However, if the Statutory Successor 
and a majority of the Cabinet disagree, Congress will “decide the issue” 
within twenty-one days.  This provision protects against usurpations of 
presidential power while providing a check on disabled Presidents and Vice 
Presidents who do not recognize that they are incapacitated. 
The statute follows a slightly different notification procedure than Section 
4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Instead of notifying the Speaker of the 
House and Senate President pro tempore of the dual inability and transfer of 
power,264 the Statutory Successor and Cabinet notify the majority and 
minority leaders of both houses of Congress.  Because the Speaker of the 
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962 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
  
House and President pro tempore are the first two officials in the line of 
succession,265 one would likely fill the role of the Statutory Successor in a 
dual disability scenario.  It would make little sense for the Statutory 
Successor to send notification to himself. 
B.  Constitutional and Practical Justification 
for Dual Inability Statute 
Congress has constitutional authority to enact the Clinic’s proposed 
statute, and the procedure that the statute provides has a firm practical basis. 
1.  Constitutional Basis 
The Succession Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause support 
Congress’s authority to create procedures for determining dual inabilities. 
a.  The Succession Clause 
The Succession Clause is the principal constitutional source of 
congressional authority to enact legislation relating to presidential 
succession.  In addition to designating the Vice President as the first 
successor to the presidency, the Clause provides that Congress “may by Law 
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the 
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as 
President.”266  Although the Clause does not explicitly authorize Congress to 
establish procedures to declare a dual inability, that power is arguably 
implicit in the power to designate a successor in the event of a dual 
inability.267 
Congress broadly exercised this power in the three acts dealing with the 
line of presidential succession.268  In all three statutes, Congress went beyond 
the textual mandate to declare an official to act as President in the event of a 
dual vacancy or inability.  The Presidential Succession Act of 1792, for 
example, provided for a special election to fill dual vacancies that occurred 
more than a year before the expiration of the President’s term.269  The 
Presidential Succession Act of 1886 implemented protocols for dealing with 
inabilities when Congress was not in session.  It provided that a successor 
should issue a proclamation calling Congress to convene for an extraordinary 
session.270  Finally, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 addressed 
separation of powers concerns by imposing a resignation requirement on any 
legislator who becomes Acting President.271 
 
 265. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b) (2012). 
 266. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 267. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 1033. 
 268. See Feerick, supra note 90, at 20. 
 269. RONAN, supra note 162, at 8. 
 270. Id. at 24; RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 120–21 (1951). 
 271. RONAN, supra note 162, at 34. 
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b.  The Necessary and Proper Clause 
The interaction between the Succession Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause provides additional support for Congress’s authority to create 
procedures for determining a dual inability.272  The Necessary and Proper 
Clause empowers Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or any 
Department or Officer thereof.”273  The Clause has been interpreted as 
granting Congress broad discretion to enact laws in furtherance of other 
provisions in the Constitution.274 
In McCulloch v. Maryland,275 the U.S. Supreme Court described the power 
granted to Congress by the Necessary and Proper Clause as contingent on 
means that are “plainly adapted to [their] end.”276  Laws enacted under the 
Clause’s authority must be incidental or implied by another provision in the 
Constitution.277  Unless otherwise inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution, any law that is appropriate to carry into effect any of the powers 
of the federal government is valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause.278  
The power to provide a way to declare a dual inability is arguably implied 
from the Succession Clause. 
2.  Practical Basis:  The Contingent Grant-of-Power Theory 
and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
Prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification, legal scholars debated 
who had the authority to determine whether a presidential inability existed,279 
with some believing that the Vice President had the power to make this 
determination.280  This view relied, in part, on the contingent grant-of-power 
theory, which holds that implied in the power to act under certain 
contingencies is the power to declare when such contingencies exist.281 
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Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is rooted in the contingent 
grant-of-power theory.  Because the Vice President has the power to act as 
President in the case of inability, he is a judge of that inability.  However, 
Congress imposed an additional restraint by requiring the Vice President to 
coordinate with the Cabinet or another body to make the inability 
determination.282  The restraint serves many purposes, including encouraging 
the Vice President to take appropriate action by providing him with 
additional political support283 and preventing attempts to usurp presidential 
power. 
The Clinic’s proposed statute reflects the rationale behind Section 4 by 
extending the contingent grant of power to the next highest official in the line 
of succession.  It incorporates a check on that official by requiring the 
participation of the Cabinet or a congressionally created body. 
C.  Proposed Statute for Vice Presidential Inability 
The Clinic’s proposed vice presidential inability statute mirrors Sections 3 
and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, providing mechanisms for both a 
voluntary and involuntary declaration of vice presidential inability.284  The 
proposed statute provides as follows: 
Definition of Statutory Successor 
For purposes of this statute, a “Statutory Successor” shall be defined as 
the highest-ranking official in the line of succession after the Vice 
President, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 19. 
Voluntary Declaration of Inability; Office of Vice President 
Whenever the Vice President transmits to the President and to the 
majority and minority leaders of both Houses of Congress his written 
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office, and until the Vice President transmits to them a written 
declaration to the contrary, the powers and duties of his office pursuant 
to Sections Three and Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment shall be 
discharged by the Statutory Successor. 
Involuntary Declaration of Inability; Office of Vice President 
Whenever the President and a majority of either the principal officers 
of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by 
law provide, transmit to the majority and minority leaders of both 
Houses of Congress their written declaration that the Vice President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice 
President shall immediately cease to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office, and until the Vice President transmits to them a written 
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties of his office under 
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Sections Three and Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment shall be 
discharged by the Statutory Successor. 
Thereafter, when the Vice President transmits to the majority and 
minority leaders of both Houses of Congress his written declaration 
that no inability exists, the Vice President shall resume the powers and 
duties of his office unless the President and a majority of either the 
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the majority 
and minority leaders of both Houses of Congress their written 
declaration that the Vice President is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office.  Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, 
assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session.  
If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter 
written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one 
days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds 
vote of both Houses that the Vice President is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office, the powers and duties of his office 
under Section Three and Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment shall be 
discharged by the Statutory Successor; otherwise, the Vice President 
shall resume the powers and duties of his office. 
The proposed statute’s voluntary declaration provision is modeled after 
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and could be used in a similar 
manner to temporarily transfer the Vice President’s powers and duties powers 
and duties under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  However, brief transfers of 
power for routine surgical procedures, such as President George W. Bush’s 
uses of Section 3,285 may not be necessary or wise absent a need for the 
Statutory Successor to act as President. 
The involuntary inability declaration provision is nearly identical to 
Section 4, except that the President takes the Vice President’s role in the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment process.  While granting the President the power 
to determine vice presidential inability raises concerns that he might abuse 
his authority over the Cabinet to influence their decision, the Clinic believes 
that public accountability and the secondary check of Congress will provide 
sufficient balance, just as in Section 4. 
When power is transferred under the proposed statute, the Statutory 
Successor assumes the Vice President’s powers and duties under Sections 3 
and 4:  the power to serve as Acting President after a voluntary declaration 
of inability by the President and the power to participate in declaring a 
presidential inability.  The Statutory Successor’s discharge of these 
responsibilities would, in essence, allow for the use of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment’s inability provisions, which require an able Vice President.  
The Clinic does not believe that the Statutory Successor should exercise any 
of the Vice President’s other responsibilities. 
The Statutory Successor would likely be either the Speaker of the House 
or the Senate President pro tempore, the top two officials in the current line 
of succession.  Both are required by the Incompatibility Clause and the line-
 
 285. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 202–03. 
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of-succession statute to resign their positions to act as President.286  They 
would not be required to resign from Congress to participate in the proposed 
statute’s process of declaring the President unable.  The Incompatibility 
Clause prohibits legislators from holding an “Office,”287 but participating in 
the inability process does not involve holding any such “Office.”  If the 
inability process resulted in a determination that the President was unable, 
the Statutory Successor, if he or she were a member of Congress, would have 
to resign to act as President. 
1.  Constitutional Basis 
The constitutional authority for this proposed legislation is based on the 
Succession Clause the principle that a continually functioning executive 
branch must be maintained, and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
a.  The Succession Clause 
The Succession Clause supports Congress’s authority to create procedures 
for declaring vice presidential inabilities.  The Clause states, in relevant part, 
“Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation 
or Inability, both of the President and Vice President.”288  The Clinic submits 
that the phrase “both of the President and Vice President” includes authority 
for Congress to act in the case of inability of the President and Vice 
President—individually—because it would be impossible to declare a dual 
inability without declaring each individual disabled. 
Furthermore, Congress’s authority under the Succession Clause to 
“provide” for dual inabilities arguably includes the power to prevent dual 
inabilities from occurring.  As discussed, if the Vice President is disabled, 
there is no other official empowered to participate with the Cabinet to declare 
the President disabled.289  Without the ability to transfer the Vice President’s 
duties under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, any type of presidential inability 
could paralyze the executive branch. 
b.  Executive Continuity Principle 
That the framers envisioned the presidency to be a continually functioning 
part of the government provides a compelling structural argument for 
Congress’s authority to pass a vice presidential inability statute.290  The 
 
 286. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b) (2012). 
 287. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 288. Id. art. II, §. 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added). 
 289. See Brownell, supra note 260, at 436. 
 290. Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me?:  The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-
Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 793 n.87 (1996) (“Constitutional structuralists . . . look at text 
and context, stressing the ways in which various provisions (explicit and implicit) interrelate.  
Instead of treating the Constitution as a series of disjointed, unrelated clauses, they treat it as 
a whole, looking to the structure of constitutional government, stressing its internal 
consistency and recurring themes.”). 
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continuous nature of the presidency is clear from the lack of any recess or 
adjournment provisions, such as those pertaining to Congress.291 
Additionally, the Constitution includes three distinct measures for ensuring 
executive continuity in the Constitution:  the Succession Clause, the vice 
presidency, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
The Succession Clause provides Congress with the legislative power to 
ensure that there is always an able President.292  The provision facilitates a 
transition to a successor in the absence of a capable President.  The language 
“the same shall devolve” immediately vests the powers and duties of the 
presidency in the successor.293  In contrast, vacancies in the legislative and 
judicial branches are filled through more elaborate, slow-moving processes, 
such as special elections for congressional vacancies and presidential 
nomination and congressional confirmation for judges.294  The executive 
branch is also unique in that the President is the only official with a 
constitutionally designated successor, the Vice President.295 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment furthered the Constitution’s emphasis on 
continuity of the executive branch by providing procedures designed to 
ensure that there is always someone able to discharge the powers and duties 
of the presidency.296 
Continuity of the executive branch is a structural principle that is inherent 
in the Constitution, and the advancement of this principle supports 
congressional action to provide for vice presidential inability.  The Vice 
President serves two roles that are critical to ensuring continuity of the 
executive branch:  he is the first successor to the presidency and 
indispensable to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s inability procedures.  
Accordingly, Congress has the authority to pass a statute to ensure that there 
is someone to carry out these functions, which may become essential to 
maintaining executive branch continuity. 
c.  Necessary and Proper Clause 
The Necessary and Proper Clause supports the enactment of a vice 
presidential inability statute.  Such a statute furthers Congress’s power under 
the Succession Clause because declaring the Vice President unable could be 
essential to allowing the next person in the statutory line of succession to act 
as President.297  Additionally, addressing vice presidential inability is 
important to ensuring that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s provisions can 
function in practice, as an able Vice President is essential to Sections 3 and 
 
 291. Interview with Akhil Reed Amar, supra note 225.  
 292. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 293. Id. 
 294. See id. art. II, § 2; id. amend. XVII. 
 295. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.  The Constitution requires the Senate to choose a President 
pro tempore “in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of 
President of the United States,” but does not designate a specific official to succeed to the 
position. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. 
 296. See id. amend. XXV. 
 297. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 34–35. 
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4.  Finally, as with a dual-inability statute, a vice presidential inability statute 
furthers the general constitutional imperative to maintain the functioning of 
the federal government. 
2.  Precedential Authority 
Congress has previously implemented mechanisms for fulfilling 
constitutional duties in the absence of an express constitutional mandate.  For 
example, there is no provision in the Constitution that specifically grants 
Congress investigatory powers or contempt powers.298  Yet the Supreme 
Court has consistently held that these powers are inherently necessary to 
effectuate Congress’s duty to legislate.299  To pass laws, Congress must 
gather and analyze information.300  Thus, Congress must have the power to 
conduct investigations.301  Similarly, any request for information to a third 
party would be an empty request without the power to enforce compliance.302 
It is similarly appropriate for the most democratically representative 
branch of government to provide procedures that fill gaps necessary to 
effectuate the spirit of the Constitution.  The enactment of a statute to fill a 
vacancy in another branch of government is consistent with this notion.  For 
example, the statute entitled “Vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice; 
disability”303 allows the most senior Associate Justice to occupy the position 
of Chief Justice if the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties.304  While 
there is no explicit grant of such power in the Constitution, the statute is an 
appropriate means of ensuring continuity within the judicial branch.  A 
statute providing for vice presidential inability would similarly promote 
continuity within the executive branch. 
3.  Alternatives 
The Clinic considered various alternatives to address vice presidential 
inability, including prospective declarations of inability, impeachment, and a 
range of parties other than the Cabinet and President who could possibly 
determine a Vice President’s inability. 
 
 298. ALISSA M. DOLAN & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34114, CONGRESS’S 
CONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS:  A SKETCH 2 
(2014). 
 299. See id. at 2 n.11 (“In short, there can be no question that Congress has a right—derived 
from its Article I legislative function—to issue and enforce subpoenas, and a corresponding 
right to the information that is the subject of such subpoenas.  Several Supreme Court decisions 
have confirmed that fact.” (quoting Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 84 
(D.D.C. 2008))). 
 300. Id. at 2. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. 28 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). 
 304. Id. 
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a.  Prospective Declarations 
of Inability and Resignation 
Prospective declarations of inability, like those the Clinic recommends the 
President create,305 and letter agreements, like those between Presidents and 
Vice Presidents before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,306 would be difficult 
to use to address vice presidential inability.307  While prospective 
declarations addressing a President’s inability are consistent with Section 3 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, there is no clear constitutional authority for 
prospective letters drafted by the Vice President.  At most, such declarations 
are informal mechanisms that lack the force of law.  Letter agreements would 
also have a tenuous legal basis.  When Presidents used the agreements to 
authorize their Vice Presidents to declare them unable, the Vice Presidents 
arguably had the authority to make such declarations under the contingent 
grant-of-power theory.308  There is no similarly situated individual in a vice 
presidential inability scenario. 
Prospective resignation letters, like those drafted by Vice President Dick 
Cheney, may encounter legal and practical difficulties.309  Cheney’s 
arrangement gave his counsel and President Bush the authority to determine 
whether to submit the presigned resignation letter.310  The statute that 
describes the procedure for vice presidential resignations does not require the 
Vice President or any specified person to submit the Vice President’s 
resignation letter.311  But it would be unreasonable to interpret that 
unaddressed detail as allowing the Vice President to designate the authority 
to determine when to trigger his resignation.  The statute allows someone to 
carry out the ministerial task of delivering the Vice President’s letter at the 
Vice President’s instruction; a grant of discretion to determine whether 
prospective resignation letter arrangements should be executed, however, 
may require explicit statutory or constitutional authorization, which does not 
currently exist.312 
b.  Impeachment 
Impeachment is not an appropriate response to vice presidential or dual 
inabilities.313  The Constitution envisions impeachment as the remedy for 
serious misconduct by the President, Vice President, other executive branch 
officials, and federal judges, and its use to address inability may prove 
 
 305. See supra Part II.A. 
 306. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 31–32. 
 307. Interview with Roy E. Brownell II, Washington, D.C., Attorney, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct. 
24, 2016); see FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 79. 
 308. See Feerick, supra note 175, at 914. 
 309. Interview with Roy E. Brownell II, supra note 307. 
 310. See, e.g., FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 203–04. 
 311. See 3 U.S.C. § 20 (2012) (“The only evidence of . . . a resignation of the office of . . . 
Vice President, shall be an instrument in writing, declaring the same, and subscribed by the 
person . . .  resigning, . . . and delivered into the office of the Secretary of State.”). 
 312. Interview with Roy E. Brownell II, supra note 307. 
 313. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 35. 
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challenging.314  Two judges who appeared to be alcoholics have been 
impeached (and one removed),315 but at least one of those impeachments was 
still tied to misconduct, not necessarily to alcoholism in and of itself.316  
Impeachment should be based on intentional conduct, not physical or mental 
disabilities. 
c.  Alternative Parties 
The Clinic considered whether individuals other than Cabinet members 
should participate with the President in declaring the Vice President disabled. 
i.  Senate 
The Vice President’s constitutional relationship with the Senate, as 
President of that chamber,317 led the Clinic to consider involving Senators in 
the disability process.  Unlike Cabinet members, Senators do not serve at the 
pleasure of the President, so they might be more likely to exercise 
independent judgment if they worked with the President to declare the Vice 
President unable. 
However, Senators could politicize and prolong the process.  Their 
involvement would also raise separation of powers concerns.  Concerns about 
the President placing undue influence are addressed through the proposed 
statute’s provision for the Vice President to appeal to Congress. 
ii.  Vice President’s Staff 
The Vice President’s staff could bring firsthand knowledge of the Vice 
President’s condition to the process that the Cabinet does not have.  But staff 
members lack the public accountability of Cabinet members, whom the 
Senate confirms.318  Cabinet members are also better known to the public.  
Accordingly, a determination by the Cabinet is likely to carry more 
legitimacy. 
 
 314. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of 
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”); Interview with Roy E. Brownell 
II, supra note 307 (stating that inability may fall outside of the parameters of the power to 
impeach).  See generally Charles L. Black Jr., The Impeachable Offense, LAWFARE (July 20, 
2017, 2:00 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/impeachable-offense [https://perma.cc/L5RD-
JLWJ]. 
 315. Interview with Roy E. Brownell II, supra note 307; see also Impeachments of Federal 
Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/impeachments-federal-judges 
[https://perma.cc/9N4E-ZMC2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (stating that Judges John 
Pickering and Mark W. Delahay were impeached, in part, for “intoxication”). 
 316. See WM. HOLMES BROWN ET AL., HOUSE PRACTICE:  A GUIDE TO THE RULES, 
PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 593 (2003) (stating that Judge Pickering was 
also impeached for “errors in a trial” and for “using profane language”). 
 317. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
 318. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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V.  CONGRESS’S ROLE UNDER SECTION 4 
OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
While dual and vice presidential inability are “gaps” left unaddressed by 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Clinic also addressed gaps within the 
Amendment itself, particularly Section 4.  The Amendment’s framers 
envisioned that Section 4 would cover “the most difficult cases of inability—
when the President cannot or does not declare his own inability.”319  If the 
President disputes a declaration by the Vice President and a majority of the 
Cabinet that he is unable, Section 4 tasks Congress with “decid[ing] the 
issue” within twenty-one days.320  The Clinic recommends a joint committee 
procedure that will govern any congressional action under Section 4. 
The Amendment’s legislative history indicates that Congress has the 
discretion to create its own procedures for a Section 4 scenario.321  Attorney 
General Nicholas Katzenbach testified to the Senate that Congress should 
address these procedural issues “at a time when [a Section 4 dispute is] not 
before it, providing in advance for this problem and providing for the most 
expeditious procedure.”322 
Despite this suggestion, Congress has not yet created such procedures, 
likely because Section 4 has never been invoked.  If a Section 4 dispute were 
before Congress, however, it could not afford to take up much, if any, of its 
twenty-one days debating the procedure it would follow.323  Given the high 
stakes,324 Congress should provide a Section 4 procedure as soon as 
possible—before such a dispute occurs. 
The Clinic’s proposal for a Section 4 procedure is not merely academic.  
Disagreements in the executive branch over presidential disability have 
occurred.325  For example, after a stroke incapacitated President Woodrow 
 
 319. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 115. 
 320. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 321. See S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 3–4 (1965) (“[T]he proceedings in the Congress prescribed 
in section [4] would be pursued under rules prescribed, or to be prescribed, by the Congress 
itself.”); see also id. at 24. 
 322. Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  Hearing on S.J. 
Res. 1 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 22 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearing]. 
 323. The risk of failing to plan for invocations of the Amendment is illustrated by the first 
implementation of Section 2’s vice presidential nomination process in the wake of Vice 
President Spiro Agnew’s 1973 resignation.  Debate erupted in the Senate over how it would 
consider Gerald Ford’s nomination, leading one Senator to lament, “we have proven to the 
country that we are the kind of body that, in many of their minds, they think we are.” FEERICK, 
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 141. 
 324. Conjuring the challenges of a Section 4 dispute, Richard E. Neustadt stated, “Think of 
Capitol Hill in those three weeks, to say nothing of after; the factions, the hearings, and the 
rival medical teams could create a circus for the media.  Think of the Executive Office of the 
President, with its rival staffs working against one another.” Richard E. Neustadt, The Twenty-
Fifth Amendment and Its Achilles Heel, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 427, 432 (1995). 
 325. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 4–24 (discussing 
Presidents who suffered disabilities).  There are also examples of executive disability on the 
state level. See FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 16, at 286–91.  For example, when 
Louisiana Governor Earl K. Long displayed signs of mental illness in 1959, his wife, cousin, 
and doctor committed him to a Texas psychiatric hospital.  He was later brought to a Louisiana 
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Wilson for the final year and a half of his term, Wilson, his wife, and closest 
associates concealed his condition and rejected suggestions that he should 
step aside.  Wilson even fired Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who had 
suggested that the Vice President should act as President and convened 
Cabinet meetings to conduct government business.326 
This Part first discusses guiding principles that the Clinic considered in 
drafting its proposal.  It then outlines the recommended procedure and 
justifications for it.  This Part concludes with an exploration of legal issues 
that could arise during a Section 4 dispute. 
A.  Guiding Principles 
There are five principles that a congressional procedure implementing 
Section 4 should satisfy.  An ideal procedure will maximize informed 
deliberations with efficiency, democratic legitimacy, fairness to the 
President, and constitutional morality.  These principles are distilled from the 
text of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment itself and its legislative history. 
1.  Informed Deliberations 
Congress’s mandate to “decide” a disagreement between the President and 
the Vice President suggests that any congressional procedure under Section 
4 must utilize Congress’s core attribute:  making collective decisions through 
reasoned deliberation.  Moreover, the Amendment’s legislative history 
makes clear that members of Congress would vote on the issue only after 
informed debate and an opportunity to persuade each other.327  Any 
procedure should preserve the opportunity for members of Congress to 
meaningfully participate in the process and ensure they can access the best 
information available to aid in their deliberation. 
2.  Urgency and Efficiency 
A competing consideration is the need for efficiency required by the 
circumstances and, in particular, Section 4’s twenty-one-day time frame.  
Even before the twenty-one-day limit was added, Senator Birch Bayh 
testified that “the purpose and intent of [the congressional review provision] 
is for Congress to decide the issue as quickly as possible.”328  The urgency 
informed some members’ reluctance to assign the decision to Congress at all, 
 
hospital but secured his release by replacing the superintendent of hospitals with a political 
ally. See id. at 289–91. 
 326. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 15–16. 
 327. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 46 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) 
(warning that a time limit for Congress to make a decision could lead to an undesirable 
situation where “a decision [is made] without any debate whatsoever”); 1965 Senate Hearing, 
supra note 322, at 21 (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska); see also infra Part V.B.2 (discussing 
the filibuster, which implies awareness of congressional debate). 
 328. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 42 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
2017] IMPROVING PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 973 
as the process of taking testimony and debating is “cumbersome.”329  
Consequently, the process should avoid procedural mechanisms that risk 
unnecessary delay. 
3.  Democratic and Procedural Legitimacy 
The Amendment’s legislative history also prioritizes the legitimacy of a 
disability determination in the eyes of the public.  The Amendment’s framers 
made Congress the arbiter of a dispute over the President’s capacity to instill 
confidence in the outcome by lending the people a voice through their 
representatives.330  Any congressional procedure should aspire to a fair and 
reasonable determination of the President’s disability that engenders public 
confidence. 
4.  Fairness to the President 
In crafting Section 4, Congress acknowledged that the President, carrying 
the electoral mandate of the people, deserves “every advantage in any action 
or contemplated action.”331  Congress expressed this deference by allowing 
the President to challenge involuntary removal, establishing a two-thirds vote 
requirement in each house to remove the President from the powers and 
duties of the office, and providing for the President’s automatic resumption 
of powers and duties if Congress does not decide the issue in twenty-one 
days.332  Consequently, any congressional proceeding under Section 4 should 
ensure a fair process for the President and respect his or her democratic 
legitimacy. 
5.  “Constitutional Morality” and Deterring Partisanship 
Finally, Section 4’s success depends on every stakeholder working for the 
best interests of the country with “a sense of ‘constitutional morality,’” free 
from partisanship and self-interest.333  The Clinic acknowledges that even 
those congressional actions that carry a heightened expectation for 
 
 329. See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 322, at 21–23 (statement of Sen. Roman 
Hruska) (warning that time would not be served by having Congress in the picture of a 
presidential disability because of the inherent delay of congressional debate). 
 330. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 47 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (“[T]he 
powers which have been given to the President by all the people [should not] be taken away 
from him without the representatives of the people having a voice.”); 111 CONG. REC. 7943 
(1965) (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (stating that “the elected representative[s] of the 
people . . . share the greatest trust of the people”). 
 331. See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  Hearings on 
S.J. Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 4–5 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) [hereinafter 1964 Senate 
Hearings]; 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler) (“The [Amendment] 
shall . . .  be in favor of the President because he is the elected representative of the people, 
the first officer of the land, and he shall be favored without doubt.”). 
 332. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 987–89, 988 n.159. 
 333. See S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965). 
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nonpartisanship are increasingly susceptible to partisan brinksmanship.334  
As the 1965 Senate Judiciary Committee Report on presidential inability 
noted, however, “[n]o . . . procedural solution will provide a complete answer 
if [it is derived from] hypothetical cases in which most of the parties are 
rogues . . . .”335  Any Section 4 process should minimize the possibility of 
political mischief but presume that even the best efforts to deter partisanship 
will ultimately rely upon faith in government leaders.336 
B.  Recommendation for a Congressional 
Procedure Under Section 4 
In light of these guiding principles, the House of Representatives and the 
Senate should pass a concurrent resolution and amend their standing rules to 
allow for the establishment of a joint committee to evaluate presidential 
disability pursuant to Section 4. 
1.  Format of the Proceedings 
a.  Proposal for a Joint Committee 
Following a declaration to Congress by the Vice President and a majority 
of the Cabinet (“or by such other body as Congress may by law provide”) 
that the President is unable to discharge his duties pursuant to Section 4, 
Congress shall immediately establish a joint select committee (the “Joint 
Committee”) to determine the President’s ability to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office.  The Joint Committee shall operate as a cohesive unit 
with a unified staff and a single budget,337 review the necessary 
documentation, and conduct the necessary hearings to determine whether the 
President is unable. 
The Joint Committee shall consist of twelve members:  six members from 
the Senate Rules Committee and six members from the House Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice.338  The 
Joint Committee shall consist of six Republicans and six Democrats.  The 
 
 334. See Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, Senior Counsel, Office of the 
Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 11, 2017) (observing that even 
purportedly “solemn” congressional actions are shaped by political pressures). 
 335. See S. REP. NO. 89-66, 13; see also 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 322, at 64 
(statement of Herbert Brownell, former Att’y Gen.) (arguing that the risk of filibuster in a 
Section 4 scenario was “unrealistic” because presidential disability “would be a national 
crisis” in which Congress “always rise[s] to [its] best heights”). 
 336. Moreover, the partisan lines in this instance are likely unclear, as a Section 4 scenario 
only arises when a politician of the President’s own party—the Vice President—and Cabinet 
officials of the President’s own choosing initiate the process in the first place. 
 337. The Joint Committee will also have access to the appropriate resources, including 
physicians and medical experts, to assist it in making a determination. 
 338. The Clinic recommends that the members of both Committees and their staff receive 
special training on their responsibilities in the event that they are appointed to the Joint 
Committee.  Staff members should also conduct periodic meetings aimed at refining the 
congressional response to a Section 4 dispute. 
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members from the House Judiciary’s Subcommittee shall be chosen by the 
Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, and the members from the Senate 
Rules Committee shall be chosen by the Senate Majority and Minority 
Leaders in consultation with the Chairmen and ranking members of the 
respective committees.339  The Joint Committee shall have two cochairs, one 
from the Senate and one from the House, each from a different party.  
Additionally, Senators or Representatives not participating in the inquiry 
shall have the opportunity to submit questions to the Joint Committee before 
and during its proceedings. 
Upon completing its inquiry, the Joint Committee shall vote on whether 
the President is able to discharge his powers and duties.  Irrespective of the 
vote, the Joint Committee shall report its determination, accompanied by a 
report of the committee’s findings and recommendations, to both houses of 
Congress for debate and a final vote. 
b.  Justifications for a Bipartisan Joint Committee Established 
from the Senate Rules and House Judiciary Committees 
The proposed Joint Committee is supported by precedent and practical 
considerations. 
i.  Joint Committee 
Although Congress typically operates via committees working 
independently in each house of Congress, there is clear historical precedent 
for a joint committee of this kind.  Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, for 
example, Congress investigated the incident by establishing a ten-member 
joint committee composed of three Democrats and two Republicans from 
each house of Congress.340  A joint congressional action was also utilized 
during the investigation of the Iran-Contra affair,341 where special select 
committees were established in the Senate and the House to investigate the 
scandal, and both committees “agreed to combine their investigations and 
hearings.”342 
Joint congressional action also draws from previous recommendations for 
congressional procedures under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
which requires confirmation of the President’s nominee from both houses of 
Congress to fill a vacancy in the vice presidency.343  When Congress was 
tasked with considering Gerald Ford’s nomination in 1973, a strong minority 
of the Senate Rules and Judiciary Committees supported creating a joint 
 
 339. To incorporate the House Rules and Senate Judiciary Committees as much as possible, 
the Clinic advises that the majority and minority leaders in each House appoint the Chairmen 
and ranking members of each committee to the Joint Committee. 
 340. See generally Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, U.S. 
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Pearl 
Harbor.htm [https://perma.cc/2W8L-PZS2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 341. LEE H. HAMILTON ET AL., REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
INVESTIGATING THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR 683–84 (1987). 
 342. Id. at 684. 
 343. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. 
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committee.344  Similarly, in 1975, the American Bar Association’s Special 
Committee on Election Reform (the “ABA Committee”) recommended that 
future Section 2 confirmation proceedings consist of joint hearings conducted 
by the Senate Rules and House Judiciary Committees.345  To support its 
recommendation, the ABA Committee cited the redundant process by which 
the House and Senate committees conducted hearings, independent of each 
other, to confirm Vice Presidents Gerald Ford and Nelson D. Rockefeller.346 
Historical precedent aside, the proposed Joint Committee best conforms to 
the guiding principles set forth above.  First, the Joint Committee would 
satisfy Congress’s intent that it “decide the issue as quickly as possible”347 
by avoiding duplicative hearings in each House of Congress.348  Second, the 
Joint Committee would enhance the legitimacy of the process:  departing 
from routine, a single committee process sends a message to the public that 
Congress is aware of the gravity of the situation.349  Third, hearings before 
the Joint Committee would maintain fairness to the President by reducing the 
burden on him to argue his case twice.  Fourth, the Joint Committee’s unified 
record would enhance the deliberative process by ensuring that each House 
of Congress is making decisions based on a common set of facts. 
ii.  Bipartisan Members from the Senate Rules 
and House Judiciary Committees 
Practical considerations also support the conclusion that Joint Committee 
members should be drawn from the Senate Rules and House Judiciary 
Committees, since those Committees have jurisdiction over matters of 
 
 344. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 139–40.  The idea 
acknowledged the House members’ concerns that they would be overshadowed by the Senate. 
Id. 
 345. Examination of the First Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment:  Hearing on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 142–43 (1975) (statement of the American Bar 
Association) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearing]. 
 346. See id. at 143 (noting that the Senate Rules and House Judiciary Committees “each 
drew on [the same] investigatory arms of the government and covered much of the same 
ground,” resulting in a fifty-five-day absence of a Vice President before Congress confirmed 
Gerald Ford under Section 2); id. at 144 (statement of John D. Feerick) (“[H]ad a single joint 
hearing been in effect at the time of the Rockefeller nomination, it might have [proceeded] 
with more expedition.”). 
 347. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 42 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 348. See 1975 Senate Hearing, supra note 345, at 143–44 (statement American Bar 
Association) (“A joint inquiry . . . would eliminate duplication of effort . . . [and] increase the 
effectiveness of the inquiry, since the resources of both Houses would be combined, 
coordinated and utilized to best advantage.” (emphasis added)). 
 349. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 140 (outlining the 
argument that joint hearings under Section 2 would “lift the nomination ‘out of normal 
legislative procedures’ and put ‘it on a higher plane of constitutional prerogative’” (quoting 
119 CONG. REC. 33,793 (1973) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)); id. at 141 (noting Senator 
Joseph Biden’s concern that “we must impress upon the American people that we do not think 
[a Section 2 proceeding] is business as usual”). 
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presidential succession.350  Allowing legislators and staff members with 
expertise in this area would make the process more efficient and effective.351 
There is also precedent for bipartisan committees.  For example, the Senate 
Select Committee on Ethics is divided evenly between the parties.352  
Additionally, a bipartisan committee increases legitimacy by guarding 
against the appearance and effect of political motives.  Finally, even if the 
gravity of the situation alone cannot do this, public scrutiny will likely 
minimize any gridlock that could arise from the evenly divided committee. 
iii.  Noncommittee Members Submitting 
Questions to the Joint Committee 
Allowing other members of Congress to submit questions for the Joint 
Committee to ask witnesses, at the cochairs’ discretion, has a close analogue 
in the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
Impeachment.353  The ability to submit questions to the cochairs would likely 
help satisfy concerns that the procedure is shutting noncommittee members 
out of the fact-finding process.354 
2.  Expedited Procedures for the Committee’s Work 
and for Consideration in Both Houses 
Given Section 4’s twenty-one-day time frame, the Joint Committee should 
conduct its inquiry as quickly as possible to provide the full Congress enough 
time to evaluate its findings.  Therefore, the Joint Committee shall be 
established in the first two days of the twenty-one-day period.  The Joint 
Committee should also complete its inquiry and vote within the first sixteen 
days, allowing the full Congress five days to debate and vote.  During this 
five-day period, Senators shall be prohibited from filibustering and all other 
attempts to delay a vote shall be discouraged. 
 
 350. About the Committee, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMM., 
https://judiciary.house.gov/about-the-committee/ [https://perma.cc/7WXT-8AYM] (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2017); About the Committee, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., 
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PurposeJurisdiction 
[https://perma.cc/RQ2Y-SSC7] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017); see also ROBERT KATZMANN, 
JUDGING STATUTES 12 (2014) (emphasizing the need for Congress “to develop procedures so 
that its members would develop specialized competence and experience”). 
 351. See KATZMANN, supra note 350, at 14 (“The committee system . . . channel[s] the 
pursuit of the individual interest to the good of Congress itself.”). 
 352. See Committee Members, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 
http://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/committee-members [https://perma.cc/AA56-
57BH] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).  This tradition also finds support in the Joint Select 
Committee on Deficit Reduction. See 2 U.S.C. § 900 note sec. 401(b)(4) (2012) (Joint Select 
Committee on Deficit Reduction) (establishing a twelve-member committee with six members 
from each party to recommend a budget for congressional approval). 
 353. See S. DOC. NO. 113-1, at 227 (2014) (“If a Senator wishes a question to be put to a 
witness . . . it shall be reduced to writing, and put by the Presiding Officer.”). 
 354. See Interview with Roy E. Brownell II, supra note 307 (outlining potential practical 
and policy concerns that members of Congress might raise regarding the Clinic’s proposal). 
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Removing the filibuster finds strong support in the legislative history355 
and its guiding principles.  Senators have long utilized the tradition of 
unlimited debate to thwart legislation or the confirmation of nominees.356  
Precluding this delay tactic helps to ensure that a determination on the 
President’s competence is completed within twenty-one days.  It also 
enhances the legitimacy of the process by blocking an avenue for political 
gamesmanship. 
Precedent for such expedited rules can be found in the Budget Control Act 
of 2011, which mandated that recommendations of the bipartisan Joint Select 
Committee on Deficit Reduction receive expedited votes.357  The Act 
removed the opportunity for objection or filibuster and restricted the total 
debate on the floors of each house.358 
3.  Subpoena Powers 
The Joint Committee shall have broad authority to request any and all 
documents and testimony it deems necessary.  A cochairman may issue a 
subpoena with either the concurrence of the other cochairman or the support 
of a majority of the Joint Committee.  If an individual refuses to comply with 
a subpoena, the Joint Committee may find that individual in contempt of 
Congress.359 
The Amendment’s framers likely contemplated congressional authority to 
compel testimony and the production of documents.360  At the very least, they 
anticipated the need to hear from the President, the Vice President, the 
Cabinet, medical experts, and those aides “[who] can compare how the 
 
 355. The time limit might imply a ban on filibuster. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 
38, at 236 (statement of Rep. Richard Poff) (observing that the proposal for a time limit on 
congressional deliberations was motivated by a fear that “a filibuster might develop in the 
other body[,] which might not be altogether pure in its motivation”); see also 111 CONG. REC. 
3276 (1965) (statement of Sen. Pastore). 
 356. See Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster:  The Politics of Obstruction, 48 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 467, 477–79 (2011) (surveying the bipartisan “flood” of filibusters over 
the past twenty years that has imposed an effective supermajority requirement for the passage 
of legislation and the confirmation of presidential appointees). 
 357. See Budget Control Act of 2011, 2 U.S.C. § 900 note sec. 402(c)(3) (2012) (Expedited 
Consideration of Joint Committee Recommendations). 
 358. See id. 
 359. Ideally, Congress and the White House would work to avoid subpoenas because 
proceedings to enforce subpoenas, such as declaring subpoenaed individuals in contempt of 
Congress, might be infeasible in the twenty-one-day time frame.  However, congressional 
subpoenas may become necessary. See Telephone Interview with Bernard Nussbaum, former 
White House Counsel to President Bill Clinton (Sept. 15, 2016) (suggesting that the lack of 
cooperation in a Section 4 proceeding could give rise to an impeachable offense). 
 360. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 46 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) 
(emphasizing the importance of “the opportunity to call on medical witnesses [and] to consult 
with the members of Cabinet and the Vice President who had made this important decision”); 
see also 111 CONG. REC. 3279 (1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin).  The standing rules of both 
the House and the Senate provide that their committees may exercise subpoena authority. See 
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 113–181, r. 
XI, at 571–78 (2015); STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113–18, r. XXVI, at 31 
(2013). 
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President is acting now with how he acted yesterday or a month ago.”361  
Similarly, there was likely an assumption that Congress would have access 
to documents like the President’s medical records362 and any other 
information that the Vice President and Cabinet relied upon to make their 
determination.363 
The rule aims to ensure that Congress will have access to the information 
it needs to conduct informed deliberations, especially in situations where a 
disabled President refuses to testify or provide records.364  It also enhances 
efficiency if the President tries to “run out” the twenty-one days by 
stonewalling. 
4.  Due Process to the President 
The President shall be given fair and adequate notice of Section 4 
congressional proceedings and shall have the opportunity to testify before the 
Joint Committee.  The President shall also have the opportunity to submit the 
results of his own medical examination and to recommend witnesses to the 
committee who can then be called upon for a hearing at the discretion of the 
cochairs. 
As discussed in further detail below, the guarantees of fair notice, 
opportunity to be heard, and the opportunity to recommend witnesses satisfy 
procedural fairness.  Moreover, those guarantees respect the President’s 
constitutional legitimacy and improve public confidence in the integrity of 
the proceeding without impairing the efficiency of the process.  These 
guarantees also enhance Congress’s deliberation by affording the President 
adequate time to prepare his argument. 
5.  Information and Publicity 
Generally, the documents and hearings before the Joint Committee shall 
be open to the public.  However, the Joint Committee may determine by a 
majority vote that documents or hearings shall be kept behind closed doors. 
A Section 4 scenario would likely lend itself to open hearings given the 
intense public interest in this issue.  Brownell, for example, envisioned that 
 
 361. 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 322, at 29 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); see also 
1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 251 (statement of Herbert Brownell, former Att’y 
Gen.); id. at 143 (statement of Rep. Byron Rogers) (discussing the possibility of questioning 
the President’s doctor and inquiring into his or her medical history).  Accordingly, the staff 
members most likely to be subpoenaed are those who interact with the President on a daily 
basis.  While this list would include prominent figures like the Chief of Staff, guests of the 
Clinic have raised several lesser-known possibilities. See, e.g., Interview with John O. 
Brennan, supra note 49 (discussing the White House photographer); Interview with Dr. 
Connie Mariano, supra note 78 (discussing presidential valets); Interview with Frances F. 
Townsend, supra note 210 (discussing White House gardeners and housekeepers). 
 362. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 46 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 363. Indeed, Congress intended that the Vice President and Cabinet would invoke Section 
4 “only after adequate consultation with medical experts who were intricately familiar with 
the President’s . . . condition.” S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965). 
 364. See supra note 361 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of the executive 
branch resisting inquiries into the President’s mental health). 
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“there would be hourly bulletins from the medical [professionals], and 
statements would be made in the press, television, radio [such that] the 
problem would be present in the minds of everybody in the United States.”365 
Moreover, transparency is essential to the process’s legitimacy—it ensures 
that the public knows just as much as their representatives about the 
President’s health before those representatives make an ultimate 
determination.  It also guards against any perception of a “star chamber”366 
proceeding and preempts allegations of back-room deals.367 
Just as significantly, public scrutiny will likely incentivize more informed 
deliberations and a fairer process for the President.  Members of Congress 
will feel greater pressure to deliberate objectively and to treat an allegedly 
ailing President with respect when they know that their constituents are 
watching.368 
National security concerns raised by a dispute over the President’s fitness 
might weigh in favor of closed proceedings.369  Dragging the President 
through such an intrusive procedure could erode the President’s ability to 
project an image of strength and stability at home and abroad, even after the 
disability ends.370  An interest in closed proceedings under Section 4 is also 
furthered by the privacy concerns implicated by an inquiry into a President’s 
health.371  However, granting the Joint Committee discretion to close any 
 
 365. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 247 (statement of Herbert Brownell, former 
Att’y Gen.).  During the same hearings, Senator Bayh maintained that “[t]here is going to be 
public debate [with respect to the President’s disability] no matter to which body you give the 
final power of decision,” citing the “great deal of congressional debate” that “was done in the 
open” concerning the alleged disability of President Wilson as precedent. Id. at 93.  Similarly, 
Representative Basil Whitener of North Carolina envisioned a proceeding where “Congress 
could . . . invite [the President] over here to speak to the Congress and appeal.  It could be 
televised and the people of the Nation could look at it, and if the man was competent, . . .  it 
would not only be apparent to Members of the Congress but would be apparent to the Nation.” 
Id. at 147. 
 366. See id. at 148 (statement of Rep. Basil Whitener). 
 367. See id. at 189 (statement of Rep. Charles Mathias Jr.) (acknowledging the danger of 
removing the President from his powers and duties without public accountability). 
 368. See id. at 147 (statement of Rep. Basil Whitener) (“There would be very few Members 
of Congress, no matter how politically motivated they were, who would stand up and say the 
[President] was . . . unable to carry on his work if the millions of people . . .  who looked on 
him on television as he spoke to the Congress decided he was all right.”). 
 369. See Interview with John O. Brennan, supra note 49. 
 370. See Robert E. Gilbert, Coping with Presidential Disability:  The Proposal for a 
Standing Medical Commission, POL. & LIFE SCI., Mar. 2003, at 2, 10–11 (emphasizing the 
significance of “aura” and “image” to presidential power); see also 1965 House Hearings, 
supra note 38, at 92–93 (statement of Rep. Charles Mathias Jr.) (warning that any 
congressional procedure to resolve a dispute over presidential disability could be very 
demoralizing and damaging to the public opinion of the presidency); id. at 163 (statement of 
Marion Folsom, Chairman, Committee for Improvement of Management in Government, 
Committee of Economic Development). 
 371. See, e.g., Neustadt, supra note 324, at 430 (noting that Section 4 raises the issue of 
whether “a doctor h[as] a duty to breach the confidentiality of the physician-patient 
relationship in favor of the public’s right to know”); see also Interview with Frances F. 
Townsend, supra note 210. 
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proceedings addresses concerns regarding national security, presidential 
privacy, and the President’s public image. 
C.  Legal Issues 
Several legal issues could arise if Congress were to implement the 
proposed procedure.  A court may need to decide (1) whether a President is 
protected by executive and attorney-client privileges, (2) whether a challenge 
by the President to the recommended procedure would be justiciable, and (3) 
whether the President could have a meritorious due process challenge if 
Congress decides he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office. 
1.  Privileges 
There are at least two legal issues that a court may need to decide regarding 
the Joint Committee’s access to evidence:  (1) whether the White House 
could successfully assert executive privilege over its staff and documents 
against a Congressional subpoena and (2) whether attorney-client privilege 
prevents Congress from accessing documents and receiving testimony from 
executive branch attorneys working with the President. 
a.  Overriding Executive Privilege Against Subpoenas 
for Documents and Testimony Related to 
the President’s Ability to Serve 
It is arguably against the President’s interests to refuse congressional 
demands for documents and testimony, as Congress and the public may view 
such resistance as evidence of the inability.372  Nonetheless, the President 
may assert executive privilege, and a court may have to decide the scope of 
Congress’s subpoena power in a Section 4 proceeding. 
Although federal courts have recognized a strong presumption of 
executive privilege, a court is likely to find that any claims of privilege will 
yield to the specific need for Congress to fulfill its constitutional duty to 
determine the President’s capacity.373  Federal courts have shown a 
willingness to override executive privilege when there is a strong showing of 
specific need for information by a coequal branch of government executing 
a core function.  For example, in United States v. Nixon,374 the Supreme 
Court rejected the President’s claims of privilege over tape recordings of 
White House conversations when they were subpoenaed by a special 
prosecutor for use in a criminal trial.375  The Court held that “[t]he 
 
 372. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 144 (statement of Rep. Willard 
Curtin) (“[T]he refusal of the President could be in such manner as to very well indicate . . . 
that he is mentally incapacitated.”). 
 373. See Telephone Interview with Bernard Nussbaum, supra note 359 (observing that the 
public interest in determining a president’s inability would likely overcome executive 
privilege). 
 374. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 375. See id. at 713. 
982 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
  
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific 
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.”376 
By contrast, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities v. Nixon,377 the D.C. Circuit ruled that subpoenas of the tapes 
issued by a special committee of the Senate did not override claims of 
executive privilege.378  The court concluded that the subpoenaed materials 
were “too attenuated” to Congress’s legislative or oversight functions to 
override the presumption of executive privilege.379  This was especially the 
case because the tapes were already in the possession of the House Judiciary 
Committee as part of its impeachment proceedings. 
b.  Maintaining Attorney-Client Privilege 
for Records and Testimony by White House Attorneys 
Congress may seek information from White House attorneys in a Section 
4 scenario.  The Supreme Court has generally recognized a broad privilege 
for attorney-client relationships.380  However, members of Congress have 
argued that attorney-client privilege should not apply in the context of 
Congressional proceedings.381 
Federal courts have rarely addressed this issue and in the few instances 
where they have, they have reached different conclusions.  In cases relating 
to the criminal and congressional investigations into the “Whitewater 
Controversy,” the Eighth and D.C. Circuits both came down on the side of 
disclosure.382  In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,383 a divided 
Eighth Circuit panel held that the independent counsel could obtain attorney 
notes prepared by White House attorneys in connection with the 
investigation.384  The majority emphasized that “the strong public interest in 
honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be 
 
 376. Id. 
 377. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 378. Id. at 733. 
 379. Id. 
 380. See generally Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (protecting 
attorney-client privileges for a deceased client); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 
(1981) (recognizing the public policy interests for an attorney-client relationship with 
corporate clients). 
 381. See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi, No Secrets Allowed:  Congress’s Treatment and 
Mistreatment of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Protection in 
Congressional Investigations and Contempt Proceedings, 25 J.L. & POL. 145, 178 (2009) 
(stating that several members of Congress have argued that the privilege does not apply to 
particular congressional activity). 
 382. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 383. 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 384. Id. at 921.  One additional question that a court may consider is whether a Section 4 
determination would rise to the same level of public interest as a criminal investigation to 
warrant an override of an assertion of privilege. 
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ill-served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege 
applicable in criminal proceedings.”385 
However, a dissenting opinion insisted that “[t]he President’s justifiable 
need for confidentiality is . . . ever present no matter what other governmental 
interests are asserted by a prosecutor.”386  The dissent emphasized the 
importance of the White House receiving effective legal counsel387 and 
advocated balancing “the governmental privilege asserted by the White 
House against the competing governmental interest asserted by the 
[independent counsel], the ultimate goal being to promote the ‘public 
interest.’”388 
In In re Lindsey,389 the D.C. Circuit granted the independent counsel’s 
request to compel grand jury testimony from a Deputy White House 
Counsel.390  The court held that “it would be contrary to tradition, common 
understanding, and our governmental system for the attorney-client privilege 
to attach to White House Counsel in the same manner as private counsel.”391 
By contrast, in In re Grand Jury Investigation,392 the Second Circuit held 
that a governor could assert attorney-client privilege over communications 
with government attorneys in connection with a criminal investigation.393  
The court reasoned that 
the traditional rationale for the privilege applies with special force in the 
government context.  It is crucial that government officials, who are 
expected to uphold and execute the law and who may face criminal 
prosecution for failing to do so, be encouraged to seek out and receive fully 
informed legal advice.394 
Based on the sparse precedent, a court is unlikely to override attorney-
client privilege in a Section 4 proceeding absent an extremely high showing 
of need.  Indeed, the Clinic anticipates that a Section 4 proceeding would 
likely increase the need to protect the President’s legal representation and 
consultation.  Allowing Congress to access these records would likely put the 
President at a legal disadvantage and chill the President’s willingness to 
exchange information with government attorneys. 
Any balancing of the public interest will depend on the factual 
circumstances before the court.  A court will likely look to whether the 
President is asserting attorney-client privilege to hinder the congressional 
inquiry, as in In re Lindsey,395 or to protect legitimate legal advice, as in In 
re Grand Jury Investigation.396 
 
 385. Id.  
 386. Id. at 927 (Kopf, J., dissenting). 
 387. Id. at 930. 
 388. Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707–13 (1974)). 
 389. 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 
 390. Id. at 1278. 
 391. Id. 
 392. 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 393. Id. at 536. 
 394. Id. at 534. 
 395. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1263. 
 396. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 535. 
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2.  Justiciability:  The Political Question Doctrine 
If the President filed suit to challenge the process Congress followed to 
evaluate his capacity, a court would need to decide whether the case is 
justiciable.  A case is justiciable when a court finds that it is capable of 
resolving the dispute at hand.397  Conversely, a case is not justiciable when 
it involves a request for an advisory opinion or a political question.398 
A President’s challenge of the congressional procedures under Section 4 
would likely implicate the political question doctrine.  In Baker v. Carr,399 
the Supreme Court set forth six “formulations” to guide courts in determining 
whether a case involves a nonjusticiable political question.400  A case is 
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine where (1) there is a 
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue [at hand] to 
a coordinate political department”; (2) there is a “lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving” the issue at hand; (3) 
a court cannot decide a case “without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion”; (4) a court cannot decide a case “without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government”; (5) 
there is an “unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made”; or (6) there is “the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”401 
The Court applied the Baker “formulations” in Nixon v. United States,402 
a case involving a federal judge whom Congress had impeached and 
removed.403  The judge argued that his trial before a Senate committee, 
instead of the full Senate, violated the Constitution’s Impeachment Trial 
Clause.404 
The Court examined the extent to which the Impeachment Trial Clause 
commits the responsibility of trying impeachments to the Senate.405  Because 
the Clause states that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments”406 and outlines specific procedural requirements that the 
Senate must follow, the Court held that the Constitution “committed” the role 
of trying impeachments to the Senate alone.407  Thus, the judge’s challenge 
to the impeachment trial procedures was a nonjusticiable political 
question.408 
 
 397. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1968). 
 398. Id. at 95. 
 399. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 400. See id. 217. 
 401. Id. 
 402. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 403. See id. at 226–28. 
 404. Id. at 226. 
 405. See id. at 228–29. 
 406. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 407. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–37. 
 408. See id. at 237–38. 
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Applying precedent to any challenge of the proposed Joint Committee 
procedure, a court would likely hold that there is a “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment” in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment devolving the 
power to manage Section 4 disputes to Congress,409 as Section 4 states that 
“Congress shall decide the issue.”410 
One possible argument a President may make is that Section 4, in contrast 
to the Impeachment Trial Clause, does not explicitly say that Congress has 
the “sole” power to determine whether he is able to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office.  In addition, the President may contend that the 
Amendment’s silence regarding judicial review counsels in favor of such 
review. 
Yet, in context, Section 4 does not seem to contemplate any sort of judicial 
appellate review.  The legislative history reflects Congress’s intent that a 
disability inquiry would be a political question not subject to judicial 
review.411  Moreover, a Section 4 dispute would likely trigger an 
overwhelming need for finality.412  Any appeal by the President to the 
judiciary would undermine the legitimacy of the Vice President’s service as 
Acting President.413 
3.  Due Process 
In the unlikely event that a court does hold a challenge to be justiciable, 
the Clinic analyzed whether a President may have a meritorious claim under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Procedural due process 
violations occur when the government interferes with legitimate liberty or 
property interests without following constitutionally sufficient procedures.414  
Before a court can determine whether the government has violated procedural 
due process, it must determine whether the government has “deprived [the 
plaintiff] of . . . liberty[] or property.”415 
a.  Property Interest in the Presidency 
If a President raised a due process challenge against Congress’s procedures 
under Section 4, he may claim that Congress deprived him of his property 
interest in the presidency itself.  However, it is well settled that an elected 
 
 409. See id. at 228–29 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 410. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 411. See 111 CONG. REC. 15,588 (1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“In my view [the 
question whether a President is capable of performing or discharging the powers of his or her 
office] would be a political question and for that reason the Court would not be called upon to 
pass upon it.”). 
 412. Cf. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236 (noting that the “legitimacy of any successor, and hence 
[his or her] effectiveness, would be impaired severely, not merely while the judicial process 
was running its course, but during any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might 
conduct if its first judgment of conviction were invalidated”). 
 413. See id. 
 414. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). 
 415. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 490 U.S. at 459–60. 
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office is not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause.416  The 
principle that the office of the President is entrusted to a given President by 
the people would likely undercut a President’s claimed property interest in 
the presidency. 
After the Supreme Court held in two cases that political offices are not 
property,417 it evaluated whether there is a property interest in government 
employment more generally.418  In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth,419 the Court noted that one could have a property interest in his or her 
employment but held that the plaintiff, an assistant professor at a state 
university, lacked any such property interest because “[his] appointment 
secured absolutely no interest in re-employment [after the end of the 
contractual term].”420  In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,421 the 
Court held that the plaintiff, a security guard for Cleveland public schools, 
did have a property interest in his employment because an Ohio statute gave 
him a right to retain his position absent malfeasance.422 
In a due process challenge, the President could argue that the Court should 
reassess its holdings in Snowden and Taylor in light of Roth and Loudermill.  
However, such an outcome is unlikely, as the Court treats elected office as 
categorically different from other government employment. 
b.  Liberty Interest in One’s Reputation 
The President may also contend that the recommended procedure under 
Section 4 deprived him of his liberty interest in his reputation.  The Supreme 
Court has held that such an interest is protected under the Due Process 
Clause.423 
In the D.C. Circuit,424 a plaintiff can establish a reputation-based due 
process claim in two ways.425  First, under the “reputation-plus” theory, a 
plaintiff must show that there was (1) “an adverse employment action, such 
as [an] involuntary loss of government employment,” (2) “a stigmatizing or 
defamatory act by the government closely connected with that adverse 
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action,” and (3) a subsequent negative effect on future employment 
prospects.426 
Second, a plaintiff may articulate a “stigma” theory of reputational harm, 
which “differs from the [reputation-plus theory] in that it does not depend on 
official speech, but on a continuing stigma or disability arising from official 
action.”427  Under this theory, a plaintiff can show that the government’s 
actions exclude him from future government employment or that the actions 
prevent him from pursuing his chosen career.428 
Under the reputation-plus framework, a President may be able to establish 
that a congressional determination of presidential inability damaged his 
reputation as a healthy executive.  This reputational damage could in turn 
negatively affect a President’s future employment prospects.  However, the 
temporary nature of the removal contemplated by Section 4 undermines the 
“adverse employment action” prong of the theory.  Even if Congress were to 
determine that the President suffers from an inability, the President would 
nonetheless resume the powers and duties of the Office if the Vice President 
and Cabinet elect not to challenge a President’s subsequent declaration that 
he is able.  The “employment action” is thus not truly “adverse.” 
Similarly, under the “stigma” theory, any congressional determination of 
presidential inability would likely not keep the President from engaging in 
government work in the future.  Moreover, such a decision could hardly be 
said to preclude the President from continuing in his chosen line of work—
as an elected office with a two-term limit, the presidency is not a profession 
where one can expect to spend an entire career. 
c.  The Process That Is Due 
Despite the limited prospects of a due process challenge, Congress should 
implement procedures under Section 4 that afford the President due process.  
Affording due process to a President under Section 4 bolsters its legitimacy.  
If it appears that a President is being disadvantaged, the public could view 
any Section 4 determination as erroneous or politically motivated. 
Accordingly, the Joint Committee should provide the President with 
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard.429  Once the Vice President and 
a majority of the Cabinet trigger a Section 4 dispute through written 
disagreement, Congress should transmit a letter to relevant executive branch 
officials, including the President, to inform them of the initiation of the 
process.  The Joint Committee should then allow the President to present his 
case by testifying as to his ability to discharge the powers and duties of the 
office and responding to the Vice President and Cabinet’s arguments. 
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VI.  PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES’ HEALTH DISCLOSURES 
Planning for uses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is not the only step that 
policy-makers should take to help ensure that the country always has an able 
president.  A clear approach to the disclosure of information about 
presidential candidates’ health is needed to guarantee that voters have enough 
information to decide whether candidates are fit to serve.  Improved 
disclosure requirements may also have the added benefit of reducing political 
attacks based on unfounded speculation about candidates’ health. 
Currently, there is no legal requirement for presidential candidates to 
disclose any information about their health.  However, many recent 
candidates have disclosed some information voluntarily, though sometimes 
only after pressure from journalists or their opponents.430  There is no single 
accepted model for campaign health disclosure and, in the past few decades, 
these disclosures have trended toward providing less information.431  This 
must change. 
This Part reviews the history of issues relating to presidential candidates’ 
health in modern presidential campaigns.  Next, it reviews various 
approaches to improving the procedures for disclosing candidates’ health 
information.  Finally, it describes the Clinic’s proposal to create a 
commission charged with creating guidelines for presidential candidates to 
follow when releasing health information. 
A.  Health Issues in Modern Presidential Campaigns 
Over the past century, several candidates have failed to disclose serious 
health problems, others have seen their health become a significant focus of 
campaigns, and candidates’ approaches to disclosing health information 
generally have evolved and devolved.432 
1.  Cover-Ups 
Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy are among the candidates in the twentieth 
century who covered up serious health conditions. 
President Wilson had a history of cerebrovascular disorders and strokes 
dating back to 1896, sixteen years before he was elected.433  A neurologist 
who examined him around the time of his election in 1912 opined that he was 
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unlikely to live through his first term.434  Yet Wilson kept his health from the 
public.435  In October 1919, Wilson suffered a stroke that left him unable to 
carry out many basic presidential responsibilities for the final year and a half 
of his second term.436 
When President Roosevelt ran for a fourth term in 1944, the public knew 
the wheelchair-bound chief executive suffered from polio.437  He had 
addressed the issue openly during his first campaign in 1931 by participating 
in a magazine interview about his health and submitting to an examination 
by three physicians.438  But voters in the 1944 election did not know that he 
had subsequently been diagnosed with congestive heart failure.439  His doctor 
had issued a note saying he was in remarkably good health440 and, when 
rumors about Roosevelt’s health persisted, several other doctors verified that 
assessment.441  But one of those doctors wrote a confidential memo stating 
that he doubted the President could survive another four years.442  On April 
12, 1945, just months into his fourth term and in the midst of World War II, 
Roosevelt died of a cerebral hemorrhage.443 
Ten years after Roosevelt’s death, another incumbent presidential 
candidate faced a serious heart condition.  In September 1955, a little more 
than a year before the 1956 election, President Eisenhower suffered a massive 
heart attack.444  His medical challenges continued in June 1956 when he 
suffered an obstruction of his small intestine that required surgery under 
general anesthesia.445 
Through much of 1956, Eisenhower led the press to believe that he was 
not running for reelection, which discouraged close scrutiny of his health.446  
Eisenhower’s doctors told the public on multiple occasions that Eisenhower’s 
health was not a concern, and one said on the eve of the election that he gave 
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“every appearance of being in excellent health.”447  Yet Eisenhower had 
experienced several health problems in the lead up to the election, including 
abdominal pain, dizziness, an irregular pulse, and elevated blood pressure.448 
The day before the election, Eisenhower’s opponent, Adlai Stevenson, 
bluntly charged that Eisenhower would not survive another term.449  
Eisenhower still won by a landslide,450 but a year later he suffered a stroke 
that briefly affected his ability to speak.451 
Eisenhower’s successor brought his own health problems to the White 
House.  President John F. Kennedy suffered from Addison’s disease and 
chronic back pain, but he did not disclose either ailment.452  In fact, he and 
at least one of his doctors flatly denied rumors that he suffered from 
Addison’s disease.453  While in office, Kennedy grappled with his conditions 
through extensive use of medications, particularly steroids and 
amphetamines.454  His treatment required a “tremendous allocation of time 
and attention,”455 and some have argued that the medications “impaired 
Kennedy’s subsequent health and behavior.”456 
In addition to candidates who won the presidency, at least one unsuccessful 
candidate may have concealed significant health information.  In 1992, 
Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas was a leading candidate for the 
Democratic nomination457 following treatment several years prior for a form 
of lymph-node cancer, or lymphoma.458  Tsongas’s doctors, one of whom 
was “an ardent personal and financial backer of the campaign,”459 told 
reporters that the candidate was cured in 1986 when, in fact, they had detected 
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more lymphoma the following year.460  Tsongas lost in the primaries and 
announced several months later that his cancer had returned.461  He died two 
days before the end of the presidential term for which he had run.462 
2.  Candidates’ Health as a Campaign Issue 
Candidates’ health has become a prominent feature of several campaigns, 
often through political attacks. 
The 1972 presidential election was briefly consumed by the revelation that 
Democratic vice presidential candidate Thomas Eagleton had been treated 
for depression.  George McGovern had chosen Eagleton as his running mate 
with little information about his health history.463  The revelation about 
Eagleton’s depression and his prior electroshock therapy treatment triggered 
enormous pressure from party leaders, campaign contributors, and even 
McGovern campaign staff,464 ultimately forcing Eagleton to step down after 
only eighteen days on the ticket.465 
During the final months of the 1988 presidential campaign, rumors 
circulated that Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis “in the distant past . . . 
had suffered some kind of serious psychological breakdown.”466  Dukakis 
largely ignored the unsubstantiated rumors until they became front-page 
news after President Ronald Reagan called Dukakis “an invalid.”467  
Although he ultimately apologized,468 Reagan’s comment gave credence to 
the rumors.  Dukakis’s doctor appeared on television and released a full 
report stating that Dukakis was in “excellent health.”469  But Dukakis 
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dropped eight points in polls that week, hurting the substantial lead he had 
held before the incident.470 
The health of 2016 Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton also 
received extensive attention.  Throughout her candidacy, corners of the 
internet and media were rife with speculation that she was concealing serious 
health problems.471  This speculation was fueled in part by a December 2012 
incident in which Clinton suffered a concussion caused by a potentially life-
threatening blood clot near her brain.472 
Her opponent in the 2016 race, Donald Trump, consistently asserted that 
she was not physically fit to serve as President.  For example, in one tweet in 
January 2016, he flatly claimed, “Hillary Clinton doesn’t have the strength 
or stamina to be president.”473 
The focus on Clinton’s health intensified on September 11, 2016, when 
she fell ill at a ceremony marking the fifteenth anniversary of 9/11.474  As 
Clinton left the ceremony early, she appeared to fall while getting into a 
van.475  Her campaign initially stated that Clinton had felt “overheated” but 
revealed the next day that she was suffering from pneumonia.476  She had 
known of her condition for several days but did not disclose it for fear of 
opponents exploiting it.477  Later that week, Clinton’s doctor released a letter 
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describing her treatment for pneumonia and concluding that she was “healthy 
and fit to serve as President of the United States.”478 
Then-candidate Trump seized on the incident in the remaining weeks of 
the campaign.  During one of multiple rallies where he called attention to the 
incident, he ridiculed Clinton for being unable to “make it [fifteen] feet to her 
car” and imitated Clinton falling.479  Additionally, the Trump campaign 
released a television ad that used video of the incident as a narrator stated, 
“Hillary Clinton doesn’t have the fortitude, strength, or stamina to lead in our 
world.”480  After the second presidential debate, Trump, without evidence, 
suggested Clinton had used drugs to energize herself.481 
3.  Recent Candidate Health Disclosures 
Since the 1976 presidential campaign, all major party candidates have 
released information about their health, although the thoroughness and 
truthfulness of these disclosures has varied.  This modern era of candidate 
health disclosure was ushered in by an attitude of “post-Watergate 
candor.”482  A desire to avoid “embarrassing surprises” about medical issues, 
such as those that led to vice presidential nominee Thomas Eagleton’s 
withdrawal from the 1972 race, also likely encouraged candidates to disclose 
more health details.483 
Candidates’ openness about their health in the eleven campaigns between 
1976 and 2016 has been shaped by various forces, particularly pressure from 
opposing candidates and journalists.  The ages and health histories of 
candidates also seem to have impacted disclosures.  In 1976, major party 
candidates Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter released statements from their 
doctors about their most recent examinations.484  Ronald Reagan, the 
Republican nominee in 1980, took his health disclosures further by partaking 
in an interview with New York Times reporter Lawrence K. Altman, a 
physician.  The sixty-nine-year-old candidate said he granted the interview 
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“because the question of his age had arisen” in the campaign.485  Reagan’s 
opponent, President Jimmy Carter, did not give an interview about his health, 
but the White House doctor released a report on Carter’s health and answered 
questions from Dr. Altman.486 
In 1984, neither Ronald Reagan nor Walter Mondale gave interviews on 
their health, instead allowing their doctors to speak with the press.487  But a 
new high watermark for candidate health disclosure was reached in 1988 
when both presidential candidates—Michael Dukakis and George H.W. 
Bush—and their respective doctors gave health-related interviews.488  Some 
of the interviews that Dukakis and his doctor gave were prompted by 
unsubstantiated rumors about his alleged depression and Reagan’s “invalid” 
comment.489 
The 1992 campaign saw a temporary retreat from candidate interviews, as 
only the candidates’ doctors spoke with the press.490  Bill Clinton, the 
Democratic nominee, did not allow his doctors to give interviews or release 
detailed information until the final weeks of the campaign, after the New York 
Times charged that he had been “less forthcoming about his health than any 
presidential nominee of the last 20 years.”491 
While running for reelection in 1996, Clinton faced criticism from 
Republican candidate Bob Dole for allegedly failing to release adequate 
health information.492  He responded with statements from White House 
physician Connie Mariano and other specialists attesting to Clinton’s good 
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TIMES (Sept. 15, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/15/us/responding-to-dole-clinton-
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health.493  Additionally, Clinton and Dr. Mariano gave an interview to Dr. 
Altman in the final weeks of the campaign.494  Dole, who was seventy-three 
years old, and his doctors also gave an interview.495  During the 2000 
campaign, both candidates and their doctors again gave press interviews.496  
In 2004, Democratic candidate John Kerry was the only candidate to discuss 
his health with a journalist.497 
In the three campaigns since the 2004 race, candidates have mostly limited 
their disclosures to letters from their doctors.498  Dr. Altman noted a trend 
away from disclosure at the end of the 2008 campaign when he observed, 
“The information that has been released is a retreat from the approach that 
most campaigns took over the last 10 elections.”499  The physicians’ letters 
that have characterized most post-2004 disclosures typically summarize the 
candidate’s health histories, such as significant medical episodes, surgical 
procedures, and family health histories.  To provide a picture of the 
candidate’s current health, the letters include the physicians’ general 
impressions, medications taken by the candidate, and measures like heart 
rate, blood pressure, and cholesterol. 
The notable departures from the post-2004 trend toward physicians’ letters 
came from John McCain in 2008 and Donald Trump in 2016.  McCain was 
seventy-two in 2008 and would have been the oldest President-Elect sworn 
in for a first term as President.  McCain underwent an extensive surgery eight 
years earlier to remove a malignant melanoma.500  His campaign responded 
to heightened scrutiny of his health by allowing twenty reporters to review 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/25/us/the-2000-campaign-the-fitness-report-gore-appears-
in-excellent-health.html [https://perma.cc/V3H3-SXKP]; Lawrence K. Altman, Doctors Say 
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N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/03/politics/campaign/on-kerrys-
journey-to-healthstops-for-shrapnel-and-cancer.html [https://perma.cc/9L2V-Y7ZA]. 
 498. During the 2008 presidential campaign, then-Senator Barack Obama’s doctor released 
a letter to the public. See Letter from David L. Sheiner, Hyde Park Assocs. in Med., Ltd., 
http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images/05/29/scheiner.letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGK9-
45CK].  During the 2012 campaign, then-Governor Mitt Romney’s physician released the 
same. See Letter from Randall D. Gaz, Mass. Gen. Hosp. (Aug. 25, 2012), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/438470/physicians-letter-on-mitt-romneys-
health.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLB3-7D2G]. 
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 500. McCain in “Excellent Health,” Doctor Says, CNN (May 23, 2008), 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/05/23/mccain.health.records/index.html 
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malignant melanomas from McCain’s skin, which were less invasive and did not pose long-
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nearly 1200 pages of his medical records, though with some significant 
restrictions.501  The reporters, three of whom were doctors, only had three 
hours to review the records and were not allowed to make copies.502  In 
addition to the temporary record release, several of McCain’s doctors 
released a written health summary and answered reporters’ questions on a 
forty-five-minute conference call.503  McCain did not submit to an extensive 
media interview on his health.504 
Before the start of the 2016 primaries, Trump released a physician’s letter, 
but it had less detail than typical letters—and far more flourish.  The letter 
from Trump’s personal doctor, Harold Bornstein, stated that Trump’s 
physical examination yielded “only positive results.”505  It also asserted that 
Trump’s lab test results were “astonishingly excellent” without providing any 
specific metrics other than Trump’s prostate-specific antigen score.506  
Bornstein concluded that, if elected, Trump would be “the healthiest 
individual ever elected to the presidency.”507  Months later, Bornstein gave 
two seemingly impromptu television interviews,508 stating that he wrote the 
letter in five minutes and that its hyperbolic claims were inspired by the way 
Trump speaks.509  A day before Bornstein wrote the letter, Trump had 
tweeted that the account of his health would show “perfection.”510 
Following Clinton’s bout with pneumonia in September 2016, Trump 
released a second letter from Bornstein that contained more detail, including 
some specific results of laboratory tests.511  New York Times articles observed 
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[https://perma.cc/LW52-KYAR]. 
 504. Altman, Many Holes in Disclosures, supra note 459. 
 505. Bornstein Letters of Health for Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/01/us/politics/document-Bornstein-Letter-of-
Health-for-Trump.html [https://perma.cc/TJ6J-GA7T] (containing letter of health, dated 
December 4, 2015, from Dr. Harold N. Bornstein). 
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 507. Id. 
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[https://perma.cc/2FM5-KDF4]; Anna R. Schecter et al., Trump Doctor Wrote Health Letter 
in Just 5 Minutes As Limo Waited, NBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2016, 9:47 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-doctor-wrote-health-letter-just-5-minutes-
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that the letter revealed that Trump was overweight and had a blood sugar 
level that was “‘quite close’ to being considered prediabetes.”512  Trump 
discussed the updated letter and answered questions about his health on Dr. 
Mehmet Oz’s television show.513  After the election, Bornstein revealed that 
Trump was on two prescription medications that were not mentioned in his 
letters or Trump’s interview.514 
B.  Past Proposals 
The Clinic considered several approaches to improving candidates’ health 
disclosures, including legislation, political party rules, and a commission to 
evaluate and report on candidates’ health. 
1.  Legislation 
Federal and state laws regulating candidates’ health disclosures would 
likely raise practical and legal considerations. 
a.  Federal Law 
Some members of Congress have raised the possibility of passing laws to 
regulate presidential candidates’ health disclosures.  In early 2017, 
Republican Congressman Jason Chaffetz said he was working on legislation 
to require presidential candidates to undergo an independent medical 
examination, performed by a Navy doctor, the results of which would be 
released to the public.515  Following the return of Paul Tsongas’s cancer in 
1992, Senator Bob Kerrey, who was a rival of Tsongas in the Democratic 
primary, said full disclosure of presidential candidates’ health information 
“has to become part of our election law.”516  He suggested making disclosure 
a condition of receiving federal campaign funds and Secret Service 
protection.517 
 
 512. Maggie Haberman, New Doctor’s Note Describes Donald Trump’s Health as 
‘Excellent,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/us/ 
politics/donald-trump-health.html [https://perma.cc/4SDV-UMBJ]; see also Maggie 
Haberman, Donald Trump Checkup Said to Reveal He Is Overweight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/us/politics/donald-trump-health-dr-oz.html 
[https://perma.cc/57GZ-KL2N]. 
 513. See The Dr. Oz Show (Fox television broadcast Sept. 15, 2016), 
http://www.doctoroz.com/episode/dr-oz-exclusive-one-one-donald-trump 
[https://perma.cc/Z5JS-JKRB]. 
 514. See Lawrence K. Altman, Donald Trump’s Longtime Doctor Says President Takes 
Hair-Growth Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/ 
us/politics/trump-prostate-drug-hair-harold-bornstein.html [https://perma.cc/LR98-WSXW]. 
 515. See Christina Marcos, GOP Lawmaker Considers Requiring Presidential Candidates 
to Undergo Medical Exam, HILL (Feb. 17, 2017, 12:49 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/ 
house/320120-chaffetz-considering-bill-requiring-presidential-candidates-to-undergo-
medical [https://perma.cc/L6UQ-7YHL].  It appears that Chaffetz, who resigned from 
Congress on June 30, 2017, never introduced such legislation. See Legislation Sponsored or 
Cosponsored by Jason Chaffetz, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/member/jason-
chaffetz/C001076 [https://perma.cc/65B9-KVNX] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 516. See Altman, Tsongas’s Health, supra note 459. 
 517. Id. 
998 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
  
Both of these proposals, however, might be difficult or unwise to enforce.  
Kerrey’s suggested withholding of campaign funds is unlikely to be effective 
because most recent candidates choose not to receive federal funds.  The 
suggestion of making Secret Service protection contingent on disclosure 
might not be worth the risk; disclosure should not come at the cost of 
decreasing candidates’ safety.518  Additionally, requirements that candidates 
disclose medical records could discourage candidates, or potential 
candidates, from seeking necessary medical treatment out of fear that doing 
so could lead to the creation of damaging records.519 
Chaffetz’s proposed requirement that candidates undergo a medical 
examination might not be constitutional.  Indeed, candidates who did not 
want to be examined might claim that such an examination was a violation 
of their Fourth Amendment rights.520 
b.  State Law 
States may have unique leverage to enforce candidate health-disclosure 
laws.  The Clinic is unaware of any proposed state legislation regarding 
candidate health, but lawmakers in several states have recently proposed 
legislation that would require candidates to disclose other personal 
information:  the candidates’ tax returns.521  These proposed laws make 
disclosure of tax returns a requirement for ballot access and eligibility for 
support of presidential electors. 
However, there are at least colorable arguments that such laws are 
unconstitutional, and these arguments could be adapted to apply to 
restrictions that mandate health disclosures.  Vikram Amar has suggested that 
tax disclosure laws might burden the associational rights of candidates’ 
supporters in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and create 
impermissible extraconstitutional requirements for the presidency or 
presidential electors.522 
Because a campaign is an “effective platform” for expressing political 
views, rules that exclude candidates might burden voters’ freedom of 
association.523  However, not every rule that restricts ballot access is 
constitutionally suspect; “there must be substantial regulation of elections if 
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they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is 
to accompany the democratic processes.”524  Accordingly, courts balance the 
asserted harm of a regulation against the state’s interests in advancing the 
regulation.525 
The Supreme Court has upheld rules that require candidates to demonstrate 
that they have substantial support, such as by gathering signatures of 
registered voters or by receiving the nomination of a party with a ballot line, 
to reduce confusion and exclude frivolous candidacies.526  The Court has 
ruled against some regulation including, in Anderson v. Celebrezze,527 a 
registration deadline for independent candidates that the Court held was too 
early.528 
However, Anderson might suggest an opening for candidate-health 
disclosure laws, as it specifically identifies voter education as a legitimate 
state interest.529  States may legitimately attempt to foster informed and 
educated participation in their elections, and the goal of health disclosure 
requirements is to inform voters.  Moreover, unlike an early filing deadline, 
disclosure requirements are, at least, arguably necessary to further the interest 
of voter education because voters typically will not learn information that has 
been intentionally kept secret.  The ballot access restriction in Anderson 
excluded particular classes of candidates:  those who did not belong to major 
parties.530  In contrast, restrictions that require health disclosures would 
burden all candidates without regard to their party or political group. 
Candidates burdened by a state health-disclosure law or their supporters 
could also challenge the law on the ground that it impermissibly establishes 
extraconstitutional requirements for the presidency or presidential electors.  
Article II of the Constitution requires that the President be a “natural born 
citizen” who is at least thirty-five years old and a resident of the United States 
for fourteen years before taking office.531  The Twenty-Second Amendment 
expanded on those requirements by creating a two-term limit.532  Article II, 
Section 1 states that presidential electors cannot be members of Congress or 
officers of the United States.533 
The Supreme Court has held that states cannot create their own 
requirements for election to Congress.  In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton,534 the Court held that state laws that even “indirectly” create 
“additional qualifications” for election to Congress are impermissible.535  
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The Court held that the qualifications set forth in the Constitution are only 
subject to change through the Article V amendment process.536 
Arguably, state health-disclosure laws could also create such 
extraconstitutional requirements if they prevent candidates from appearing 
on the ballot or if they prevent electors slated for certain candidates from 
being chosen.  But states could argue that U.S. Term Limits is confined to 
interpreting the portions of the Constitution that provide qualifications for 
members of Congress and not to the provisions relating to the President or to 
presidential electors.  The constitutional provisions relating to presidential 
electors are very different than the provisions establishing the qualifications 
for other offices.  The Constitution does not establish any positive 
qualifications for presidential electors, such as the age and residency 
requirements established for members of Congress.  Instead, the Constitution 
provides only specific restrictions describing people who may not serve as 
electors.  Many states already require presidential electors to make a pledge 
that they will cast their electoral votes for the candidates for President and 
Vice President who received the most votes in a statewide contest.537  States 
could possibly adopt similar statutes forbidding the appointment of electors 
slated by a candidate who has not complied with health disclosure rules. 
2.  Political Party Rules 
Political parties might have the authority to create health disclosure 
requirements for the candidates who run in their primaries.  Parties are 
entitled to a certain degree of autonomy stemming from their associational 
rights under the Constitution.538  But, if political parties impose health 
disclosure requirements, candidates and their supporters might claim 
constitutional violations, such as some of the possible challenges to the state 
laws discussed above.  Political parties’ actions are sometimes construed as 
state action, which subjects them to constitutional challenges.  Indeed, party 
rules governing primaries can implicate constitutional rights when the 
process of choosing general election candidates is particularly entangled with 
the party’s primary process. 
In Smith v. Allwright,539 the Supreme Court ruled that a primary that 
banned nonwhite voters was unconstitutional.540  The Court held that the 
“statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on the 
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general election ballot” made the party an agent of the state in its governance 
of the party primary process.541  “When primaries become a part of the 
machinery for choosing officials,” the Court ruled, “the same tests to 
determine the character of discrimination or abridgement should be applied 
to the primary as are applied to the general election.”542  Discrimination 
against voters might easily be extended to discrimination against candidates.  
Accordingly, party rules on health disclosures could implicate constitutional 
rights. 
Supporters of candidates prohibited from running in a primary because 
they did not comply with health disclosure rules might argue that the rules 
impaired their associational rights.  The candidates might claim various 
forms of discrimination, especially under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Disclosure rules would almost certainly impair the prospects of candidates 
who suffered from certain disabilities.  Those candidates could claim 
discrimination on the basis of their disability.  Additionally, because some 
medical conditions are gender specific, candidates could potentially make 
gender discrimination claims.  Finally, candidates could make privacy claims 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
As an alternative to outright bans on candidates who fail to disclose health 
information, political parties might use other forms of leverage to compel 
disclosures.  In particular, the parties could ban noncompliant candidates 
from primary debates that the parties sponsor.543 
3.  Independent Medical Commission 
Proposals for an independent commission to evaluate presidential 
candidates’ health have been “kicked around medical conferences and 
academic journals for years.”544  These proposals typically involve a 
commission of physicians who examine candidates and report their findings 
to the public.545  Similar commissions have been proposed for evaluating 
Presidents to assist in determining whether the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
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should be invoked.546  Former President Jimmy Carter is among those who 
have proposed presidential health commissions.547 
Under many of those proposals, Congress would create the commission to 
evaluate the President’s health.548  Congress could create a similar 
commission for presidential candidates. Selection of a commission’s 
members by the voters’ elected representatives or other governmental 
officials, such as the Surgeon General or Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, might add a level of credibility to the panel.549  But a 
nongovernmental entity could also form a commission.  Such proposals have 
drawn analogies to the American Bar Association’s practice of rating the 
Supreme Court nominees and the Commission on Presidential Debates, the 
nonpartisan corporation that organizes presidential debates.550 
Commission membership would not have to be limited to physicians.  
Members may also include former Presidents, who understand the challenges 
of the office; former journalists, particularly those with medical backgrounds; 
current or retired elected officials who could evaluate political implications 
of the commission’s work; and military officials, whose training might 
encourage a nonpartisan approach.  However, elected officials might create 
a perception of partisanship and the involvement of military officials could 
undermine the independence of the military.551 
Independent medical commissions are not without flaws.  First, it might be 
difficult to secure candidates’ cooperation.  A commission and its sponsors 
could argue that participation would help candidates by preventing baseless 
speculation about their health, but candidates might still worry that their 
opponents and members of the public could use some of the commission’s 
findings against them.552  Requiring candidates to submit to examinations 
likely is not legal, regardless of whether Congress created the commission. 
Second, it would be difficult to eliminate partisanship from a commission.  
An absence of partisanship would be critical to encouraging candidate 
participation and ensuring that the public viewed the commission’s findings 
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as credible.  But it would be hard to excise partisan influences from the 
process.  Most people, including doctors, have at least some partisan 
inclinations and interests.  For example, physician groups like the American 
Medical Association are often entangled in partisan causes.553  A candidates’ 
party should be irrelevant to determinations regarding the candidates’ 
health,554 but commission members’ candidate preferences could 
consciously or unconsciously impact their conclusions. 
Finally, it may be difficult for the commission to agree on an approach to 
evaluating and drawing conclusions about candidates’ health.  Without 
unanimous conclusions, speculation about candidates’ health could increase, 
the public could be left confused, and the commission approach might be 
undermined.  Dr. Burton Lee, a former White House physician, has observed 
that a committee would likely produce “the lowest common denominator of 
medical decision-making[,]”555 and former Senator Birch Bayh has said “it 
is impossible to diagnose by committee.”556 
C.  Recommendation:  
A Commission to Create Disclosure Guidelines 
The Clinic recommends the creation of a commission to set nonbinding 
guidelines for what presidential candidates should disclose about their 
health.557  The commission’s guidelines would serve two primary purposes:  
informing candidates’ approaches to disclosure and creating expectations that 
would encourage adequate disclosure. 
Without uniform health disclosure standards, even candidates who aspire 
to be transparent might not know exactly what to release.  The commission’s 
guidelines would allow candidates to efficiently make disclosures calculated 
to satisfy the public’s right to know and to blunt baseless health-related 
claims.  Comments from doctors who treated Paul Tsongas, the 1992 
Democratic primary candidate who had suffered from lymphoma, suggest 
they may have benefited from disclosure standards.  They said “they were 
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 557. This idea has been proposed before by someone with firsthand experience with 
candidate health disclosures.  After confirming that his lymphoma had returned and conceding 
that he had “made mistakes in discussing his health” while running for the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 1992, Paul Tsongas called for the creation of a national commission 
to determine what presidential candidates should disclose about their health. See Lawrence K. 
Altman, Tsongas, Battling Cancer, Admits Candor Is Needed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/06/weekinreview/nov-28-dec-5-american-politics-tsongas-
battling-cancer-admits-candor-is-needed.html [https://perma.cc/S465-Q2HF]. 
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operating in uncharted waters because of the lack of national guidelines on 
what to disclose about a candidate’s health.”558 
The guidelines could also improve disclosures of candidates who are less 
inclined toward transparency.  The guidelines’ clear expectations would 
improve journalists’ ability to encourage candidates to disclose useful 
information about their health.  If candidates failed to disclose some basic 
information, journalists would be prearmed with a “shopping list” of missing 
disclosures.  Opposing candidates would also likely pressure candidates who 
did not comply with the guidelines. 
Health disclosure guidelines should not be binding on candidates; the sole 
purpose of disclosure guidelines should be to offer guidance and set 
expectations.  Compliance with the guidelines could only be required through 
laws or political party rules, but, as discussed, such requirements imposed in 
that manner would likely face legal challenges.  Furthermore, the guidelines 
commission should not comment on whether candidates are complying with 
the guidelines or issue midcampaign rulings on applications of the guidelines.  
If the commission evaluated particular candidates’ compliance, the risk of 
partisanship influencing the commission and undermining its integrity would 
significantly increase. 
1.  Who Should Serve on the Commission? 
Medical doctors should constitute at least half of the commission’s 
membership.  Doctors are equipped to understand the implications of 
different kinds of health conditions and gauge the usefulness of particular 
information to judging a candidate’s health.559  Both internists and 
practitioners from a wide variety of medical and surgical specialties should 
be part of the commission.  Because it is not feasible to represent every 
specialty on the commission, consultation with outside experts should occur 
as needed. 
The commission should also include knowledgeable people who have 
experience deciding normative questions on behalf of the community.  
Former politicians could be among those who serve this role.  They could 
also provide insight into the political implications of possible disclosure 
guidelines.  If former politicians are included, there should be an equal 
number from each party to prevent perceptions that the commission favors 
one party.  Current elected officials should not serve on the commission 
because partisan considerations could impact their contributions.  
Nonmedical academics or journalists could also serve valuable roles on the 
commission.  They could provide information about what the public expects 
to know about candidates’ health and how the public might react to particular 
kinds of disclosures. Ideally, the commission members would receive 
 
 558. Altman, Tsongas’s Health, supra note 459. 
 559. See supra Part VI.B.3. 
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compensation or at least receive reimbursement for the costs associated with 
their participation. 
2.  Who Should Create the Commission? 
The commission could be formed by Congress or an independent 
organization, perhaps by a group of concerned voters or another private 
nonpartisan entity.560  Both approaches have advantages.  On the one hand, 
congressionally created guidelines commission would possess an innate 
prestige, which could encourage compliance with their recommendations.  
On the other hand, the formation of the commission by Congress would raise 
the specter of partisanship. 
An independently created guidelines commission would be more likely to 
avoid perceptions of partisanship but would face greater challenges 
establishing its legitimacy.  It could also have trouble raising operating funds 
and might be less able to attract members of prominence, which could 
compound the legitimacy problem. 
3.  Meeting of the Guidelines Commission 
The commission should meet and issue its guidelines at least two years 
before the presidential election.  This requirement is meant to prevent 
favoritism for certain candidates or parties.  If the commission members 
knew who the candidates were, it could impact their views. 
After the guidelines are issued, the commission should not meet or conduct 
any other business until after the election.  The commission and its members 
should avoid commenting on the compliance of particular candidates with 
the guidelines. 
Following the election, the members of the commission should reconvene 
to consider whether they can improve the guidelines to account for medical 
advances and any flaws that might have been exposed in the prior election 
cycle.  Periodic meetings of the commission for this purpose should occur—
always outside of the two-year period before elections. 
4.  Considerations in Crafting the Guidelines 
The Clinic considered how the commission might develop its guidelines 
and some of the issues that might arise in the process.  It probably would not 
require much deliberation for the commission to include certain basic 
disclosures in the guidelines, such as blood test results.  But to assist in 
determining the appropriate level of detail for disclosures, the commission 
might create a standard for the kinds of conditions that the guidelines are 
 
 560. The League of Women Voters Education Fund’s sponsorship of presidential debates 
during several campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s provides an example of an independent 
group taking initiative to help inform voters. See The League of Women Voters and Candidate 
Debates:  A Changing Relationship, LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS, http://lwv.org/content/league-
women-voters-and-candidate-debates-changing-relationship [https://perma.cc/WN3Q-5REU] 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
1006 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
  
aimed at uncovering.  For example, one possible standard would seek 
medical information that would reveal a likelihood of impairment in office.  
“Impairment” could include actual disability, such as death or medical 
incapacitation.  It could also include substantial diminishment of capability, 
such as a limitation on working hours that might result from a heart condition. 
In deciding whether candidates should disclose specific medical 
conditions, the commission will likely consider a variety of factors.  For past 
conditions that candidates suffered, the guidelines might be based on the 
likelihood of recurrence.  The commission may wish to adopt special 
disclosure standards for some politically sensitive or poorly understood 
illnesses, such as HIV/AIDS and certain psychological ailments, because 
such disclosures could produce public reactions out of proportion with any 
real health risk. 
The commission might also consider whether candidates should undergo 
tests to assess their cognitive functions.561  Such testing could lend insight 
into whether a candidate is suffering any intellectual decline, but tests for 
cognitive decline typically must be administered over months and years, 
which could make it difficult to provide the results of such tests before an 
election.  Additionally, candidates would almost certainly view the tests as 
invasive. 
The commission may want to consider providing a higher standard to 
protect medical information of a sitting President.  Such a higher standard 
would be inherently unfair because it would favor incumbent Presidents 
against their challengers but might be necessary in the interests of security. 
Emerging technologies for detecting and predicting the onset of illnesses 
might present novel and challenging questions for the commission.562  One 
of the more significant developments relates to the use of genetic testing.  It 
is now possible to make genetic assessments in a relatively noninvasive 
manner,563 and those assessments might be capable of revealing ailments that 
would impair a president, such as Alzheimer’s disease.564  Some scholars 
have suggested genetic testing as an alternative method to disclosing 
 
 561. See Jeremy Samuel Faust, There’s an Easy Test We Could Use to Assess Older 
Politicians’ Cognitive Health, SLATE (June 9, 2017, 3:08 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2017/06/speculating_over_a_politician_s_co
gnitive_decline_is_irresponsible_using.html [https://perma.cc/LKM5-ZB88] (stating that the 
“Mini-Mental State Exam” can detect early or mild dementia through administrations over the 
course of months and years). 
 562. See, e.g., Maggie Fox, New Heart Imaging Method May Predict Heart Attacks, NBC 
NEWS (July 12, 2017, 2:27 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/new-heart-
imaging-method-may-predict-heart-attacks-n782271 [https://perma.cc/83G8-WGTC]. 
 563. Rose McDermott, Extensions on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  The Influence of 
Biological Factors on the Assessments of Impairment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV 881, 884 (2011). 
 564. See Hannah Devlin, New Alzheimer’s Test Can Predict Age When Disease Will 
Appear, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/ 
mar/22/new-alzheimers-test-can-predict-age-when-disease-will-appear 
[https://perma.cc/YY59-AZWT]. 
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presidential health.565  But deciding whether genetic testing should be 
required involves a wide array of medical, ethical, and philosophical 
questions.  Genetic testing does not provide perfect predictions.  For example, 
someone with a gene marker for depression is not inevitably going to be 
depressed.566  Even if genetic testing were perfectly accurate, it might face 
criticism as an excessive invasion of privacy. 
VII.  POLITICAL PARTY RULES 
FOR REPLACING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 
Presidential candidates’ health can impact campaigns in more immediate 
ways than being the focus of public disclosures.  A health issue could cause 
a presidential candidate to leave the campaign, potentially resulting in a 
vacancy on a political party’s ticket only weeks before an election.  And 
health is only one of several possible reasons a candidate might drop out. 
The political parties’ procedures for filling presidential candidate 
vacancies lack detail and might encounter problems if implemented.567  This 
Part discusses these problems and proposes improvements.  First, it 
highlights aspects of campaign history which indicate that vacancies are a 
real possibility.  It then provides an overview of the current replacement rules 
and discusses their shortcomings.  It goes on to offer the Clinic’s proposed 
rules for replacing presidential candidates after a vacancy.  This Part 
concludes with a discussion of whether the parties should create rules for 
removing their presidential nominees. 
A.  History of Vacancies and Near Vacancies 
There has never been a vacancy in the presidential nominee position of a 
major political party before Election Day.568  But there have been two 
instances where a vacancy has occurred in the vice presidential 
nomination.569  On other occasions, scandals or assassination attempts raised 
the prospect of vacancies. 
 
 565. Teneille R. Brown, Double Helix, Double Standards:  Private Matters and Public 
People, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 295, 371–76 (2008). 
 566. McDermott, supra note 563, at 888. 
 567. During Hillary Clinton’s bout of pneumonia in the final weeks of the 2016 campaign, 
one former party chairman called for the party to develop a clearer process to select a 
replacement nominee. Kyle Cheney, Former DNC Chairman Call for Clinton Contingency 
Plan, POLITICO (Sept. 12, 2016, 4:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/hillary-
clinton-health-replace-contingency-228037 [https://perma.cc/H9HX-HZ32].  Another former 
chairman “agreed that the party’s vacancy rules should be modernized” but not until after the 
election. Id.  
 567. The first Clinic recommended that the political parties “examine the need for criteria 
and procedures to guide” the candidate replacement process. First Clinic Report, supra note 
8, at 54–55. 
 568. In 1872, Horace Greeley, the presidential nominee for the Democratic and Liberal 
Republican parties, died weeks after Election Day.  He had won sixty-six presidential electors, 
and the political parties instructed those electors to vote for other candidates. See First Clinic 
Report, supra note 8, at 56. 
 569. Although there have been only two vacancies in the vice presidential nomination, it 
bears noting that Benjamin Fitzpatrick promptly declined the vice presidential nomination 
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1.  Vacancies 
The first vacancy on a national ticket occurred when Vice President James 
S. Sherman died less than one week before the 1912 election.570  Sherman 
had been renominated after serving as Vice President during President 
William Howard Taft’s first term.571  He died from Bright’s disease, a serious 
kidney disease he had developed in 1904.572 
At the Republican convention in June 1912, the delegates gave the power 
to fill vacancies on the national ticket to the Republican National Committee 
(RNC).573  But Sherman’s death immediately before the election gave the 
committee little time to act.  Recognizing as much, the RNC’s chairman 
scheduled a meeting for a week after the election to choose a replacement 
vice presidential candidate.574  Woodrow Wilson won the presidency while 
Taft came in third with only eight electoral votes.575  In January, the RNC 
assigned Sherman’s electoral votes to Columbia University President 
Nicholas Butler.576 
The other national ticket vacancy occurred in 1972 when Democratic vice 
presidential nominee Thomas Eagleton withdrew eighteen days after his 
nomination.  Eagleton had suffered from bipolar II disorder and had been 
hospitalized and treated with electroshock therapy.577  Democratic 
presidential nominee George McGovern did not know about Eagleton’s 
health history when he offered him the nomination, as the campaign hardly 
vetted Eagleton.  He was a last-minute choice for McGovern, who invited 
him to join the ticket after a thirty-five-second phone call.578 
Rumors about Eagleton’s health quickly received extensive media 
attention following his nomination.579  When Eagleton told McGovern and 
his aides about his health history, McGovern said he believed the campaign 
could weather the challenges it posed.580  But McGovern soon took a 
grimmer outlook581 and, on August 1, 1972, asked Eagleton to leave the 
 
after receiving it at the 1860 Democratic National Convention.  The party instead nominated 
Herschel V. Johnson as replacement on the same day. Herschel V. Johnson, From the 
Autobiography of Herschel V. Johnson, 1856–1867, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 311, 317 (1925). 
 570. See Sherman Is Dead, Hurt by Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1912, at 1. 
 571. MARK O. HATFIELD, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1783–1993, at 325–28 
(Wendy Wolff ed., 1997).  Sherman became the first sitting Vice President to be renominated 
since John C. Calhoun eighty years earlier. Id. at 331. 
 572. Id. 
 573. Sherman Always Allied to Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1912, at 5. 
 574. Id. 
 575. HATFIELD, supra note 571, at 331. 
 576. May Be Taft and Butler, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1913, at 1. 
 577. James N. Giglio, The Eagleton Affair:  Thomas Eagleton, George McGovern, and the 
1972 Vice Presidential Nomination, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 647, 659, 661 (2009). 
 578. Id. at 649–63. A more substantial vetting process may have uncovered that rumors 
about Eagleton’s mental health had circulated for years in his home state of Missouri. See id. 
at 652. 
 579. Id. 
 580. Id. at 661. 
 581. Id. at 656–74. 
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ticket less than three weeks after he joined it.582  On August 5, 1972, 
McGovern selected Sargent Shriver, the former director of the Peace Corps, 
to replace Eagleton.583  The Democratic National Committee (DNC) called a 
special committee vote to formally nominate Shriver several days later.584 
After the Eagleton incident, the DNC put more focus on proper vice 
presidential vetting.585  With the Party feeling the pressure of loss and 
internal division, its chairman adopted a charter to reform the Party that 
included the Party’s current rule on filling nominee vacancies.586 
2.  Scandals 
Scandals have at least twice raised the prospect of candidates withdrawing 
in the final weeks of campaigns.  In September 1952, reports emerged that 
Republican vice presidential nominee Richard Nixon maintained a fund of 
undisclosed donations.587  Nixon explained that the money was used to cover 
expenses that arose during his tenure in the Senate, but presidential nominee 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and his advisers were livid.588  New York Governor 
Thomas Dewey, who had encouraged Eisenhower to select Nixon, 
recommended that Nixon offer a public explanation and leave the ticket.589  
Some advisors were more measured.  Herbert Brownell, who would become 
Attorney General, was hesitant to remove Nixon without an investigation.590  
Eisenhower said he wanted to give Nixon a chance to explain himself.591 
Nixon addressed the controversy in an impassioned address on national 
television.592  The address became known as the Checkers speech because 
Nixon said one gift he would not return was Checkers, a dog given to his 
children by a donor.593  Journalists and voters accepted Nixon’s denial of 
wrongdoing, and he remained on the ticket.594 
During the 2016 campaign, lewd comments by Donald Trump drew harsh 
condemnation from Republican leaders and led the chairman of the RNC, 
 
 582. Id. at 670–71. In his statement announcing that Eagleton was leaving the ticket, 
McGovern said that health was not a factor.  Instead, McGovern attributed his decision to the 
attention Eagleton’s medical history was drawing from the greater national issues. Id. at 672. 
 583. Id. 
 584. See James M. Naughton, Shriver Is Named for Second Place by the Democrats, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 9, 1972), http://www.nytimes.com/1972/08/09/archives/shriver-is-named-for-
second-place-by-the-democrats-national.html [https://perma.cc/UQU9-SC9R]. 
 585. ROBERT E. DICLERICO, THE CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PRESIDENT 456 (2016). 
 586. Text of Party Charter Adopted at Democratic Conference Following Compromise, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1974, at 44. 
 587. Lee Huebner, The Checkers Speech After 60 Years, ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-checkers-speech-after-60-
years/262172/ [https://perma.cc/4Z92-QRTZ]. 
 588. See HERBERT BROWNELL WITH JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE:  THE MEMOIRS OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 124 (1993). 
 589. Id. 
 590. Id. 
 591. Id. at 125. 
 592. Richard Nixon Foundation, Checkers Speech (full version), YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpWwgwytdzk [https://perma.cc/JY5D-G3C7]. 
 593. See Huebner, supra note 587. 
 594. See id. 
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Reince Priebus, to privately suggest that he leave the race.595  Although the 
comments in which Trump “bragged in vulgar terms about kissing, groping 
and trying to have sex with women” dated back to a 2005 filming of the show 
Access Hollywood, the video only became public on October 7, 2016, a 
month before the election.596 
3.  Threats and Violence Against Candidates 
Presidential candidates have faced threats to their lives.  In 1968, 
Democratic primary candidate Robert F. Kennedy was shot and killed on the 
night that he won the California primary.597  Many speculated that he would 
have been the Democratic nominee had he lived.598  Only four years later, 
during the 1972 campaign, George Wallace, another Democratic primary 
candidate, was shot.599  Wallace survived the assassination attempt, but it left 
him paralyzed and effectively ended his campaign.600 
During the 1980 presidential campaign, the man who would eventually 
shoot President Reagan in early 1981 was “stalking” President Jimmy Carter, 
the Democratic nominee.  John Hinckley Jr. came within feet of President 
Carter at a campaign event on October 2, 1980.601  He was arrested a week 
later, with several guns, at an airport in Nashville, Tennessee, where Carter 
was holding a rally.602 
B.  Current Party Rules and Their Shortcomings 
The Republican and Democratic Parties’ respective rules for filling 
candidate vacancies are inadequate. 
 
 595. Alexander Burns et al., Donald Trump Apology Caps Day of Outrage over Lewd Tape, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/politics/donald-trump-
women.html [https://perma.cc/KNS7-3J59]; Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Republicans 
Look to Reince Priebus, Trump’s Chief of Staff, to Bring Stability, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/us/politics/reince-priebus-chief-of-staff.html 
[https://perma.cc/2TNB-AYTX] (reporting Priebus’s suggestion that Trump consider 
dropping out of the race).  Two Republican Senators and Republican former Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice also called on Trump to drop out. Growing Number of Republicans Rebuke 
Trump, CBS NEWS (Oct. 7, 2016, 10:25 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
republicans-rebuke-trump-after-access-hollywood-tape-released/ [https://perma.cc/2PPR-
8HZ3]. 
 596. See David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation 
About Women in 2005, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
3b9ce776-8cb4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html [https://perma.cc/QF9X-EFY9]. 
 597. RONALD L. FEINMAN, ASSASSINATIONS, THREATS, AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:  
FROM ANDREW JACKSON TO BARACK OBAMA 112–13 (2015). 
 598. Id. at 112. 
 599. Id. at 127.  Wallace’s would-be assassin also stalked and considered targeting 
President Richard Nixon, the 1972 Republican candidate. Id. at 125. 
 600. Id. at 129. 
 601. See Jeremy P. Kelley, John Hinckley Stalked Carter in Dayton Before Shooting 
Reagan, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (July 27, 2016, 1:55 PM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/ 
RCJLMW6RyC74XnbfX8MOpL/ [https://perma.cc/33LP-YHDS]. 
 602. See United States v. Hinckley, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2016). 
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1.  Republican Party Rules 
The Republican Party’s procedures for filling vacancies are found in the 
Rules of the Republican National Committee.  Rule 9 provides two options 
for “fill[ing] any and all vacancies which may occur by reason of death, 
declination, or otherwise of the Republican candidate” for the President or 
Vice President.603 
The first option allows the RNC to choose the replacement nominee.  The 
RNC comprises approximately 150 voting members with representatives 
from Republican parties in every state.  If they were choosing a replacement 
nominee, RNC members would vote as part of their state delegations with 
each state casting the same number of votes as it would cast at the national 
convention.604  If the RNC members from a state could not agree on how to 
cast their votes, their votes would be divided equally among present RNC 
members or those voting by proxy.605  A replacement candidate needs a 
majority of votes for approval.606 
The second option for filling vacancies provides that the RNC can 
reconvene the national convention to select a new candidate.607  Rule 9 does 
not specify any procedures for a reconvened national convention to follow. 
2.  Democratic Party Rules 
The bylaws of the Democratic Party give the Democratic National 
Committee the “responsibility” of “filling vacancies in the nominations for 
the office of President and Vice President.”608  A special meeting for this 
purpose is “held on the call of the [DNC] Chairperson.”609  The Bylaws 
require a majority of the DNC membership to be present in person or by 
proxy to select a replacement candidate.610  Replacement candidates are 
selected by majority vote.611  “[T]he DNC is composed of the chair and vice-
chairs of each state Democratic Party Committee and over 200 members 
elected by Democrats in all 50 states and the territories.”612 
 
 603. See REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY r. 9(a) (2016) 
[hereinafter RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY], https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/docs/2016-
Republican-Rules-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GN5-GKMU]. 
 604. Id. r. 9(b). 
 605. Id. r. 9(c). 
 606. Id. r. 9(d). 
 607. Id. r. 9(a). 
 608. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., Bylaws, in THE CHARTER AND THE BYLAWS OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES art. 3, § 1(c) (2015), http://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
uploads.democrats.org/Downloads/DNC_Charter__Bylaws_9.17.15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U8S6-9LCP]. 
 609. Id. art. 2, § 7(c). 
 610. Id. art. 3, § 5. 
 611. Id. art. 2, § 8(d) (“Except as otherwise provided in the Charter or in these Bylaws, all 
questions before the Democratic National Committee shall be determined by majority vote of 
those members present and voting in person or by proxy.”). 
 612. The Democratic National Committee, DEMOCRATS, https://www.democrats.org/ 
organization/the-democratic-national-committee [https://perma.cc/SY9D-VHJ6] (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2017). 
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The 2016 Call for the Democratic National Convention appears to require 
the DNC Chairperson to consult elected officials in the Party before the DNC 
selects a replacement nominee.  In the event of “death, resignation, and 
disability” of a presidential or vice presidential nominee, the Call requires the 
Chairperson to “confer with the Democratic leadership of the United States 
Congress and the Democratic Governors Association” and then “report to the 
Democratic National Committee.”613 
3.  Shortcomings of the Rules 
The DNC and RNC rules permitting the national committee to select a 
replacement candidate risk wasting time and heightening intraparty tensions.  
The RNC’s alternative procedure of recalling the conventions suffers these 
drawbacks while also posing significant logistical challenges. 
Absent broad consensus on the replacement candidate, the committee 
process could be excessively time consuming.  Potential replacement 
candidates might launch minicampaigns, and committee members would 
likely demand time to consider their options.  Forging a consensus among a 
committee of over 150 members could also take time.  With every lost day, 
the major disadvantages facing a party that lost its nominee in the final weeks 
of a campaign would only be made worse.  The Clinic’s study of the length 
of time between party conventions and Election Day since 1980 revealed that 
the election was, on average, ninety days after the Democratic convention 
and eighty-three days after the Republican convention. 
The committee process could also expose rifts among the party’s factions.  
Sometimes hard feelings from hotly contested primaries remain well into the 
general election season, a phenomenon apparent in both parties during the 
2016 campaign.614  When Eisenhower’s 1952 campaign grappled with 
Nixon’s scandal, Herbert Brownell feared that recalling the convention to 
replace Nixon would reignite tension with Eisenhower’s more conservative 
primary opponent.615  Reawakening intraparty tensions in the process of 
choosing a replacement nominee, especially at a late stage in the campaign, 
could undermine the replacement candidate. 
The RNC option of reconvening the convention to select a replacement 
nominee could provide a high-profile platform for the replacement 
candidate’s introduction to the public and could even result in something of 
 
 613. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., Call for the 2016 Democratic National Convention, in 
DELEGATE SELECTION MATERIALS art. VIII(G) (2014) [hereinafter Call for the 2016 
Democratic National Convention], http://www.demrulz.org/wp-content/files/12.15.14 
_2016_Delegate_Selection_Documents_Mailing_-_Rules_Call_Regs_Model_Plan_ 
Checklist_12.15.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVX9-82QB]. 
 614. See Gabrielle Debenedetti, Democrats Sweat Clinton vs. Sanders Rift, POLITICO (Jan. 
16, 2017, 6:52 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/democrats-clinton-sanders-dnc-
233648 [https://perma.cc/L8EU-F3BS]; Peter Schroeder, No Trump Endorsement from Cruz:  
‘Vote Your Conscience,’ HILL (July 20, 2016, 9:56 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-
box/presidential-races/288607-no-trump-endorsement-from-cruz-who-tells-gop-vote-your 
[https://perma.cc/NU2W-MGCP]. 
 615. See BROWNELL WITH BURKE, supra note 588, at 124–25. 
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a “convention bump” in popularity.  However, the party almost certainly 
could not organize an event of the magnitude of regular conventions. 
Reconvening the convention presents several challenges.  First, the 
logistics of holding a convention on short notice may be prohibitive.  The 
party could struggle to find a large enough venue to accommodate the 
thousands of delegates,616 and many delegates may not be able to attend.  The 
party may have trouble funding a second convention, as the party only 
budgets for one convention.617  Second, the convention would have to create 
procedures for selecting a replacement nominee.  Under normal 
circumstances, almost all convention delegates are bound to vote for 
candidates based on the outcomes of their states’ primaries.618  It is unclear 
how a special convention to name a replacement candidate would implicate 
these rules. 
C.  Recommended Procedures 
This Part discusses possible replacement procedures before arriving at a 
recommendation.  These proposals do not address vice presidential nominee 
vacancies, which raise different considerations than presidential nominee 
vacancies.619 
1.  Designated Replacement Candidate 
The parties could designate officials to automatically succeed to the 
nomination in case of a vacancy.  Such a procedure would not require any 
additional proceedings, such as a committee meeting or reconvened 
convention.  It would save time and allow the replacement candidate to 
quickly begin campaigning in earnest.  However, this approach is not without 
at least one drawback.  A rule for having a predetermined successor could 
preclude a superior candidate from being the nominee, which would 
disadvantage the party. 
There are two logical choices for automatic replacement:  the vice 
presidential nominee and the runner-up primary candidate. 
a.  Vice Presidential Nominee as Designated Replacement 
The vice presidential nominee is, in a way, the most natural replacement, 
given the Vice President’s constitutionally designated role as successor to the 
 
 616. There were 2472 delegates to the 2016 Republican National Convention. Republican 
National Convention Roll Call, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2016/politics/ 
republican-convention-delegate-count/ [https://perma.cc/93Z4-GP4X] (last visited Nov. 19, 
2017). 
 617. See, e.g., Emily Shah, How Much Will the Democratic National Convention Cost?, 
FISCAL TIMES (July 27, 2016), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2016/07/27/How-Much-Will-
Democratic-National-Convention-Cost [https://perma.cc/R7NR-MF6R]. 
 618. RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, supra note 603, r. 16(a)(2). 
 619. This report assumes that the presidential nominee typically has nearly unfettered 
discretion in choosing the vice presidential nominee, whereas choosing a presidential 
candidate is a decision for the party. 
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presidency.620  Vice Presidents are “understudies” whose position affords 
them the ability to understand the issues they would face if required to assume 
the presidency.621  Vice Presidents also typically share many of their 
Presidents’ views, which would prevent any major policy changes if a Vice 
President succeeded to the presidency. 
Vice presidential candidates could fill a similar role.  Upon selection, they 
typically educate themselves on the presidential candidate’s positions and 
campaign on them.  The candidates’ similar ideological outlooks would help 
the campaign retain its supporters in the event of a vacancy.  Additionally, 
the Vice President’s succession responsibilities tend to encourage 
presidential candidates to choose running mates based at least partially on 
their suitability to assume the Oval Office.622  Furthermore, vice presidential 
candidates normally undergo rigorous vetting before selection.623 
But the vice presidential nominee may not always be the best choice to 
assume the top of the ticket.  In some cases, the vice presidential nominee 
may not have experience campaigning on the national level, which could be 
detrimental to the campaign.  This potential shortcoming could also make it 
difficult for the successor candidate to overcome a lack of public exposure 
relative to the opposing presidential nominee.624 
Another drawback to making the vice presidential nominee the automatic 
successor is that prospective vice presidential nominees’ “competency to 
assume the presidency” is not always the primary criterion for selection.625  
Indeed, some presidential nominees do not choose vice presidential 
candidates “to succeed them” but “to help them succeed.”626  For example, 
Republican nominee John McCain’s selection of Sarah Palin in 2008 sought 
to “energize” the conservative base,627 but the McCain campaign chose Palin 
without probing the depth of her knowledge on domestic and foreign 
policy.628  Palin’s lack of policy knowledge became apparent in the weeks 
 
 620. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XXV. 
 621. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, at 248–49. 
 622. Telephone Interview with Michael S. Dukakis, Distinguished Professor of Political 
Sci., Ne. Univ. (Apr. 20, 2017). 
 623. Id. (explaining his process for selecting his running mate). 
 624. This lack of public exposure and input has been a major concern over the years and 
has generated many proposals designed to improve upon the way the United States selects its 
vice presidential candidates. See DICLERICO, supra note 585, at 465.  One proposal “calls for 
having candidates run for the vice presidency in the primaries and caucuses, just as presidential 
candidates do now.” Id.  A second plan would be to “automatically award the vice presidency 
to the runner-up in the presidential contest, thereby increasing the likelihood that the Vice 
President would be someone of reasonably high quality.” Id. 
 625. Id. 
 626. Id. 
 627. See id.; Michael Cooper & Elisabeth Bumiller, McCain Chooses Palin as Running 
Mate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/us/politics/ 
30veep.html [https://perma.cc/PML7-C638]. 
 628. See DICLERICO, supra note 585, at 464. 
2017] IMPROVING PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 1015 
following her selection,629 leading a majority of Americans to conclude that 
Palin was not qualified to serve as President.630 
b.  Primary Runner-Up as Designated Replacement 
The primary candidate who received the second highest number of 
delegate votes at the party’s convention is another possible designated 
successor.  A primary candidate is guaranteed to have experience 
campaigning at the national level and the ambition to run for President, unlike 
some vice presidential nominees.  The runner-up will have withstood the 
physical, mental, and managerial challenges of national campaigning, which 
increases the likelihood that he or she would be an effective presidential 
candidate.  Additionally, primary candidates are typically well known to the 
public and have undergone public scrutiny over the course of months, making 
it more likely that they can withstand the scrutiny placed on presidential 
candidates. 
Still, one may argue there are good reasons that the runner-up candidate 
did not win the nomination and that automatically giving that candidate the 
presidential nomination would go against the will of primary voters and the 
party.  Furthermore, the runner-up’s policy positions may be substantially 
different from the original nominee’s positions, which could prevent the 
runner-up candidate from winning the support of many of the party’s voters. 
2.  Designated Replacement with Override Provision 
If the parties designate successors to the nomination, the parties might 
include a “safety valve” provision that allows them to override the designees’ 
succession in extraordinary circumstances.  Such a rule would presume the 
succession of the vice presidential nominee, primary runner-up, or someone 
else but would allow the national committee to prevent automatic succession 
with a two-thirds vote.  This approach would likely retain the main benefits 
of the designated successor rule, particularly the efficiency of the process and 
the minimization of intraparty division, while providing for scenarios where 
the designated successor was unwilling or unable to become the nominee or 
where there was an obviously superior replacement candidate.  The two-
thirds, or supermajority, vote requirement would ensure that there was good 
reason to override succession of the designated candidate. 
However, a safety valve provision could encourage division within the 
party, whose members might collude or campaign for a replacement other 
than the designated replacement.  Such efforts could create actual or 
perceived disunity late in a presidential campaign—a moment when it is 
important for a party to be united behind a nominee. 
 
 629. See id. 
 630. See id. 
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3.  Special Party Committee to Select a Replacement 
Instead of designating a replacement candidate, the parties could provide 
for the creation of a special committee to recommend replacement candidates 
to the party committee.  A “Vacancy Committee” comprising predetermined 
members could convene immediately when a vacancy occurs.  The 
committee could have seven members from different regions of the country.  
They might include party officials, legal advisors, campaign managers, 
communications experts, and specialized consultants in areas of social media 
and technology to aid in proper vetting.631 
The Vacancy Committee would only have the power to submit a report to 
the party recommending between two and four individuals for the 
nomination.  The party committee then would have full discretion in choosing 
the nominee.  This purely advisory role is more appropriate than allowing the 
committee to unilaterally choose the nominee, which would vest an 
enormously consequential decision in a small group and mark a substantial 
change from the current party rules. 
Using a committee to aid the selection of a replacement candidate would 
have two primary benefits.  First, it might help instill public confidence in 
the new nominee.  Although members of the public would not have any direct 
input on the selection, as they do in the primary process, they would at least 
know that a transparent and rational process was followed to arrive at the new 
nominee.  Second, the committee would help narrow the field of potential 
replacements.  Without a way to limit the choices, the party committees’ 
selection processes could become prolonged and unwieldy. 
The committee approach is not without its drawbacks.  First, choosing 
committee members who adequately consider the parties’ interests and 
represent its constituencies would be challenging.  And if the committee did 
not have these characteristics, it would lose some or all of its ability to choose 
an effective nominee in whom the public and party had confidence.  Second, 
allowing the committee to limit the choice of possible nominees would 
inhibit the party’s and public’s participation in the process, which might 
undermine engagement with and support for the replacement nominee’s 
campaign.  Finally, if a vacancy occurred late in a campaign, the Vacancy 
Committee approach could be unreasonably time consuming and place the 
party at a disadvantage at a moment when there is likely little time to spare. 
4.  Recommended Rule:  
Combined Timeline Approach 
The Clinic recommends that the parties take an approach that combines 
aspects of the above options.  The recommended rule would provide for 
 
 631. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., SELECTING A VICE PRESIDENT:  ADVICE FOR 
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 11 (2016), https://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/04/BPC-VP-Selection-Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9NS-G53M]. 
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different replacement procedures for two periods of time following the 
convention. 
If the vacancy occurs between— 
(a)  the convention and September 15, a vacancy committee shall select 
two to four individuals for recommendation to the national committee, 
which will then have full discretion in choosing the replacement 
nominee. 
(b)  September 16 and Election Day, the vice presidential nominee 
shall become the presidential nominee unless two-thirds of the national 
committee vote against this presumption. 
This approach is designed to respond to time and efficiency considerations 
while maximizing the parties’ discretion to the greatest practical extent.  As 
discussed, the short period between the convention and the election places 
significant limitations on the deliberative process available for choosing 
replacement nominees.  But the recommended approach recognizes that there 
is a greater opportunity for a more considered process in the time period 
immediately after the convention. 
In the first period (convention to September 15), there is still sufficient 
time for the Vacancy Committee to carefully deliberate on the party’s best 
replacement options and ultimately to recommend two to four candidates to 
the national committee.  If the Vacancy Committee carried out its work 
effectively, including by avoiding some of the drawbacks outlined above, it 
would help the party arrive at a nominee the public and party could 
confidently support. 
In the second period (September 16 to Election Day), the vice presidential 
candidate would be the presumed successor because there would be less time 
for deliberation.  Additionally, at this point in the campaign the vice 
presidential nominee is more likely to be a viable successor than in the period 
immediately following the convention.  The vice presidential candidate will 
have campaigned for several weeks, gained familiarity with the public, and 
embraced the presidential candidate’s policies. 
However, the national committee would still have the ability to override 
the vice presidential candidate’s succession to the presidential nomination by 
a two-thirds vote.  This high barrier is intended to prevent overrides in all but 
the most extraordinary circumstances, such as where the vice presidential 
candidate has died, is disabled, or is blatantly ill-suited to be the presidential 
nominee.  Barring these conditions, a deliberative process to choose a new 
nominee would likely be detrimentally time consuming and could ignite 
intraparty tensions at a moment when such behavior would do more harm 
than good.  Additionally, the provision for an automatic successor is critical 
because it might be impossible to choose a replacement nominee in the final 
days of a campaign, as was the case with the vacancy caused by James 
Sherman’s death in 1912.632 
 
 632. See supra Part VII.A.1. 
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D.  Removal 
A party may need to replace a presidential candidate in a range of 
circumstances.  In some of those circumstances, the need for replacement is 
unambiguous, such as where a candidate withdraws or dies.  However, other 
circumstances are more ambiguous, such as where a candidate becomes 
disabled or faces a catastrophic scandal.  In these cases, a candidate may be 
unable or unwilling to withdraw from the ticket, putting the onus on a party 
to affirmatively remove the candidate before replacing him or her.  But 
neither party has rules that clearly grant it removal authority.  The Clinic 
recommends that the parties create explicit removal provisions, at least to 
cover situations where candidates become physically disabled. 
1.  Current Rules 
The Democratic Party’s rules explicitly mention the possibility of 
replacement when a presidential candidate is disabled,633 while the 
Republican Party’s rules do not.  But the Republican replacement rule uses 
broader language that likely does encompass disability scenarios.  It states 
that the national committee or a recalled convention may replace a 
presidential candidate in instances of “death, declination, or otherwise.”634  
The “otherwise” contingency appears to be a catchall, likely covering cases 
of disability or anything else that could cause the national committee to deem 
replacement necessary. 
2.  Constitutional Concerns 
Removing a candidate from the national ticket might implicate the First 
Amendment right of political association.635  The First Amendment protects 
individuals’ freedom to join political parties and support their preferred 
candidates636 while protecting political parties’ ability to manage their 
affairs, including determining who can run under their mantles.637  These 
protections may come into conflict if a political party attempted to remove a 
candidate from its line on the general-election ballot. 
A court has never addressed whether a political party can remove a 
presidential nominee from general-election ballots.  But a state party’s ability 
to block a candidate from its primary ballot has been upheld.638  When the 
Georgia Republican Party did not allow David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan 
leader, to run as a Republican in the 1992 presidential primary, Duke and 
 
 633. See Call for the 2016 Democratic National Convention, supra note 613, art. VIII(G). 
 634. RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, supra note 603, r. 9(a) (emphasis added). 
 635. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 636. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (stating that the right of political 
association allows individuals to make political donations and join political parties, which 
“serves to affiliate a person with a candidate . . . [and] it enables like-minded persons to pool 
their resources in furtherance of common political goals”). 
 637. See Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 638. See id. 
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voters who wanted to support him sued both the party committee that made 
the decision and the Georgia Secretary of State who effectuated it.639  Duke 
and his supporters alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.640 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected those claims in Duke v. Massey.641  It held 
that Duke had no “right to associate with an ‘unwilling partner’” and that his 
supporters did not have a “right to associate with [Duke] as a Republican 
Party presidential candidate.”642  “Duke’s supporters were not foreclosed 
from supporting him as an independent candidate or as a third-party 
candidate in the general election.”643  The court analyzed the alleged 
violations with strict scrutiny because, it ruled, barring Duke constituted state 
action.644  Nevertheless, the court held that the government has a “compelling 
interest in protecting political parties’ right to define their membership.”645  
That right, the court stated, flowed from the party’s “freedom of association 
and an attendant right to identify those who constitute the party based on 
political beliefs.”646 
The removal of a presidential nominee would occur under fairly different 
circumstances than those in Duke.  Most significantly, Duke was never on 
the ballot, whereas a candidate subject to removal necessarily will be on the 
general election ballot and would have been on the primary ballot.  Many 
primary voters would have cast their ballots for the candidate.  Those voters 
might argue that a removal violated their rights because, unlike in Duke, they 
would not have an option to adjust their vote.  The prospective Duke voters 
could have written him in, as the court observed, or they could have voted 
for another candidate.  Primary voters in a removal scenario would have no 
similar recourse.  The candidate’s options would also be more limited 
because it would likely be too late to run on another party line.  This could 
provide a basis for the candidate to argue that his or her rights were violated, 
although the candidate could mount a write-in campaign. 
Duke makes clear that a party can control access to its ballot line to ensure 
that candidates who appear on it represent the party’s beliefs.  There are 
circumstances in which a party might seek to remove a candidate for that 
purpose, such as where a scandal raises questions about the candidate’s 
personal values.  However, in the more likely removal scenario, where a 
candidate becomes disabled, the candidate—if conscious and determined to 
stay on the ballot—might challenge his or her removal as discrimination 
against a disabled person and thus a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.647  A court might treat such a claim differently than Duke’s suit 
 
 639. Id. at 1228–30. 
 640. Id. at 1230. 
 641. 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 642. Id. at 1234. 
 643. Id. 
 644. Id. at 1231. 
 645. Id. at 1234. 
 646. Id. 
 647. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985). 
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because the presence of a disabled candidate on the party’s ticket does not 
bear on the party’s policy stances. 
Ultimately, however, parties’ discretion over who appears on their ballots 
would probably cover most removal scenarios.  As Duke shows, the First 
Amendment protections afforded to political parties grant them broad leeway 
to chart their political courses.  And a party’s presidential candidate is critical 
to promoting the party’s positions and advancing its political fortunes.  
Therefore, a party would have a strong argument that it is empowered to 
remove a candidate who severely disadvantaged its electoral prospects or 
undermined its core political convictions.  Furthermore, in the most likely 
removal scenario, where a candidate is severely disabled, there would 
probably never be a legal challenge, as removal would only be necessary 
because the candidate was not capable of withdrawing. 
3.  Crafting Removal Rules 
The political parties should create procedures to remove presidential 
candidates who are medically disabled.  The removal procedure should allow 
a majority of the national committee to effectuate a removal.  The Clinic does 
not recommend explicit removal procedures for any other instances, such as 
scandals.  The narrowness of this proposal reflects concerns about the 
undemocratic nature of candidate removal, possible constitutional 
challenges, and possible misuse of a removal provision. 
In developing a candidate removal proposal, the Clinic looked to the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the reasoning behind its provisions, as the 
Amendment addresses similar issues and its framers had to navigate similar 
concerns. 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment responded to the absence of constitutional 
procedures for declaring the existence of a presidential “inability” to serve.  
Similarly, the political parties do not have explicit procedures for situations 
where presidential candidates become unable to serve.  The parties’ current 
replacement rules might be read to infer the power of the national committees 
to remove candidates, but explicit procedures are preferable.  Removing a 
President or presidential candidate is a profoundly consequential action.  In 
most circumstances, the decision-makers will, appropriately, be hesitant to 
act.  But the lack of clear removal procedures could deter action even when 
it is required.  Indeed, the absence of explicit constitutional procedures to 
declare presidential inabilities created confusion and led to clearly disabled 
Presidents remaining in power.648 
When the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers designed procedures for the 
President’s temporary removal, they grappled with an issue that also exists 
with presidential candidate removal rules:  how far those rules should go in 
defining the situations in which they should be used.  The Twenty-Fifth 
 
 648. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 8–10, 14–16. 
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Amendment’s text simply states that its provisions should be used when the 
President is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”649 
The Amendment’s framers deliberately did not offer more detail because 
they believed that “inability” could manifest itself in different ways and that 
a strict definition could impede removal during an unpredictable crisis.650  Of 
course the framers did envision limitations; Section 4’s involuntary removal 
provision was intended to be narrowly tailored to solving crises involving 
severe medical or psychological ailments.651  But the term might take on a 
fairly expansive meaning in Section 3, the voluntary declaration provision.  
For example, President Nixon might have been able to invoke the 
Amendment to temporarily step aside during the Watergate scandal.652 
The parties should probably reserve their removal rules for disabilities 
similar to those that Section 4 is intended to address.  The broad meaning of 
inability in Section 3 results from the President’s discretion to determine 
whether an inability exists.653  A presidential candidate would not have 
similar discretion.  Additionally, determining the existence of more 
borderline disabilities, such as scandals, might be contentious and require a 
fact-intensive investigation.  Even though Section 4 does not envision liberal 
usage, it still incorporates the possibility of congressional involvement to 
review inability determinations.  There likely is not sufficient time to engage 
in such a process during a campaign.  And if there were time for an 
investigation, it still might not prevent intense and divisive disagreement 
within the party on the issue.  Accordingly, candidate removal procedures 
should be designed only for use in cases of physical or mental incapacity. 
CONCLUSION 
Fifty years after the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the country 
must continue to build on the Amendment’s legacy by taking further steps to 
plan for presidential succession.  The Clinic’s recommendations provide 
ways to address some of the most pressing remaining issues.  It took a tragedy 
to jolt lawmakers into crafting and implementing the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. Today’s policy-makers should not wait for a similar impetus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 649. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3–4. 
 650. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 111; supra Part I.B. 
 651. See Feerick, supra note 175, at 925–26. 
 652. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 161. 
 653. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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APPENDIX A 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE II, SECTION I, CLAUSE 6 
 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, 
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said 
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may 
by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, 
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then 
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability 
be removed, or a President shall be elected.654 
  
 
 654. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
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APPENDIX B 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
 
SECTION 1.  In case of the removal of the President from office or of his 
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President. 
SECTION 2.  Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice 
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office 
upon confirmation by a majority of both Houses of Congress. 
SECTION 3.  Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written 
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, 
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such 
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting 
President.  
SECTION 4.  Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the 
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties 
of the office as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written 
declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of 
his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal 
officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may 
by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office.  Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within 
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session.  If the Congress, within 
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress 
is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to 
assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President 
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the 
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.655 
  
 
 655. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
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APPENDIX C 
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT 
3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012) 
 
§ 19.  Vacancy in offices of both President and Vice President; officers 
eligible to act 
 
(a)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or 
failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge 
the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as 
Representative in Congress, act as President. 
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, resignation, removal 
from office, or inability of an individual acting as President under this 
subsection. 
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a Speaker is to 
begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, there 
is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then the 
President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President 
pro tempore and as Senator, act as President. 
(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection (b) 
of this section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then current 
Presidential term, except that— 
(1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in 
whole or in part on the failure of both the President-elect and the Vice-
President-elect to qualify, then he shall act only until a President or Vice 
President qualifies; and 
(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in 
whole or in part on the inability of the President or Vice President, then he 
shall act only until the removal of the disability of one of such individuals. 
(d)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or 
failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President under 
subsection (b) of this section, then the officer of the United States who is 
highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the 
powers and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary 
of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, 
Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, 
Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of 
Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of 
Homeland Security. 
(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue 
so to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not after 
a qualified and prior-entitled individual is able to act, except that the removal 
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of the disability of an individual higher on the list contained in paragraph (1) 
of this subsection or the ability to qualify on the part of an individual higher 
on such list shall not terminate his service. 
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in 
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation 
from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as 
President. 
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such 
officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. 
Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, 
resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the 
President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the 
House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of 
President devolve upon them. 
(f) During the period that any individual acts as President under this 
section, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the case 
of the President.656 
 
 
 656. 18 U.S.C. § 19 (2012). 
